Rfc9697
TitleDetecting RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) Session Desynchronization
AuthorJ. Snijders, T. de Kock
DateDecember 2024
Format:HTML, TXT, PDF, XML
UpdatesRFC8182
Status:PROPOSED STANDARD





Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       J. Snijders
Request for Comments: 9697                                        Fastly
Updates: 8182                                                 T. de Kock
Category: Standards Track                                       RIPE NCC
ISSN: 2070-1721                                            December 2024


        Detecting RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) Session
                           Desynchronization

Abstract

   This document describes an approach for Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) Relying Parties to detect a particular form of
   RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) session desynchronization and
   how to recover.  This document updates RFC 8182.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9697.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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   in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
     1.1.  Requirements Language
   2.  Immutability of RRDP Files
   3.  Detection of Desynchronization
     3.1.  Example
   4.  Recovery After Desynchronization
   5.  Changes to RFC 8182
   6.  Security Considerations
   7.  IANA Considerations
   8.  References
     8.1.  Normative References
     8.2.  Informative References
   Acknowledgements
   Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

   The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Repository Delta
   Protocol (RRDP) [RFC8182] is a one-way synchronization protocol for
   distributing RPKI data in the form of _differences_ (deltas) between
   sequential repository states.  Relying Parties (RPs) apply a
   contiguous chain of deltas to synchronize their local copy of the
   repository with the current state of the remote Repository Server.
   Delta files for any given session_id and serial number are expected
   to contain an immutable record of the state of the Repository Server
   at that given point in time, but this is not always the case.

   This document describes an approach for RPs to detect a form of RRDP
   session desynchronization where the hash of a delta for a given
   serial number and session_id have mutated from the previous Update
   Notification File and how to recover.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Immutability of RRDP Files

   Section 3.1 of [RFC8182] describes how discrete publication events
   such as the addition, modification, or deletion of one or more
   repository objects _can_ be communicated as immutable files,
   highlighting advantages for publishers, such as the ability to
   precalculate files and make use of caching infrastructure.

   Even though the global RPKI is understood to present a loosely
   consistent view that depends on the cache's timing of updates (see
   Section 6 of [RFC7115]), different caches having different data for
   the same RRDP session at the same serial violates the principle of
   least astonishment.

   If an RRDP server over time serves differing data for a given
   session_id and serial number, distinct RP instances (depending on the
   moment they connected to the RRDP server) would end up with divergent
   local repositories.  Comparing only the server-provided session_id
   and latest serial number across distinct RP instances would not bring
   such divergence to light.

   The RRDP specification [RFC8182] alludes to immutability being a
   property of RRDP files, but it doesn't make it clear that
   immutability is an absolute requirement for the RRDP to work well.

3.  Detection of Desynchronization

   Relying Parties can implement a mechanism to keep a record of the
   serial and hash attribute values in delta elements of the previous
   successful fetch of an Update Notification File.  Then, after
   fetching a new Update Notification File, the Relying Party should
   compare if the serial and hash values of previously seen serials
   match those in the newly fetched file.  If any differences are
   detected, this means that the Delta files were unexpectedly mutated,
   and the RP should proceed to Section 4.

3.1.  Example

   This section contains two versions of an Update Notification File to
   demonstrate an unexpected mutation.  The initial Update Notification
   File is as follows:

   <notification xmlns="http://www.ripe.net/rpki/rrdp" version="1"
   session_id="fe528335-db5f-48b2-be7e-bf0992d0b5ec" serial="1774">
   <snapshot uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1774/snapshot.xml"
   hash=
   "4b5f27b099737b8bf288a33796bfe825fb2014a69fd6aa99080380299952f2e2"
   />
   <delta serial="1774" uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1774/delta.xml"
   hash=
   "effac94afd30bbf1cd6e180e7f445a4d4653cb4c91068fa9e7b669d49b5aaa00"
   />
   <delta serial="1773" uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1773/delta.xml"
   hash=
   "731169254dd5de0ede94ba6999bda63b0fae9880873a3710e87a71bafb64761a"
   />
   <delta serial="1772" uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1772/delta.xml"
   hash=
   "d4087585323fd6b7fd899ebf662ef213c469d39f53839fa6241847f4f6ceb939"
   />
   </notification>

                                  Figure 1

   Based on the above Update Notification File, an RP implementation
   could record the following state:

   fe528335-db5f-48b2-be7e-bf0992d0b5ec
   1774 effac94afd30bbf1cd6e180e7f445a4d4653cb4c91068fa9e7b669d49b5aaa00
   1773 731169254dd5de0ede94ba6999bda63b0fae9880873a3710e87a71bafb64761a
   1772 d4087585323fd6b7fd899ebf662ef213c469d39f53839fa6241847f4f6ceb939

                                  Figure 2

   A new version of the Update Notification File is published as
   follows:

