| Rfc | 7382 |
|---|
| Title | Template for a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the
Resource PKI (RPKI) |
|---|
| Author | S. Kent, D. Kong, K. Seo |
|---|
| Date | April 2015 |
|---|
| Format: | TXT, HTML |
|---|
| Also | BCP0173 |
|---|
| Status: | BEST CURRENT PRACTICE |
|---|
|
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Kent
Request for Comments: 7382 D. Kong
BCP: 173 K. Seo
Category: Best Current Practice BBN Technologies
ISSN: 2070-1721 April 2015
Template for a Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
Abstract
This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an organization that is
part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), e.g., a
resource allocation registry or an ISP.
Status of This Memo
This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7382.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
Preface ............................................................8
1. Introduction ....................................................9
1.1. Overview ..................................................10
1.2. Document Name and Identification ..........................10
1.3. PKI Participants ..........................................11
1.3.1. Certification Authorities ..........................11
1.3.2. Registration Authorities ...........................11
1.3.3. Subscribers ........................................11
1.3.4. Relying Parties ....................................11
1.3.5. Other Participants .................................12
1.4. Certificate Usage .........................................12
1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses .......................12
1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses ........................12
1.5. Policy Administration .....................................12
1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document ............12
1.5.2. Contact Person .....................................12
1.5.3. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy ..12
1.5.4. CPS Approval Procedures ............................13
1.6. Definitions and Acronyms ..................................13
2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities ....................14
2.1. Repositories ..............................................14
2.2. Publication of Certification Information ..................14
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication ..........................14
2.4. Access Controls on Repositories ...........................15
3. Identification and Authentication ..............................15
3.1. Naming ....................................................15
3.1.1. Types of Names .....................................15
3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful ....................15
3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers ...........15
3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms ..........15
3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names ................................16
3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of
Trademarks .........................................16
3.2. Initial Identity Validation ...............................16
3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key ..........16
3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity ............16
3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity ..............17
3.2.4. Non-verified Subscriber Information ................17
3.2.5. Validation of Authority ............................17
3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation ........................17
3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests .....18
3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for
Routine Re-key .....................................18
3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for
Re-key after Revocation ............................18
3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request ..18
4. Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements ................18
4.1. Certificate Application ...................................18
4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application ...........18
4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities ............19
4.2. Certificate Application Processing ........................19
4.2.1. Performing Identification and
Authentication Functions ...........................19
4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications ..19
4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications ...........19
4.3. Certificate Issuance ......................................19
4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance .............19
4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of
Issuance of Certificate ............................20
4.3.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................20
4.4. Certificate Acceptance ....................................20
4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance ........20
4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA ...........20
4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................20
4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage ............................20
4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage .......20
4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage .....21
4.6. Certificate Renewal .......................................21
4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal ...............21
4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal ............................21
4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests ............22
4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
Subscriber .........................................22
4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
Renewal Certificate ................................22
4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA ...22
4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................22
4.7. Certificate Re-key ........................................22
4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-key ................22
4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key ..23
4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests ..........23
4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
Subscriber .........................................23
4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
Re-keyed Certificate ...............................23
4.7.6. Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA ..23
4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................23
4.8. Certificate Modification ..................................23
4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification ..........23
4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification ...........24
4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests .......24
4.8.4. Notification of Modified Certificate
Issuance to Subscriber .............................24
4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified
Certificate ........................................24
4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA ..24
4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................24
4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension .....................25
4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation .......................25
4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation .........................25
4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request ...................25
4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period ....................25
4.9.5. Time within Which CA Must Process the
Revocation Request .................................25
4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying
Parties ............................................25
4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency .............................26
4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs ...........................26
4.10. Certificate Status Services ..............................26
5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls .................26
5.1. Physical Controls .........................................26
5.1.1. Site Location and Construction .....................26
5.1.2. Physical Access ....................................26
5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning .........................26
5.1.4. Water Exposures ....................................26
5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection .....................26
5.1.6. Media Storage ......................................26
5.1.7. Waste Disposal .....................................26
5.1.8. Off-Site Backup ....................................26
5.2. Procedural Controls .......................................27
5.2.1. Trusted Roles ......................................27
5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task ................27
5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role ....27
5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties ...............27
5.3. Personnel Controls ........................................27
5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance
Requirements .......................................27
5.3.2. Background Check Procedures ........................27
5.3.3. Training Requirements ..............................27
5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements ..............27
5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence ................27
5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions .................27
5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements ................27
5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel ................27
5.4. Audit Logging Procedures ..................................28
5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded ...........................28
5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log ........................28
5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log .....................28
5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log ............................28
5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures ........................28
