Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H. Brockhaus
Request for Comments: 9480 D. von Oheimb
Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 Siemens
Category: Standards Track J. Gray
ISSN: 2070-1721 Entrust
November 2023
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates
Abstract
This document contains a set of updates to the syntax of Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP) version 2 and its HTTP transfer mechanism.
This document updates RFCs 4210, 5912, and 6712.
The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData
instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages,
improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message
types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP,
and well-known URI path segments.
CMP version 3 is introduced to enable signaling support of
EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and signal the use of an
explicit hash AlgorithmIdentifier in certConf messages, as far as
needed.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9480.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Convention and Terminology
2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
2.1. New Section 1.1 - Changes Since RFC 4210
2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage
2.3. Update Section 5.1.1 - PKI Message Header
2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3 - CertProfile
2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1 - Shared Secret Information
2.6. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection
2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2 - Encrypted Values
2.8. New Section 5.2.9 - GeneralizedTime
2.9. Update Section 5.3.4 - Certification Response
2.10. Update Section 5.3.18 - Certificate Confirmation Content
2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2 - Signing Key Pair Types
2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3 - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair
Types
2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9 - Revocation Passphrase
2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates
2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update
2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template
2.17. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL Update Retrieval
2.18. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content
2.19. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response
2.20. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation
2.21. Update Section 7.1.1 - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers
2.22. Add Section 8.4 - Private Keys for Certificate Signing and
CMP Message Protection
2.23. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and
Shared Secret Information
2.24. Add Section 8.6 - Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP
Messages
2.25. Add Section 8.7 - Authorizing Requests for Certificates
with Specific EKUs
2.26. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase
2.27. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral
Clarifications
2.28. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of
These Profiles
2.29. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile
2.30. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification
(Basic Authenticated Scheme)
3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)
3.1. Update Section 1 - Introduction
3.2. New Section 1.1 - Changes Since RFC 6712
3.3. Replace Section 3.6 - HTTP Request-URI
4. IANA Considerations
4.1. Updates to the ASN.1 Modules in RFCs 4210 and 5912
4.2. Updates to the IANA Considerations of RFC 4210
4.2.1. SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose Registry
4.2.2. SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information Types
4.2.3. SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration Controls
4.3. Updates to the IANA Considerations of RFC 6712
4.3.1. Well-Known URIs
4.3.2. Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Registry
5. Security Considerations
6. References
6.1. Normative References
6.2. Informative References
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
A.1. Update to RFC 4210 - 1988 ASN.1 Module
A.2. Update to RFC 5912 - 2002 ASN.1 Module
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and Internet of Things
environments and developing the Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483],
some limitations were identified in the original CMP specification.
This document updates [RFC4210] and [RFC6712] to overcome these
limitations.
Among other updates, this document improves the crypto agility of
CMP, which allows more flexibility for future advances in
cryptography.
This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP
endpoints on registration and certification authorities.
The main content of [RFC4210] and [RFC6712] remains unchanged. This
document lists all sections that are updated, replaced, or added to
the current text of the respective RFCs.
The authors acknowledge that the style of the document is hard to
read because the original RFCs must be read along with this document
to get the complete content. The working group decided to use this
approach in order to keep the changes to [RFC4210] and [RFC6712] to
the required minimum. This was meant to speed up the editorial
process and to minimize the effort spent on reviewing the full text
of the original documents.
However, [PKIX-CMP] and [HTTP-CMP] are intended to obsolete RFCs 4210
and 6712, respectively; these documents also include the changes
listed in this document.
1.1. Convention and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Technical terminology is used in conformance with [RFC4210],
[RFC4211], and [RFC5280]. The following key words are used:
CA: Certification authority, which issues certificates.
RA: Registration authority, an optional system component to which
a CA delegates certificate management functions, such as
authorization checks.
KGA: Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf
of an EE. The KGA could be colocated with an RA or a CA.
EE: End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI
certificate. An identifier for the EE is given as its subject
of the certificate.
2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
2.1. New Section 1.1 - Changes Since RFC 4210
The following subsection describes feature updates to [RFC4210].
They are always related to the base specification. Hence, references
to the original sections in [RFC4210] are used whenever possible.
Insert this section after the current Section 1 of [RFC4210]:
1.1. Changes Since RFC 4210
The following updates are made in this document:
* Adding new extended key usages for various CMP server types, e.g.,
registration authority and certification authority, to express the
authorization of the entity identified in the certificate
containing the respective extended key usage extension that acts
as the indicated PKI management entity.
* Extending the description of multiple protection to cover
additional use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages.
* Offering EnvelopedData as the preferred choice next to
EncryptedValue to better support crypto agility in CMP. Note
that, according to [RFC4211], Section 2.1, point 9, the use of the
EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
EnvelopedData structure. [RFC4211] offers the EncryptedKey
structure a choice of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData for
migration to EnvelopedData. For reasons of completeness and
consistency, the type EncryptedValue has been exchanged in all
occurrences in [RFC4210]. This includes the protection of
centrally generated private keys, encryption of certificates, and
protection of revocation passphrases. To properly differentiate
the support of EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, CMP
version 3 is introduced in case a transaction is supposed to use
EnvelopedData.
* Offering an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus that supports
confirmation of certificates signed with signature algorithms,
e.g., preparing for upcoming post quantum algorithms, not directly
indicating a specific hash algorithm to use to compute the
certHash.
* Adding new general message types to request CA certificates, a
root CA update, a certificate request template, or a Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) update.
* Extending the usage of polling to p10cr, certConf, rr, genm, and
error messages.
* Deleting the mandatory algorithm profile in Appendix D.2 of
[RFC4210] and referring to Section 7 of CMP Algorithms [RFC9481].
2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage
The following subsection introduces a new extended key usage for CMP
servers authorized to centrally generate key pairs on behalf of end
entities.
Insert this section after Section 4.4.3 of [RFC4210]:
4.5. Extended Key Usage
The extended key usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for
which the certified key pair may be used. Therefore, it restricts
the use of a certificate to specific applications.
A CA may want to delegate parts of its duties to other PKI management
entities. This section provides a mechanism to both prove this
delegation and enable an automated means for checking the
authorization of this delegation. Such delegation may also be
expressed by other means, e.g., explicit configuration.
To offer automatic validation for the delegation of a role by a CA to
another entity, the certificates used for CMP message protection or
signed data for central key generation MUST be issued by the
delegating CA and MUST contain the respective EKUs. This proves the
authorization of this entity by delegating CA to act in the given
role, as described below.
The OIDs to be used for these EKUs are:
id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 27 }
id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 32 }
Note: Section 2.10 of [RFC6402] specifies OIDs for a Certificate
Management over CMS (CMC) CA and a CMC RA. As the functionality of a
CA and RA is not specific to any certificate management protocol
(such as CMC or CMP), these EKUs are reused by CMP.
The meaning of the id-kp-cmKGA EKU is as follows:
CMP KGA: CMP key generation authorities are CAs or are identified by
the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage. The CMP KGA knows the
private key it generated on behalf of the end entity. This
is a very sensitive service and needs specific
authorization, which by default is with the CA certificate
itself. The CA may delegate its authorization by placing
the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage in the certificate used
to authenticate the origin of the generated private key.