   <notification xmlns="http://www.ripe.net/rpki/rrdp" version="1"
   session_id="fe528335-db5f-48b2-be7e-bf0992d0b5ec" serial="1775">
   <snapshot uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1775/snapshot.xml"
   hash=
   "cd430c386deacb04bda55301c2aa49f192b529989b739f412aea01c9a77e5389"
   />
   <delta serial="1775" uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1775/delta.xml"
   hash=
   "d199376e98a9095dbcf14ccd49208b4223a28a1327669f89566475d94b2b08cc"
   />
   <delta serial="1774" uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1774/delta.xml"
   hash=
   "10ca28480a584105a059f95df5ca8369142fd7c8069380f84ebe613b8b89f0d3"
   />
   <delta serial="1773" uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1773/delta.xml"
   hash=
   "731169254dd5de0ede94ba6999bda63b0fae9880873a3710e87a71bafb64761a"
   />
   </notification>

                                  Figure 3

   Using its previously recorded state (see Figure 2), the RP can
   compare the hash values for serials 1773 and 1774.  For serial 1774,
   compared to the earlier version of the Update Notification File, a
   different hash value is now listed, meaning an unexpected delta
   mutation occurred.

4.  Recovery After Desynchronization

   Following the detection of RRDP session desynchronization, in order
   to return to a synchronized state, RP implementations SHOULD issue a
   warning and SHOULD download the latest Snapshot File and process it
   as described in Section 3.4.3 of [RFC8182].

   See Section 6 for an overview of risks associated with
   desynchronization.

5.  Changes to RFC 8182

   The following paragraph is added to Section 3.4.1 of [RFC8182],
   "Processing the Update Notification File", after the paragraph that
   ends "The Relying Party MUST then download and process the Snapshot
   File specified in the downloaded Update Notification File as
   described in Section 3.4.3."

   NEW

   |  If the session_id matches the last known session_id, the Relying
   |  Party SHOULD compare whether hash values associated with
   |  previously seen files for serials match the hash values of the
   |  corresponding serials in the newly fetched Update Notification
   |  File.  If any differences are detected, this means that files were
   |  unexpectedly mutated (see [RFC9697]).  The Relying Party SHOULD
   |  then download and process the Snapshot File specified in the
   |  downloaded Update Notification File as described in Section 3.4.3.

6.  Security Considerations

   Due to the lifetime of RRDP sessions (often measured in months),
   desynchronization can persist for an extended period if undetected.

   Caches in a desynchronized state pose a risk by emitting a different
   set of Validated Payloads than they would otherwise emit with a
   consistent repository copy.  Through the interaction of the
   desynchronization and the _failed fetch_ mechanism described in
   Section 6.6 of [RFC9286], Relying Parties could spuriously omit
   Validated Payloads or emit Validated Payloads that the Certification
   Authority intended to withdraw.  As a result, due to the
   desynchronized state, route decision making processes might consider
   route announcements intended to be marked valid as "unknown" or
   "invalid" for an indeterminate period.

   Missing Validated Payloads negatively impact the ability to validate
   BGP announcements using mechanisms such as those described in
   [RFC6811] and [ASPA].

   Section 6.6 of [RFC9286] advises RP implementations to continue to
   use cached versions of objects, but only until such time as they
   become stale.  By detecting whether the remote Repository Server is
   in an inconsistent state and then immediately switching to using the
   latest Snapshot File, RPs increase the probability to successfully
   replace objects before they become stale.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8182]  Bruijnzeels, T., Muravskiy, O., Weber, B., and R. Austein,
              "The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)", RFC 8182,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8182, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8182>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [ASPA]     Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., Snijders,
              J., and K. Sriram, "BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on
              Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-
              verification-19, 27 September 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
              aspa-verification-19>.

   [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.

   [RFC7115]  Bush, R., "Origin Validation Operation Based on the
              Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185,
              RFC 7115, DOI 10.17487/RFC7115, January 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7115>.

   [RFC9286]  Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
              "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 9286, DOI 10.17487/RFC9286, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9286>.

Acknowledgements

   During the hallway track at RIPE 86, Ties de Kock shared the idea for
   detecting this particular form of RRDP desynchronization, after which
   Claudio Jeker, Job Snijders, and Theo Buehler produced an
   implementation based on rpki-client.  Equipped with tooling to detect
   this particular error condition, in subsequent months it became
   apparent that unexpected delta mutations in the global RPKI
   repositories do happen from time to time.

   The authors wish to thank Theo Buehler, Mikhail Puzanov, Alberto
   Leiva, Tom Harrison, Warren Kumari, Behcet Sarikaya, Murray
   Kucherawy, Éric Vyncke, Roman Danyliw, Tim Bruijnzeels, and Michael
   Hollyman for their careful review and feedback on this document.

Authors' Addresses

   Job Snijders
   Fastly
   Amsterdam
   Netherlands
   Email: job@fastly.com