5.4.6. Audit Collection System (Internal vs.
External) [OMITTED] ................................29
5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject [OMITTED] ....29
5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments ..........................29
5.5. Records Archival [OMITTED] ................................29
5.6. Key Changeover ............................................29
5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery ..........................29
5.8. CA or RA Termination ......................................29
6. Technical Security Controls ....................................29
6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation ......................29
6.1.1. Key Pair Generation ................................29
6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber .................30
6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer ..........30
6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties ..........30
6.1.5. Key Sizes ..........................................30
6.1.6. Public Key Parameter Generation and Quality
Checking ...........................................30
6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key
Usage Field) .......................................30
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
Engineering Controls ......................................31
6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls ........31
6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control ......31
6.2.3. Private Key Escrow .................................31
6.2.4. Private Key Backup .................................31
6.2.5. Private Key Archival ...............................31
6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a
Cryptographic Module ...............................31
6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module ........31
6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key ...................32
6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Key .................32
6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key ..................32
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating .......................32
6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management ......................32
6.3.1. Public Key Archival ................................32
6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key
Pair Usage Periods .................................32
6.4. Activation Data ...........................................32
6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation ........32
6.4.2. Activation Data Protection .........................32
6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data ...................33
6.5. Computer Security Controls ................................33
6.6. Life Cycle Technical Controls .............................33
6.6.1. System Development Controls ........................33
6.6.2. Security Management Controls .......................33
6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls .......................33
6.7. Network Security Controls .................................33
6.8. Time-Stamping .............................................33
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles ...................................33
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments .........................34
9. Other Business and Legal Matters ...............................34
9.1. Fees ......................................................34
9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees ...............34
9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees [OMITTED] ..................34
9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access
Fees [OMITTED] .....................................34
9.1.4. Fees for Other Services (if Applicable) ............34
9.1.5. Refund Policy ......................................34
9.2. Financial Responsibility ..................................34
9.2.1. Insurance Coverage .................................34
9.2.2. Other Assets .......................................34
9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities ....34
9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information ...................34
9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information ..................34
9.3.2. Information Not within the Scope of
Confidential Information ...........................34
9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential
Information ........................................34
9.4. Privacy of Personal Information ...........................34
9.4.1. Privacy Plan .......................................34
9.4.2. Information Treated as Private .....................35
9.4.3. Information Not Deemed Private .....................35
9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information ......35
9.4.5. Notice and Consent to Use Private Information ......35
9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or
Administrative Process .............................35
9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances .........35
9.5. Intellectual Property Rights (if Applicable) ..............35
9.6. Representations and Warranties ............................35
9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties ..................35
9.6.2. Subscriber Representations and Warranties ..........35
9.6.3. Relying Party Representations and Warranties .......35
9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties .................................35
9.8. Limitations of Liability ..................................35
9.9. Indemnities ...............................................35
9.10. Term and Termination .....................................35
9.10.1. Term ..............................................35
9.10.2. Termination .......................................35
9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival ................35
9.11. Individual Notices and Communications with Participants ..35
9.12. Amendments ...............................................35
9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment ...........................35
9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period .................35
9.13. Dispute Resolution Provisions ............................35
9.14. Governing Law ............................................35
9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law ...........................36
9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions .................................36
9.16.1. Entire Agreement ..................................36
9.16.2. Assignment ........................................36
9.16.3. Severability ......................................36
9.16.4. Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of
Rights) ...........................................36
9.16.5. Force Majeure .....................................36
10. Security Considerations .......................................36
11. References ....................................................37
11.1. Normative References .....................................37
11.2. Informative References ...................................37
Acknowledgments ...................................................38
Authors' Addresses ................................................38
Preface
This RFC contains text intended for use as a template as designated
below by the markers <BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT> and <END TEMPLATE TEXT>.
Such Template Text is subject to the provisions of Section 9(b) of
the Trust Legal Provisions.
This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an organization that is
part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). (Throughout
this document, the term "organization" is used broadly, e.g., the
entity in question might be a business unit of a larger
organization.)
There is no expectation that a CPS will be published as an RFC. An
organization will publish the CPS in a manner appropriate for access
by the users of the RPKI, e.g., on the organization's web site. As a
best current practice, organizations are expected to use this
template instead of creating one from scratch. This template
contains both text that SHOULD appear in all Certification Practice
Statements and places for text specific to the organization in
question (indicated by <text in angle brackets>).