The authorization may also be determined through local
configuration of the end entity.
2.3. Update Section 5.1.1 - PKI Message Header
Section 5.1.1 of [RFC4210] describes the PKI message header. This
document introduces the new version 3, indicating support of
EnvelopedData as specified in Section 2.7 and hashAlg as specified in
Section 2.10.
Replace the ASN.1 syntax of PKIHeader and the subsequent description
of pvno with the following text:
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
cmp2021(3) },
sender GeneralName,
recipient GeneralName,
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL,
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
}
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
The usage of the protocol version number (pvno) is described in
Section 7.
2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3 - CertProfile
Section 5.1.1 of [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it OIDs to be
used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces id-it-
certProfile.
Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.2 of [RFC4210]:
5.1.1.3. CertProfile
This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profiles,
e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request
template; see Section 5.3.19.16.
id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
When used in an ir/cr/kur/genm, the value MUST NOT contain more
elements than the number of CertReqMsg or InfoTypeAndValue elements
and the certificate profile names refer to the elements in the given
order.
When used in a p10cr, the value MUST NOT contain multiple certificate
profile names.
2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1 - Shared Secret Information
Section 5.1.3.1 of [RFC4210] describes the protection of a PKIMessage
based on message authentication code (MAC) using the algorithm id-
PasswordBasedMac.
Replace the first paragraph with the following text:
In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with
sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means or from a
previous PKI management operation). PKIProtection will contain a MAC
value and the protectionAlg MAY be one of the options described in
CMP Algorithms [RFC9481]. The PasswordBasedMac is specified as
follows (see also [RFC4211] and [RFC9045]):
Replace the last paragraph with the following text (Note: This fixes
Errata ID 2616):
Note: It is RECOMMENDED that the fields of PBMParameter remain
constant throughout the messages of a single transaction (e.g.,
ir/ip/certConf/pkiConf) to reduce the overhead associated with
PasswordBasedMac computation.
2.6. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection
Section 5.1.3.4 of [RFC4210] describes the nested message. This
document also enables using nested messages for batch-delivery
transport of PKI messages between PKI management entities and with
mixed body types.
Replace the text of the section with the following text:
5.1.3.4. Multiple Protection
When receiving a protected PKI message, a PKI management entity, such
as an RA, MAY forward that message along with adding its own
protection (which is a MAC or a signature, depending on the
information and certificates shared between the RA and the CA).
Additionally, multiple PKI messages MAY be aggregated. There are
several use cases for such messages.
* The RA confirms having validated and authorized a message and
forwards the original message unchanged.
* The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., adds or modifies
particular field values or adds new extensions) before forwarding
them; then, it MAY create its own desired PKIBody. If the changes
made by the RA to PKIMessage break the POP of a certificate
request, the RA MUST set the popo field to RAVerified. It MAY
include the original PKIMessage from the EE in the generalInfo
field of PKIHeader of a nested message (to accommodate, for
example, cases in which the CA wishes to check POP or other
information on the original EE message). The infoType to be used
in this situation is {id-it 15} (see Section 5.3.19 for the value
of id-it), and the infoValue is PKIMessages (contents MUST be in
the same order as the message in PKIBody).
* A PKI management entity collects several messages that are to be
forwarded in the same direction and forwards them in a batch.
Request messages can be transferred as batch upstream (towards the
CA); response or announce messages can be transferred as batch
downstream (towards an RA but not to the EE). For instance, this
can be used when bridging an off-line connection between two PKI
management entities.
These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages within a new
PKI message. The structure used is as follows:
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2 - Encrypted Values
Section 5.2.2 of [RFC4210] describes the use of EncryptedValue to
transport encrypted data. This document extends the encryption of
data to preferably use EnvelopedData.
Replace the text of the section with the following text:
5.2.2. Encrypted Values
Where encrypted data (in this specification, private keys,
certificates, or revocation passphrase) is sent in PKI messages, the
EncryptedKey data structure is used.
EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData }
See Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] for
EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] for EnvelopedData syntax. Using the
EncryptedKey data structure offers the choice to either use
EncryptedValue (for backward compatibility only) or EnvelopedData.
The use of the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor
of the EnvelopedData structure. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED to use
EnvelopedData.
Note: The EncryptedKey structure defined in CRMF [RFC4211] is reused
here, which makes the update backward compatible. Using the new
syntax with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bits-on-
the-wire compatible with the old syntax.
To indicate support for EnvelopedData, the pvno cmp2021 has been
introduced. Details on the usage of the protocol version number
(pvno) are described in Section 7.
The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to transport a private
key, certificate, or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.
EnvelopedData is used as follows:
* It contains only one RecipientInfo structure because the content
is encrypted only for one recipient.
* It may contain a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage
structure, as defined in [RFC5958], that is wrapped in a
SignedData structure, as specified in Section 5 of CMS [RFC5652]
and [RFC8933], and signed by the Key Generation Authority.
* It may contain a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in
the encryptedContent field.
The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in Section 6
of CMS [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated symmetric
content-encryption key. This content-encryption key MUST be securely
provided to the recipient using one of three key management
techniques.
The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender
depends on the credential available at the recipient:
* recipient's certificate with an algorithm identifier and a public
key that supports key transport and where any given key usage
extension allows keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will
be protected using the key transport key management technique, as
specified in Section 6.2.1 of CMS [RFC5652].
* recipient's certificate with an algorithm identifier and a public
key that supports key agreement and where any given key usage
extension allows keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the key agreement key management technique, as
specified in Section 6.2.2 of CMS [RFC5652].
* a password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the password-based key management technique, as
specified in Section 6.2.4 of CMS [RFC5652].
2.8. New Section 5.2.9 - GeneralizedTime
The following subsection points implementers to [RFC5280] regarding
usage of GeneralizedTime.
Insert this section after Section 5.2.8.4 of [RFC4210]:
5.2.9 GeneralizedTime
GeneralizedTime is a standard ASN.1 type and SHALL be used as
specified in Section 4.1.2.5.2 of [RFC5280].
2.9. Update Section 5.3.4 - Certification Response
Section 5.3.4 of [RFC4210] describes the Certification Response.
This document updates the syntax by using the parent structure
EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue, as described in Section 2.7
above. Additionally, it clarifies the certReqId to be used in
response to a p10cr message.
Replace the ASN.1 syntax with the following text (Note: This also
fixes Errata ID 3949 and 4078):
CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL,
response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
}
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
}
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- See [RFC4211] for comments on encoding.
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
}
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
}
Add the following as a new paragraph right after the ASN.1 syntax:
A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data
structure, as specified in PKCS #10 [RFC2986], but no certReqId.
Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding Certification Response
(cp) message MUST be set to -1.
Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section:
The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.
Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData, the pvno cmp2021 has
been introduced. Details on the usage of different protocol version
numbers (pvno) are described in Section 7.
2.10. Update Section 5.3.18 - Certificate Confirmation Content
This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus
type used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash
algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified
in the signatureAlgorithm field.
Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
certHash OCTET STRING,
certReqId INTEGER,
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL
}
The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the
signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not
specify a hash algorithm in the OID or in the parameters. In such
cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash
algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value. Otherwise,
the certHash value SHALL be computed using the same hash algorithm as
used to create and verify the certificate signature. If hashAlg is
used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message header must
be cmp2021(3).
2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2 - Signing Key Pair Types
The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair
Types on referencing elliptic curves.
Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2 of [RFC4210]:
Note: In case several elliptic curves are supported, several id-
ecPublicKey elements as defined in [RFC5480] need to be given, one
per named curve.
2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3 - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types
The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key
Agreement Key Pair Types on referencing elliptic curves.
Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3 of [RFC4210]:
Note: In case several elliptic curves are supported, several id-
ecPublicKey elements as defined in [RFC5480] need to be given, one
per named curve.
2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9 - Revocation Passphrase
Section 5.3.19.9 of [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of a
revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation request.
This document updates the handling by using the parent structure
EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this information,
as described in Section 2.7 above.
Replace the text of the section with the following text:
5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase
This MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the
purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case
that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to
authenticate the request). See Appendix B for further details on the
use of this mechanism.
GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey
GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent >
The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.
2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates
The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
caCerts. The intended use is specified in Section 4.3 of the
Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483].
Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13 of [RFC4210]:
5.3.19.14. CA Certificates
This MAY be used by the client to get CA certificates.
GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate | < absent >
2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update
The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
rootCaCert and id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in
Section 4.3 of the Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483].
Insert this section after the new Section 5.3.19.14:
5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update
This MAY be used by the client to get an update of a root CA
certificate, which is provided in the body of the request message.
In contrast to the ckuann message, this approach follows the request/
response model.
The EE SHOULD reference its current trust anchor in a TrustAnchor
structure in the request body, giving the root CA certificate if
available; otherwise, the public key value of the trust anchor is
given.
GenMsg: {id-it 20}, RootCaCertValue | < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent >
RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate,
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
}
Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting
newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the
needs of the EE.
2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template
The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-
it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in Section 4.3 of the
Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483].
Insert this section after the new Section 5.3.19.15:
5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template
This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing
requirements for certificate request attributes and extensions. The
controls id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen MAY contain
details on the types of subject public keys the CA is willing to
certify.
The id-regCtrl-algId control MAY be used to identify a cryptographic
algorithm (see Section 4.1.2.7 of [RFC5280]) other than
rsaEncryption. The algorithm field SHALL identify a cryptographic
algorithm. The contents of the optional parameters field will vary
according to the algorithm identified. For example, when the
algorithm is set to id-ecPublicKey, the parameters identify the
elliptic curve to be used; see [RFC5480].
The id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen control SHALL be used for algorithm
rsaEncryption and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of
the RSA key.
GenMsg: {id-it 19}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent >
CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
certTemplate CertTemplate,
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL }
Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be
used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the
certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity
wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field
MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or
RSA key length MUST be used.
Note: The controls ASN.1 type is defined in Section 6 of CRMF
[RFC4211].
2.17. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL Update Retrieval
The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-
it-crlStatusList and id-it-crls. Details are specified in
Section 4.3 of the Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483]. Insert this
section after the new Section 5.3.19.16:
5.3.19.17. CRL Update Retrieval
This MAY be used by the client to get new CRLs, specifying the source
of the CRLs and the thisUpdate value of the latest CRL it already
has, if available. A CRL source is given either by a
DistributionPointName or the GeneralNames of the issuing CA. The
DistributionPointName should be treated as an internal pointer to
identify a CRL that the server already has and not as a way to ask
the server to fetch CRLs from external locations. The server shall
only provide those CRLs that are more recent than the ones indicated
by the client.
GenMsg: {id-it 22}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CRLStatus
GenRep: {id-it 23}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertificateList | < absent >
CRLSource ::= CHOICE {
dpn [0] DistributionPointName,
issuer [1] GeneralNames }
CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
source CRLSource,
thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL }
2.18. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content
Section 5.3.21 of [RFC4210] describes the regular use of error
messages. This document adds a use by a PKI management entity to
initiate delayed delivery in response to certConf, rr, and genm
requests and to error messages.
Replace the first sentence of the first paragraph with the following
one:
This data structure MAY be used by an EE, CA, or RA to convey error
information and by a PKI management entity to initiate delayed
delivery of responses.
Replace the second paragraph with the following text:
This message MAY be generated at any time during a PKI transaction.
If the client sends this request, the server MUST respond with a
PKIConfirm response or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header is
not valid. In case a PKI management entity sends an error message to
the EE with the pKIStatusInfo field containing the status "waiting",
the EE will initiate polling as described in Section 5.3.22.
Otherwise, both sides MUST treat this message as the end of the
transaction (if a transaction is in progress).
2.19. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response
Section 5.3.22 of [RFC4210] describes when and how polling messages
are used for ir, cr, and kur messages. This document extends the
polling mechanism for outstanding responses to any kind of request
message. This update also fixes the inconsistent use of the terms
'pReq' vs. 'pollReq' and 'pRep' vs. 'pollRep'.
Replace Section 5.3.22 of [RFC4210] with following text:
This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the
client needs to poll the server to determine the status of an
outstanding response (i.e., when the "waiting" PKIStatus has been
received).
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER }
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }
In response to an ir, cr, p10cr, or kur request message, polling is
initiated with an ip, cp, or kup response message containing status
"waiting". For any type of request message, polling can be initiated
with an error response messages with status "waiting". The following
clauses describe how polling messages are used. It is assumed that
multiple certConf messages can be sent during transactions. There
will be one sent in response to each ip, cp, or kup that contains a
CertStatus for an issued certificate.
1 In response to an ip, cp, or kup message, an EE will send a
certConf for all issued certificates and expect a PKIconf for each
certConf. An EE will send a pollReq message in response to each
CertResponse element of an ip, cp, or kup message with status
"waiting" and in response to an error message with status
"waiting". Its certReqId MUST be either the index of a
CertResponse data structure with status "waiting" or -1, referring
to the complete response.
2 In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if
one or more of the still pending requested certificates are ready
or the final response to some other type of request is available;
otherwise, it will return a pollRep.
3 If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least the number
of seconds given in the checkAfter field before sending another
pollReq.
4 If the EE receives an ip, cp, or kup, then it will be treated in
the same way as the initial response; if it receives any other
response, then this will be treated as the final response to the
original request.
The following client-side state machine describes polling for
individual CertResponse elements.
START
|
v
Send ir
| ip
v
Check status
of returned <------------------------+
certs |
| |
+------------------------>|<------------------+ |
| | | |
| (issued) v (waiting) | |
Add to <----------- Check CertResponse ------> Add to |
conf list for each certificate pending list |
/ |
/ |
(conf list) / (empty conf list) |
/ ip |
/ +-----------------+
(empty pending list) / | pollRep
END <---- Send certConf Send pollReq---------->Wait
| ^ ^ |
| | | |
+-----------------+ +---------------+
(pending list)
In the following exchange, the end entity is enrolling for two
certificates in one request.