The user of this document should:
1. Extract the text between the <BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT> and
<END TEMPLATE TEXT> delimiters.
2. Replace the instructions between the angle brackets with the
required information.
This document has been generated to complement the Certificate Policy
(CP) for the RPKI [RFC6484]. Like RFC 6484, it is based on the
template specified in RFC 3647 [RFC3647]. A number of sections
contained in the template were omitted from this CPS because they did
not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained the section
numbering scheme employed in that RFC to facilitate comparison with
the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC and in RFC 6484.
Conventions Used in This Document:
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
<BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT>
<Create a title page saying, e.g., "<Name of organization>
Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI)" with date, author, etc.>
<Create a table of contents.>
1. Introduction
This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <name
of organization>. It describes the practices employed by the <name
of organization> Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI). These practices are defined in accordance
with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484] for
the RPKI.
The RPKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
holders of Internet Number Resources (INRs) (Section 1.6) in
accordance with the records of the organizations that act as CAs in
this PKI. The ability to verify such claims is essential to ensuring
the unique, unambiguous distribution of these resources.
This PKI parallels the existing INR distribution hierarchy. These
resources are distributed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). In some regions,
National Internet Registries (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy
below the RIRs for INR distribution. Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) and network subscribers form additional tiers below
registries.
Conventions Used in This Document:
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.1. Overview
This CPS describes:
o Participants
o Publication of the certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRLs)
o How certificates are issued, managed, re-keyed, renewed, and
revoked
o Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)
o Key management
o Audit procedures
o Business and legal issues
This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see [RFC6480] for
more details):
o CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for
each subscriber INR holder.
o End-entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use to validate
digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects (see definition in
Section 1.6).
o In the future, the PKI also may include end-entity certificates in
support of access control for the repository system as described
in Section 2.4.
1.2. Document Name and Identification
The name of this document is "<Name of organization> Certification
Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)". <If this document is available via the Internet, the CA can
provide the URI for the CPS here. It SHOULD be the same URI as the
URI that appears as a policy qualifier in the CA certificate for the
CA, if the CA elects to make use of that feature.>
1.3. PKI Participants
Note that in a PKI the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
organization that is a subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
service from an ISP. In such cases, the term "network subscriber"
will be used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always
refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though
some of them are individuals.
1.3.1. Certification Authorities
<Describe the CAs that you will operate for the RPKI. One approach
is to operate two CAs: one designated "offline" and the other
designated "production". The offline CA is the top-level CA for the
<name of organization> portion of the RPKI. It provides a secure
revocation and recovery capability in case the production CA is
compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus, the offline CA issues
certificates only to instances of the production CA, and the CRLs it
issues are used to revoke only certificates issued to the production
CA. The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to <name of
organization> members, to whom INRs have been distributed.>
1.3.2. Registration Authorities
<Describe how the Registration Authority (RA) function is handled for
the CA(s) that you operate. The RPKI does not require establishment
or use of a separate Registration Authority in addition to the CA
function. The RA function MUST be provided by the same entity
operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in Section 1.3.1. An entity
acting as a CA in this PKI already has a formal relationship with
each organization to which it distributes INRs. These organizations
already perform the RA function implicitly, since they already assume
responsibility for distributing INRs.>
1.3.3. Subscribers
Organizations receiving INR allocations from this CA are subscribers
in the RPKI.
1.3.4. Relying Parties
Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or
RPKI-signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties.
Relying parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI.
(See Section 1.6 for the definition of an RPKI-signed object.)
1.3.5. Other Participants
<Specify one or more entities that operate a repository holding
certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI-signed objects issued by this
organization, and provide a URL for the repository.>
1.4. Certificate Usage
1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses
The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in
support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.
Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal
cited above, are also permitted under RFC 6484.
Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be
used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access
control for the repository system as described in Section 2.4. Such
uses also are permitted under the RPKI certificate policy.
1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses
Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.
1.5. Policy Administration
1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document
This CPS is administered by <name of organization>. <Include the
mailing address, email address, and similar contact info here.>
1.5.2. Contact Person
<Insert organization contact info here.>
1.5.3. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private
key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing
organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the
distribution; hence, they are authoritative with respect to the
accuracy of this binding.
1.5.4. CPS Approval Procedures
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private
key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing
organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the
distribution; hence, they are authoritative with respect to the
accuracy of this binding.
1.6. Definitions and Acronyms
BPKI Business PKI. A BPKI is an optional additional PKI used by an
organization to identify members to whom RPKI certificates can
be issued. If a BPKI is employed by a CA, it may have its own
CP, separate from the RPKI CP.
CP Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that
indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular
community and/or class of applications with common security
requirements. The CP for the RPKI is [RFC6484].
CPS Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
in issuing certificates.
Distribution of INRs A process of distribution of the INRs along
the respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of
IP addresses and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) to the five
Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller
address blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations
within their service regions, who in turn distribute IP
addresses to their customers.
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for
global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing
systems and ASNs used for routing Internet traffic. IANA
distributes INRs to RIRs.
INRs Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three
protocol parameter sets, namely:
o IP version 4 addresses,
o IP version 6 addresses, and
o Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing,
currently Border Gateway Protocol-4 ASNs.
ISP Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
and selling Internet services to other organizations.
NIR National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that
manages the distribution of INRs for a portion of the
geopolitical area covered by a Regional Internet Registry.
NIRs form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to
manage INR distribution.
RIR Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organization that
manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.
RPKI-signed object An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed data
object (other than a certificate or CRL) declared to be such
an object by a Standards Track RFC. An RPKI-signed object can
be validated using certificates issued under this PKI. The
content and format of these data constructs depend on the
context in which validation of claims of current holdings of
INRs takes place. Examples of these objects are repository
manifests [RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
[RFC6482].
2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities
2.1. Repositories
As per the CP, certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects MUST be
made available for downloading by all relying parties, to enable them
to validate this data.
The <name of organization> RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs,
and RPKI-signed objects via a repository that is accessible via
<insert IETF-designated protocol name here> at <insert URL here>.
This repository will conform to the structure described in [RFC6481].
2.2. Publication of Certification Information
<Name of organization> will publish certificates, CRLs, and
RPKI-signed objects issued by it to a repository that operates as
part of a worldwide distributed system of RPKI repositories.
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication
<Describe here your procedures for publication (to the global
repository system) of the certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects
that you issue. If you choose to outsource publication of PKI data,
you still need to provide this information for relying parties. This
MUST include the period of time within which a certificate will be
published after the CA issues the certificate, and the period of time
within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked
certificate, after the CA revokes that certificate.>
The <name of organization> CA will publish its CRL prior to the
nextUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA.
2.4. Access Controls on Repositories
<Describe the access controls used by the organization to ensure that
only authorized parties can modify repository data, and any controls
used to mitigate denial-of-service attacks against the repository.
If the organization offers repository services to its subscribers,
then describe here the protocol(s) that it supports for publishing
signed objects from subscribers.>
3. Identification and Authentication
3.1. Naming
3.1.1. Types of Names
The subject of each certificate issued by this organization is
identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). The distinguished
name will consist of a single Common Name (CN) attribute with a value
generated by <name of organization>. Optionally, the serialNumber
attribute may be included along with the common name (to form a
terminal relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among
successive instances of certificates associated with the same entity.
3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful
The Subject name in each certificate SHOULD NOT be "meaningful", in
the conventional, human-readable sense. The rationale here is that
these certificates are used for authorization in support of
applications that make use of attestations of INR holdings. They are
not used to identify subjects.
3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers
Although Subject names in certificates issued by this organization
SHOULD NOT be meaningful and may appear "random", anonymity is not a
function of this PKI; thus, no explicit support for this feature is
provided.
3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms
None
3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names
<Name of organization> certifies Subject names that are unique among
the certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate
path discovery, such uniqueness is not required, nor is it enforced
through technical means. <Name of organization> generates Subject
names to minimize the chances that two entities in the RPKI will be
assigned the same name. Specifically, <insert Subject name
generation description here, or cite RFC 6487>.
3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks
Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, <name of
organization> makes no provision either to recognize or to
authenticate trademarks, service marks, etc.
3.2. Initial Identity Validation
3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key
<Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to
demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to
certificate issuance.>
3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
organizational identity of subscribers. However, certificates are
issued to subscribers in a fashion that preserves the accuracy of
distributions of INRs as represented in <name of organization>
records.
<Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that each RPKI
certificate that is issued accurately reflects your records with
regard to the organization to which you have distributed (or
sub-distributed) the INRs identified in the certificate. For
example, a BPKI certificate could be used to authenticate a
certificate request that serves as a link to the <name of
organization> subscriber database that maintains the INR distribution
records. The certificate request could be matched against the
database record for the subscriber in question, and an RPKI
certificate would be issued only if the INRs requested were a subset
of those held by the subscriber. The specific procedures employed
for this purpose should be commensurate with any you already employ
in the maintenance of INR distribution.>
3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
identity of a subscriber. However, <name of organization> maintains
contact information for each subscriber in support of certificate
renewal, re-key, and revocation.