Step End Entity PKI
--------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Format ir
2 -> ir ->
3 Handle ir
4 Manual intervention is
required for both certs
5 <- ip <-
6 Process ip
7 Format pollReq
8 -> pollReq ->
9 Check status of cert requests
10 Certificates not ready
11 Format pollRep
12 <- pollRep <-
13 Wait
14 Format pollReq
15 -> pollReq ->
16 Check status of cert requests
17 One certificate is ready
18 Format ip
19 <- ip <-
20 Handle ip
21 Format certConf
22 -> certConf ->
23 Handle certConf
24 Format ack
25 <- pkiConf <-
26 Format pollReq
27 -> pollReq ->
28 Check status of certificate
29 Certificate is ready
30 Format ip
31 <- ip <-
31 Handle ip
32 Format certConf
33 -> certConf ->
34 Handle certConf
35 Format ack
36 <- pkiConf <-
The following client-side state machine describes polling for a
complete response message.
Start
|
| Send request
|
+----------- Receive response ------------+
| |
| ip/cp/kup/error with | other
| status "waiting" | response
| |
v |
+------> Polling |
| | |
| | Send pollReq |
| | Receive response |
| | |
| pollRep | other response |
+-----------+------------------->+<-------------------+
|
v
Handle response
|
v
End
In the following exchange, the end entity is sending a general
message request, and the response is delayed by the server.
Step End Entity PKI
--------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Format genm
2 -> genm ->
3 Handle genm
4 delay in response is necessary
5 Format error message "waiting"
with certReqId set to -1
6 <- error <-
7 Process error
8 Format pollReq
9 -> pollReq ->
10 Check status of original request
general message response not ready
11 Format pollRep
12 <- pollRep <-
13 Wait
14 Format pollReq
15 -> pollReq ->
16 Check status of original request
general message response is ready
17 Format genp
18 <- genp <-
19 Handle genp
2.20. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation
Section 7 of [RFC4210] describes the use of CMP versions. This
document describes the handling of the additional CMP version
cmp2021, which is introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData and
hashAlg.
Replace the text of the second paragraph with the following text:
If a client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the server
(e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-of-band
means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest version
supported by both it and the server. If a client does not know what
version(s) the server supports, then it MUST send a PKIMessage using
the highest version it supports with the following exception.
Version cmp2021 SHOULD only be used if cmp2021 syntax is needed for
the request being sent or for the expected response.
Note: Using cmp2000 as the default pvno is done to avoid extra
message exchanges for version negotiation and to foster compatibility
with cmp2000 implementations. Version cmp2021 syntax is only needed
if a message exchange uses hashAlg (in CertStatus) or EnvelopedData.
2.21. Update Section 7.1.1 - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers
Section 7.1.1 of [RFC4210] describes the behavior of a client sending
a cmp2000 message talking to a cmp1999 server, as specified in
[RFC2510]. This document extends the section to clients with any
higher version than cmp1999.
Replace the first sentence of Section 7.1.1 of [RFC4210] with the
following text:
If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher
than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of
cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction.
2.22. Add Section 8.4 - Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP
Message Protection
The following subsection addresses the risk arising from reusing the
CA private key for CMP message protection.
Insert this section after Section 8.3 of [RFC4210] (Note: This fixes
Errata ID 5731):
8.4. Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Message Protection
A CA should not reuse its certificate signing key for other purposes,
such as protecting CMP responses and TLS connections. This way,
exposure to other parts of the system and the number of uses of this
particularly critical key are reduced to a minimum.
2.23. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and
Shared Secret Information
The following subsection addresses the risk arising from low entropy
of random numbers, asymmetric keys, and shared secret information.
Insert this section after the new Section 8.4:
8.5. Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and Shared Secret
Information
Implementations must generate nonces and private keys from random
input. The use of inadequate pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs)
to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security.
An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment
that produced the keys and to search the resulting small set of
possibilities than brute-force searching the whole key space. As an
example of predictable random numbers, see [CVE-2008-0166];
consequences of low-entropy random numbers are discussed in Mining
Your Ps and Qs [MiningPsQs]. The generation of quality random
numbers is difficult. ISO/IEC 20543:2019 [ISO.20543-2019], NIST SP
800-90A Rev.1 [NIST_SP_800_90Ar1], BSI AIS 31 V2.0 [AIS31], and other
specifications offer valuable guidance in this area.
If shared secret information is generated by a cryptographically
secure random number generator (CSRNG), it is safe to assume that the
entropy of the shared secret information equals its bit length. If
no CSRNG is used, the entropy of shared secret information depends on
the details of the generation process and cannot be measured securely
after it has been generated. If user-generated passwords are used as
shared secret information, their entropy cannot be measured and are
typically insufficient for protected delivery of centrally generated
keys or trust anchors.
If the entropy of shared secret information protecting the delivery
of a centrally generated key pair is known, it should not be less
than the security strength of that key pair; if the shared secret
information is reused for different key pairs, the security of the
shared secret information should exceed the security strength of each
individual key pair.
For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new trust
anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs or genm that is (a)
not concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret
information is reused for several key management operations, the
entropy of the shared secret information, if known, should not be
less than the security strength of the trust anchor being managed by
the operation. The shared secret information should have an entropy
that at least matches the security strength of the key material being
managed by the operation. Certain use cases may require shared
secret information that may be of a low security strength, e.g., a
human-generated password. It is RECOMMENDED that such secret
information be limited to a single PKI management operation.
2.24. Add Section 8.6 - Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages
The following subsection addresses the risk arising from in-band
provisioning of new trust anchors in a PKI management operation.
Insert this section after the new Section 8.5:
8.6. Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages
A provider of trust anchors, which may be an RA involved in
configuration management of its clients, MUST NOT include to-be-
trusted CA certificates in a CMP message unless the specific
deployment scenario can ensure that it is adequate that the receiving
EE trusts these certificates, e.g., by loading them into its trust
store.
Whenever an EE receives in a CMP message a CA certificate to be used
as a trust anchor (for example in the caPubs field of a certificate
response or in a general response), it MUST properly authenticate the
message sender with existing trust anchor information without
requiring the new trust anchors included in the message.
Additionally, the EE MUST verify that the sender is an authorized
source of trust anchors. This authorization is governed by local
policy and typically indicated using shared secret information or
with a signature-based message protection using a certificate issued
by a PKI that is explicitly authorized for this purpose.
2.25. Add Section 8.7 - Authorizing Requests for Certificates with
Specific EKUs
The following subsection addresses the security considerations to
follow when authorizing requests for certificates containing specific
EKUs.
Insert this section after new Section 8.6:
8.7. Authorizing Requests for Certificates with Specific EKUs
When a CA issues a certificate containing extended key usage
extensions as defined in Section 4.5, this expresses delegation of an
authorization that originally is only with the CA certificate itself.
Such delegation is a very sensitive action in a PKI and therefore
special care must be taken when approving such certificate requests
to ensure that only legitimate entities receive a certificate
containing such an EKU.
2.26. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase
Appendix B of [RFC4210] describes the use of the revocation
passphrase. As this document updates [RFC4210] to utilize the parent
structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in
Section 2.7 above, the description is updated accordingly.
Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following
text:
* The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a
GenMsg message at any time or MAY be sent in the generalInfo field
of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time. (In particular,
the EncryptedKey structure as described in Section 5.2.2 may be
sent in the header of the certConf message that confirms
acceptance of certificates requested in an initialization request
or certificate request message.) This conveys a revocation
passphrase chosen by the entity to the relevant CA/RA. When
EnvelopedData is used, this is in the decrypted bytes of the
encryptedContent field. When EncryptedValue is used, this is in
the decrypted bytes of the encValue field. Furthermore, the
transfer is accomplished with appropriate confidentiality
characteristics.
Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following
text:
* Either the localKeyId attribute of EnvelopedData as specified in
[RFC2985] or the valueHint field of EncryptedValue MAY contain a
key identifier (chosen by the entity, along with the passphrase
itself) to assist in later retrieval of the correct passphrase
(e.g., when the revocation request is constructed by the entity
and received by the CA/RA).
2.27. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
Appendix C of [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the request
message behavior. As this document updates [RFC4210] to utilize the
parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described
in Section 2.7 above, the description is updated accordingly.
Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the
definition of POPOSigningKey with the following text (Note: This
fixes Errata ID 2615):
-- **********
-- * For the purposes of this specification, the ASN.1 comment
-- * given in [RFC4211] pertains not only to certTemplate but
-- * also to the altCertTemplate control.
-- **********
-- * The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the
-- * DER-encoded value of poposkInput (i.e., the "value" OCTETs
-- * of the POPOSigningKeyInput DER). NOTE: If CertReqMsg
-- * certReq certTemplate (or the altCertTemplate control)
-- * contains the subject and publicKey values, then poposkInput
-- * MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be computed on the
-- * DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq (or the DER-
-- * encoded value of AltCertTemplate). If
-- * certTemplate/altCertTemplate does not contain both the
-- * subject and public key values (i.e., if it contains only
-- * one of these or neither), then poposkInput MUST be present
-- * and MUST be signed.
-- **********
Replace the ASN.1 syntax of POPOPrivKey with the following text:
POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE {
thisMessage [0] BIT STRING, -- deprecated
subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage,
dhMAC [2] BIT STRING, -- deprecated
agreeMAC [3] PKMACValue,
encryptedKey [4] EnvelopedData }
-- **********
-- * When using CMP V2, the encrypted value MUST be transferred in
-- * the thisMessage field that is given as BIT STRING in [RFC4211],
-- * but it requires EncryptedValue. Therefore, this document makes
-- * the behavioral clarification for CMP V2 of specifying that the
-- * contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded as an
-- * EncryptedValue and then wrapped in a BIT STRING.
-- * When using CMP V3, the encrypted value MUST be transferred
-- * in the encryptedKey field, as specified in Section 5.2.2.
-- **********
2.28. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These
Profiles
Appendix D.1 of [RFC4210] provides general rules for interpretation
of the PKI management messages profiles specified in Appendices D and
E of [RFC4210]. This document updates a sentence regarding the new
protocol version cmp2021.
Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with
the following text:
Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value
(e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000).
2.29. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile
Appendix D.2 of [RFC4210] provides a list of algorithms that
implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKI
management message profiles, as specified in Appendix D.2 of CMP
[RFC4210]. This document redirects to the new algorithm profile, as
specified in Section 7.1 of CMP Algorithms [RFC9481].
Replace the text of the section with the following text:
D.2. Algorithm Use Profile
For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective
conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to
Section 7.1 of CMP Algorithms [RFC9481].
2.30. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic
Authenticated Scheme)
Appendix D.4 of [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/
certification scheme. This scheme shall continue using
EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.
Replace the line specifying protectionAlg of the Initialization
Response message with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID
5201):
protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG
Replace the comment after the privateKey field of
crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response
message with the following text:
-- see Appendix C (Request Message Behavioral Clarifications)
-- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue
3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP)
3.1. Update Section 1 - Introduction
To indicate and explain why delayed delivery of all kinds of
PKIMessages may be handled at transfer level and/or at CMP level, the
introduction of [RFC6712] is updated.
Replace the third paragraph of this section with the following text:
In addition to reliable transport, CMP requires connection and error
handling from the transfer protocol, which is all covered by HTTP.
Additionally, delayed delivery of CMP response messages may be
handled at transfer level, regardless of the message contents. Since
this document extends the polling mechanism specified in the second
version of CMP [RFC4210] to cover all types of PKI management
transactions, delays detected at application level may also be
handled within CMP, using pollReq and pollRep messages.
3.2. New Section 1.1 - Changes Since RFC 6712
The following subsection describes feature updates to [RFC6712].
They are related to the base specification. Hence, references to the
original sections in [RFC6712] are used whenever possible.
Insert this section after the current Section 1 of [RFC6712]:
1.1 Changes Since RFC 6712
The following updates are made in this document:
* Introduce the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp'.
* Extend the URI structure.
3.3. Replace Section 3.6 - HTTP Request-URI
Section 3.6 of [RFC6712] specifies the used HTTP URIs. This document
introduces the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp' and extends the URIs.
Replace the text of the section with the following text:
3.6. HTTP Request-URI
Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS
transfer MUST support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' as
defined in [RFC8615] and the registered name 'cmp' to ease
interworking in a multi-vendor environment.
The CMP client needs to be configured with sufficient information to
form the CMP server URI. This is at least the authority portion of
the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operation path
segment of the PKI management entity. Additionally, OPTIONAL path
segments MAY be added after the registered application name as part
of the full operation path to provide further distinction. The path
segment 'p' followed by an arbitraryLabel <name> could, for example,
support the differentiation of specific CAs or certificate profiles.
Further path segments, e.g., as specified in the Lightweight CMP
Profile [RFC9483], could indicate PKI management operations using an
operationLabel <operation>. A valid, full CMP URI can look like
this:
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/<operation>
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p/<name>
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p/<name>/<operation>
4. IANA Considerations
4.1. Updates to the ASN.1 Modules in RFCs 4210 and 5912
This document updates the ASN.1 modules of Appendix F of [RFC4210]
and Section 9 of [RFC5912] as shown in Appendixes A.1 and A.2 of this
document, respectively. The OIDs 99 (id-mod-cmp2021-88) and 100 (id-
mod-cmp2021-02) have been registered in the "SMI Security for PKIX
Module Identifier" registry to identify the updated ASN.1 modules.
4.2. Updates to the IANA Considerations of RFC 4210
This document updates the IANA Consideration sections of [RFC4210] by
adding this content.
4.2.1. SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose Registry
IANA has registered the following new entry in the "SMI Security for
PKIX Extended Key Purpose" registry (see
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers>, as defined in
[RFC7299]:
+=========+=============+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=============+============+
| 32 | id-kp-cmKGA | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-------------+------------+
Table 1: Addition to the SMI
Security for PKIX Extended Key
Purpose
4.2.2. SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information Types
IANA has registered the following new entries in the "SMI Security
for PKIX CMP Information Types" registry (see
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers>), as defined in
[RFC7299]:
+=========+=======================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=======================+============+
| 17 | id-it-caCerts | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 18 | id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 19 | id-it-certReqTemplate | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 20 | id-it-rootCaCert | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 21 | id-it-certProfile | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 22 | id-it-crlStatusList | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 23 | id-it-crls | RFC 9480 |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+
Table 2: Additions to the PKIX CMP
Information Types Registry
4.2.3. SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration Controls
IANA has registered the following new entries in the "SMI Security
for PKIX CRMF Registration Controls" registry (see
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers>), as defined in
[RFC7299]:
+=========+======================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+======================+============+
| 11 | id-regCtrl-algId | RFC 9480 |
+---------+----------------------+------------+
| 12 | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | RFC 9480 |
+---------+----------------------+------------+
Table 3: Addition to the PKIX CRMF
Registration Controls Registry
4.3. Updates to the IANA Considerations of RFC 6712
This document contains an update to the IANA Considerations sections
of [RFC6712] by adding this content.
4.3.1. Well-Known URIs
IANA has registered the following new entry in the "Well-Known URIs"
registry (see <https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris>), as
defined in [RFC8615]:
URI Suffix: cmp
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [RFC9480] [RFC9482]
Status: permanent
Related Information: CMP has a registry at
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp>
4.3.2. Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Registry
This document defines a new protocol registry group entitled
"Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)" (at
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp>) with a new "CMP Well-Known
URI Path Segments" registry containing three columns: Path Segment,
Description, and Reference. New items can be added using the
Specification Required [RFC8615] process. The initial entry of this
registry is:
Path Segment: p
Description: Indicates that the next path segment specifies, e.g., a
CA or certificate profile name
Reference: [RFC9480] [RFC9482]
5. Security Considerations
The security considerations of [RFC4210] are extended in Section 2.22
to Section 2.24. No security considerations updates of [RFC6712]
were required.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols",
RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>.
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
[RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.
[RFC6712] Kause, T. and M. Peylo, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 6712,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6712, September 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6712>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>.
[RFC8933] Housley, R., "Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection", RFC 8933,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8933>.
[RFC9045] Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9045>.
[RFC9481] Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
"Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms",
RFC 9481, DOI 10.17487/RFC9481, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9481>.
[RFC9482] Sahni, M., Ed. and S. Tripathi, Ed., "Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP) Transfer for the Certificate
Management Protocol", RFC 9482, DOI 10.17487/RFC9482,
November 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9482>.
6.2. Informative References
[AIS31] Killmann, W. and W. Schindler, "A proposal for:
Functionality classes for random number generators -
Version 2.0", September 2011,
<https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/
Zertifizierung/Interpretationen/AIS_31_Functionality_class
es_for_random_number_generators_e.pdf>.
[CVE-2008-0166]
National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST),
"National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2008-0166", May
2008, <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0166>.
[HTTP-CMP] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer
for the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis-03,
10 February 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis-03>.
[ISO.20543-2019]
International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
"Information technology -- Security techniques -- Test and
analysis methods for random bit generators within ISO/IEC
19790 and ISO/IEC 15408", ISO/IEC 20543:2019, October
2019.
[MiningPsQs]
Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., and J. A.
Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread
Weak Keys in Network Devices", Security'12: Proceedings of
the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium, August
2012, <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/
technical-sessions/presentation/heninger>.
[NIST_SP_800_90Ar1]
Barker, E. B., Kelsey, J. M., and NIST, "Recommendation
for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random
Bit Generators", NIST Special Publications
(General) 800-90Ar1, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1, June
2015,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.
[PKIX-CMP] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis-07, 19 June 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
rfc4210bis-07>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2202] Cheng, P. and R. Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-
SHA-1", RFC 2202, DOI 10.17487/RFC2202, September 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2202>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.
[RFC9483] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., and S. Fries, "Lightweight
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", RFC 9483,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9483, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9483>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
A.1. Update to RFC 4210 - 1988 ASN.1 Module
This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for [RFC4210]. This
module replaces the module in Appendix F of that document. Although
a 2002 ASN.1 module is provided, this 1988 ASN.1 module remains the
normative module, as per the policy of the PKIX Working Group.
PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-88(99)}
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, Name, Time,
AlgorithmIdentifier, id-kp
--, UTF8String -- -- if required; otherwise, comment out
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)}
-- The import of Name is added to define CertificationRequest
-- instead of importing it from PKCS #10 [RFC2986].
DistributionPointName, GeneralNames, GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)}
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
CertReqMessages, Controls, AttributeTypeAndValue, id-regCtrl
FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}
-- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
-- in CMP Updates [RFC9480]. EncryptedValue does not need to
-- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.
-- Also, see the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
-- Appendix C of this specification.
EnvelopedData, SignedData, Attribute
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
-- the updates made in CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- The import of Attribute is added to define
-- CertificationRequest instead of importing it from
-- PKCS #10 [RFC2986].
;
-- The rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and
-- constructs:
CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE {
x509v3PKCert Certificate
}
-- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
-- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
-- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
-- attribute certificates, card-verifiable
-- certificates, or other kinds of certificates) within this
-- Certificate Management Protocol, should a need ever arise to
-- support such generality. Those implementations that do not
-- foresee a need to ever support other certificate types MAY, if
-- they wish, comment out the above structure and "uncomment" the
-- following one prior to compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that
-- interoperability with implementations that don't do this will be
-- unaffected by this change.)
-- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate
PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody,
protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL
}
PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
cmp2021(3) },
sender GeneralName,
-- identifies the sender
recipient GeneralName,
-- identifies the intended recipient
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
-- time of production of this message (used when the sender
-- believes that the transport will be "suitable", i.e.,
-- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- algorithm used for the calculation of protection bits
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- to identify specific keys used for protection
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- identifies the transaction, i.e., this will be the same in
-- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
-- messages
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
-- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
-- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
-- the intended recipient of this message.
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
-- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
-- (this field is intended for human consumption)
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
-- this may be used to convey context-specific information
-- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
}
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- text encoded as a UTF-8 string [RFC3629]
PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements
ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request
ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response
cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request
cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response
p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [RFC2986]
popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response
kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request
kup [8] CertRepMessage, --Key Update Response
krr [9] CertReqMessages, --Key Recovery Request
krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, --Key Recovery Response
rr [11] RevReqContent, --Revocation Request
rp [12] RevRepContent, --Revocation Response
ccr [13] CertReqMessages, --Cross-Cert. Request
ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response
ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann.
cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann.
rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann.
crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement
pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation
nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message
genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message
genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response
error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message
certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate Confirm
pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling Request
pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling Response
}
PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING
ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody
}
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING,
-- Note: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks.
owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function (OWF)
iterationCount INTEGER,
-- number of times the OWF is applied
-- Note: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks.
mac AlgorithmIdentifier
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481],
} -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30}
DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function
mac AlgorithmIdentifier
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481],
} -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
accepted (0),
-- you got exactly what you asked for
grantedWithMods (1),
-- you got something like what you asked for; the
-- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
rejection (2),
-- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
waiting (3),
-- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
-- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
-- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
-- in Section 5.3.22 of [RFC4210]; alternatively, polling in the
-- underlying transport layer MAY have some utility in this
-- regard)
revocationWarning (4),
-- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
-- imminent
revocationNotification (5),
-- notification that a revocation has occurred
keyUpdateWarning (6)
-- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
-- CertReqMsg
}
PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
-- since we can fail in more than one way!
-- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
badAlg (0),
-- unrecognized or unsupported algorithm identifier
badMessageCheck (1),
-- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
badRequest (2),
-- transaction not permitted or supported
badTime (3),
-- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
-- as defined by local policy
badCertId (4),
-- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
badDataFormat (5),
-- the data submitted has the wrong format
wrongAuthority (6),
-- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
-- one creating the response token
incorrectData (7),
-- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
missingTimeStamp (8),
-- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
-- (by policy)
badPOP (9),
-- the proof-of-possession failed
certRevoked (10),
-- the certificate has already been revoked
certConfirmed (11),
-- the certificate has already been confirmed
wrongIntegrity (12),
-- not valid integrity, based on the password instead of the
-- signature or vice versa
badRecipientNonce (13),
-- not valid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
timeNotAvailable (14),
-- the time source of the Time Stamping Authority (TSA) is
-- not available
unacceptedPolicy (15),
-- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA
unacceptedExtension (16),
-- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA
addInfoNotAvailable (17),
-- the additional information requested could not be
-- understood or is not available
badSenderNonce (18),
-- not valid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
badCertTemplate (19),
-- not valid cert. template or missing mandatory information
signerNotTrusted (20),
-- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
transactionIdInUse (21),
-- the transaction identifier is already in use
unsupportedVersion (22),
-- the version of the message is not supported
notAuthorized (23),
-- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
-- request or perform the preceding action
systemUnavail (24),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
systemFailure (25),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
duplicateCertReq (26)
-- the certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
-- certificate already exists
}
PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL
}
OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate
OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL,
hashVal BIT STRING
-- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
-- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
}
POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
-- one Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages)
Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
-- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
-- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
-- Challenge is to be used)
witness OCTET STRING,
-- the result of applying the One-Way Function (owf) to a
-- randomly generated INTEGER, A (Note that a different
-- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.)
challenge OCTET STRING
-- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
-- request is being made) of Rand
}
-- Rand was added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
-- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge
-- in POPODecKeyChallContent
int INTEGER,
-- the randomly generated INTEGER A (above)
sender GeneralName
-- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
}
POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
-- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The
-- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
-- corresponding Challenge.
CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL,
response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
}
CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
certificationRequestInfo SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER,
subject Name,
subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING },
attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute },
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING
}
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value
-- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
-- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr)
status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
}
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- See [RFC4211] for comments on encoding.
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change.
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
}
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change.
}
KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatusInfo,
newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL
}
RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
certDetails CertTemplate,
-- allows the requester to specify as much as they can about
-- the cert. for which revocation is requested
-- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
crlEntryDetails Extensions OPTIONAL
-- requested crlEntryExtensions
}
RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
-- in the same order as was sent in RevReqContent
revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId
OPTIONAL,
-- IDs for which revocation was requested
-- (same order as status)
crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList
OPTIONAL
-- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
}
CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
newWithNew CMPCertificate -- new pub signed with new priv
}
CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate
RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
certId CertId,
willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime,
badSinceDate GeneralizedTime,
crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL
-- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
}
CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
certHash OCTET STRING,
-- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
-- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL
-- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
-- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
}
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
-- CertReqTemplateContent, id-regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, and
-- id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen were added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
certTemplate CertTemplate,
-- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
-- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
-- be used.
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL
-- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms
-- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
-- as specified in CRMF [RFC4211]
}
id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 }
AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue
-- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3
-- public key certificate
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
-- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths
-- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in
-- CMP Updates [RFC9480]
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate,
-- new root CA certificate
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
-- signed with the old private root CA key
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
-- signed with the new private root CA key
}
CRLSource ::= CHOICE {
dpn [0] DistributionPointName,
issuer [1] GeneralNames }
CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
source CRLSource,
thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL }
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL
}
-- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
-- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as
-- appropriate for a given environment):
--
-- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
-- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
-- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
-- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
-- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
-- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
-- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
-- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList
-- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
-- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
-- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
-- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
-- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey
-- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
-- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
-- - made in CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- - syntax without this change.
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
-- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
-- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
-- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
-- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- UTF8String
-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 22}
-- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CRLStatus
-- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 23}
-- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CertificateList
-- - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
--
-- where
--
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
--
--
-- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
-- Management Protocol request and response messages or general-
-- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
-- specific environments.
GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
-- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
-- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
-- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OIDs that it
-- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
-- indicates that the CA may send
-- any/all information that it wishes.
GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- The receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
-- recognize.
ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-- implementation-specific error codes
errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
-- implementation-specific error details
}
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER
}
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
}
--
-- Extended key usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
-- operations, added due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC, as defined in
-- [RFC6402]
--
-- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
-- There is no 1988 ASN.1 module of PKCS #9 available to import the
-- syntax of the localKeyId attribute type and value from. Therefore,
-- the syntax is added here as needed for the updates made in
-- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9}
pkcs-9-at-localKeyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 21}
LocalKeyIdValue ::= OCTET STRING
END -- of CMP module
A.2. Update to RFC 5912 - 2002 ASN.1 Module
This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for [RFC5912].
This module replaces the module in Section 9 of [RFC5912]. The
module contains those changes to the normative ASN.1 module from
Appendix F of [RFC4210] that were to update to the 2002 ASN.1
standard done in [RFC5912], as well as changes made in this document.
PKIXCMP-2021
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-cmp2021-02(100) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
AttributeSet{}, SingleAttribute{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}
Certificate, CertificateList, Time, id-kp
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}
DistributionPointName, GeneralNames, GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
CertReqMessages, Controls, RegControlSet, id-regCtrl
FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) }
-- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
-- in CMP Updates [RFC9480]. EncryptedValue does not need to
-- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.
-- See also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
-- Appendix C of this specification.
CertificationRequest
FROM PKCS-10
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69)}
-- (specified in [RFC2986] with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
-- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include
-- the syntax of [RFC2986] in this module.
localKeyId
FROM PKCS-9
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
modules(0) pkcs-9(1)}
-- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in
-- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
EnvelopedData, SignedData
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)}
-- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
-- the updates made in CMP Updates [RFC9480].
;
-- The rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and
-- constructs:
CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... }
-- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
-- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
-- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
-- attribute certificates, card-verifiable
-- certificates, or other kinds of certificates) within this
-- Certificate Management Protocol, should a need ever arise to
-- support such generality. Those implementations that do not
-- foresee a need to ever support other certificate types MAY, if
-- they wish, comment out the above structure and "uncomment" the
-- following one prior to compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that
-- interoperability with implementations that don't do this will be
-- unaffected by this change.)
-- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate
PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody,
protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL }
PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
cmp2012(3) },
sender GeneralName,
-- identifies the sender
recipient GeneralName,
-- identifies the intended recipient
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
-- time of production of this message (used when the sender
-- believes that the transport will be "suitable", i.e.,
-- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL,
-- algorithm used for the calculation of protection bits
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- to identify specific keys used for protection
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- identifies the transaction, i.e., this will be the same in
-- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
-- messages
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
-- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
-- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
-- the intended recipient of this message.
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
-- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
-- (this field is intended for human consumption)
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
-- this may be used to convey context-specific information
-- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
}
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- text encoded as a UTF-8 string [RFC3629]
PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements
ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request
ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response
cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request
cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response
p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [RFC2986]
popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response
kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request
kup [8] CertRepMessage, --Key Update Response
krr [9] CertReqMessages, --Key Recovery Request
krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, --Key Recovery Response
rr [11] RevReqContent, --Revocation Request
rp [12] RevRepContent, --Revocation Response
ccr [13] CertReqMessages, --Cross-Cert. Request
ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response
ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann.
cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann.
rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann.
crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement
pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation
nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message
genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message
genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response
error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message
certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate Confirm
pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling Request
pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling Response
}
PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING
ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody }
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 }
PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING,
-- Note: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks.
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function
iterationCount INTEGER,
-- number of times the OWF is applied
-- Note: Implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks.
mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481],
-- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
}
id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 }
DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function
mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., HMAC-SHA256, AES-GMAC [RFC9481],
-- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
}
PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
accepted (0),
-- you got exactly what you asked for
grantedWithMods (1),
-- you got something like what you asked for; the
-- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
rejection (2),
-- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
waiting (3),
-- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
-- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
-- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
-- in Section 5.3.22 of [RFC4210]; alternatively, polling in the
-- underlying transport layer MAY have some utility in this
-- regard)
revocationWarning (4),
-- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
-- imminent
revocationNotification (5),
-- notification that a revocation has occurred
keyUpdateWarning (6)
-- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
-- CertReqMsg
}
PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
-- since we can fail in more than one way!
-- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
badAlg (0),
-- unrecognized or unsupported algorithm identifier
badMessageCheck (1),
-- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
badRequest (2),
-- transaction not permitted or supported
badTime (3),
-- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
-- as defined by local policy
badCertId (4),
-- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
badDataFormat (5),
-- the data submitted has the wrong format
wrongAuthority (6),
-- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
-- one creating the response token
incorrectData (7),
-- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
missingTimeStamp (8),
-- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
-- (by policy)
badPOP (9),
-- the proof-of-possession failed
certRevoked (10),
-- the certificate has already been revoked
certConfirmed (11),
-- the certificate has already been confirmed
wrongIntegrity (12),
-- not valid integrity, based on the password instead of the
-- signature or vice versa
badRecipientNonce (13),
-- not valid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
timeNotAvailable (14),
-- the TSA's time source is not available
unacceptedPolicy (15),
-- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA
unacceptedExtension (16),
-- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA
addInfoNotAvailable (17),
-- the additional information requested could not be
-- understood or is not available
badSenderNonce (18),
-- not valid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
badCertTemplate (19),
-- not valid cert. template or missing mandatory information
signerNotTrusted (20),
-- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
transactionIdInUse (21),
-- the transaction identifier is already in use
unsupportedVersion (22),
-- the version of the message is not supported
notAuthorized (23),
-- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
-- request or perform the preceding action
systemUnavail (24),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
systemFailure (25),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
duplicateCertReq (26)
-- the certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
-- certificate already exists
}
PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL }
OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate
OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL,
certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL,
hashVal BIT STRING
-- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
-- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
}
POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
-- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages)
Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL,
-- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
-- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
-- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
-- Challenge is to be used)
witness OCTET STRING,
-- the result of applying the One-Way Function (owf) to a
-- randomly generated INTEGER, A (Note that a different
-- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.)
challenge OCTET STRING
-- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
-- request is being made) of Rand
}
-- Rand was added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
-- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge
-- in POPODecKeyChallContent
int INTEGER,
-- the randomly generated INTEGER A (above)
sender GeneralName
-- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
}
POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
-- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The
-- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
-- corresponding Challenge.
CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL,
response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse }
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value
-- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
-- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr)
status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
}
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- See [RFC4211] for comments on encoding.
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change.
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL }
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFC9480].
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change.
}
KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatusInfo,
newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL }
RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
certDetails CertTemplate,
-- allows the requester to specify as much as they can about
-- the cert. for which revocation is requested
-- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
crlEntryDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL
-- requested crlEntryExtensions
}
RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
-- in the same order as was sent in RevReqContent
revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL,
-- IDs for which revocation was requested
-- (same order as status)
crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL
-- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
}
CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
newWithNew CMPCertificate -- new pub signed with new priv
}
CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate
RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
certId CertId,
willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime,
badSinceDate GeneralizedTime,
crlDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL
-- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
}
CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
-- CertReqTemplateContent, AttributeTypeAndValue,
-- ExpandedRegControlSet, id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate,
-- AltCertTemplate, regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, AlgIdCtrl,
-- regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, and RsaKeyLenCtrl
-- were added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
certTemplate CertTemplate,
-- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
-- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
-- be used.
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL
-- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms
-- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
-- as specified in CRMF [RFC4211]
}
AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SingleAttribute{{ ... }}
ExpandedRegControlSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { RegControlSet |
regCtrl-altCertTemplate | regCtrl-algId | regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, ... }
regCtrl-altCertTemplate ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE AltCertTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate }
id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 }
AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue
-- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3
-- public key certificate
regCtrl-algId ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE AlgIdCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-algId }
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA
regCtrl-rsaKeyLen ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE RsaKeyLenCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen }
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
-- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths
-- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in
-- CMP Updates [RFC9480]
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate,
-- new root CA certificate
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
-- signed with the old private root CA key
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
-- signed with the new private root CA key
}
CRLSource ::= CHOICE {
dpn [0] DistributionPointName,
issuer [1] GeneralNames }
CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
source CRLSource,
thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL }
INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
&id({SupportedInfoSet}),
infoValue INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
&Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) }
SupportedInfoSet INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= { ... }
-- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
-- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as
-- appropriate for a given environment):
--
-- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
-- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
-- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
-- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
-- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
-- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
-- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
-- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList
-- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
-- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
-- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
-- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
-- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey
-- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
-- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
-- - made in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to
-- - the syntax without this change
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
-- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
-- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
-- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
-- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- UTF8String
-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 22}
-- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CRLStatus
-- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 23}
-- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CertificateList
-- - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
--
-- where
--
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
--
--
-- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
-- Management Protocol request and response messages or general-
-- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
-- specific environments.
GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
-- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
-- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
-- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OIDs that it
-- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
-- indicates that the CA may send
-- any/all information that it wishes.
GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- The receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
-- recognize.
ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-- implementation-specific error codes
errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
-- implementation-specific error details
}
CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
certHash OCTET STRING,
-- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
-- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL
-- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
-- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
}
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER }
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }
--
-- Extended key usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
-- operations, added due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [RFC9480]
-- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC, as defined in
-- [RFC6402]
--
-- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
END
Acknowledgements
Special thanks goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the
inspiration to structure and write this document like [RFC6402],
which updates CMC. Special thanks also goes to Russ Housley, Lijun
Liao, Martin Peylo, and Tomas Gustavsson for reviewing and providing
valuable suggestions on improving this document.
We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable
feedback.
Authors' Addresses
Hendrik Brockhaus
Siemens
Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1
80333 Munich
Germany
Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com
URI: https://www.siemens.com
David von Oheimb
Siemens
Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1
80333 Munich
Germany
Email: david.von.oheimb@siemens.com
URI: https://www.siemens.com