<Describe the procedures that are used to identify at least one
individual as a representative of each subscriber. This is done in
support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate
issued to the organization. For example, one might say "The <name of
organization> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that MUST
be used to identify individuals who represent <name of organization>
subscribers." The procedures should be commensurate with those you
already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives for
INR holders. Note that this authentication is solely for use by you
in dealing with the organizations to which you distribute (or
sub-distribute) INRs and thus MUST NOT be relied upon outside of this
CA/subscriber relationship.>
3.2.4. Non-verified Subscriber Information
No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
under this certificate policy except for Subject Information Access
(SIA) extensions [RFC6487].
3.2.5. Validation of Authority
<Describe the procedures used to verify that an individual claiming
to represent a subscriber is authorized to represent that subscriber
in this context. For example, one could say "Only an individual to
whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) has been issued may
request issuance of an RPKI certificate. Each certificate issuance
request is verified using the BPKI." The procedures should be
commensurate with those you already employ in authenticating
individuals as representatives of subscribers.>
3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation
The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
other PKI. <If you operate a separate, additional PKI for business
purposes, e.g., a BPKI, then describe (or reference) how the BPKI is
used to authenticate subscribers and to enable them to manage their
resource distributions.>
3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests
3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key
<Describe the conditions under which routine re-key is required and
the manner by which it is requested. Describe the procedures that
are used to ensure that a subscriber requesting routine re-key is the
legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed. State the
approach for establishing PoP of the private key corresponding to the
new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is
used to authenticate routine re-key requests.>
3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for Re-key after Revocation
<Describe the procedures used to ensure that an organization
requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate holder of the
INRs in the certificate being re-keyed. This MUST also include the
method employed for verifying PoP of the private key corresponding to
the new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is
used to authenticate re-key requests. With respect to authentication
of the subscriber, the procedures should be commensurate with those
you already employ in the maintenance of INR distribution records.>
3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request
<Describe the procedures used by an RPKI subscriber to make a
revocation request. Describe the manner by which it is ensured that
the subscriber requesting revocation is the subject of the
certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be revoked.
Note that there may be different procedures for the case where the
legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as
opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key. These
procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in
the maintenance of subscriber records.>
4. Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements
4.1. Certificate Application
4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application
Any subscriber in good standing who holds INRs distributed by <name
of organization> may submit a certificate application to this CA.
(The exact meaning of "in good standing" is in accordance with the
policy of <name of organization>.)
4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities
<Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for
initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that
most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of your
normal business practices, as an adjunct to INR distribution, and
thus a separate application to request a certificate may not be
necessary. If so, reference should be made to where these practices
are documented.>
4.2. Certificate Application Processing
<Describe the certificate request/response processing that you will
employ. You should make use of existing standards for certificate
application processing (see [RFC6487]).>
4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions
<Describe your practices for identification and authentication of
certificate applicants. Often, existing practices employed by you to
identify and authenticate organizations can be used as the basis for
issuance of certificates to these subscribers. Reference can be made
to documentation of such existing practices.>
4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications
<Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications,
and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant to
this process. Note that according to the CP, certificate
applications will be approved based on the normal business practices
of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of
subscribers. The CP also says that each CA will follow the procedure
specified in Section 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the
private key corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the
certificate the CA issues to the requester.>
4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications
<Specify here your expected time frame for processing certificate
applications.>
4.3. Certificate Issuance
4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance
<Describe your procedures for issuance and publication of a
certificate.>
4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate
<Name of organization> will notify the subscriber when the
certificate is published. <Describe here your procedures for
notifying a subscriber when a certificate has been published.>
4.3.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities
<Describe here any other entities that will be notified when a
certificate is published.>
4.4. Certificate Acceptance
4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance
When a certificate is issued, the <name of organization> CA will
publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber. <This may be
done without subscriber review and acceptance. State your policy
with respect to subscriber certificate acceptance here.>
4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA
Certificates will be published at <insert repository URL here> once
issued, following the conduct described in Section 4.4.1. This will
be done within <specify the time frame within which the certificate
will be placed in the repository and the subscriber will be
notified>. <Describe any additional procedures with respect to
publication of the certificate here.>
4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities
<Describe here any other entities that will be notified when a
certificate is published.>
4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage
A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.
4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage
The certificates issued by <name of organization> to subordinate INR
holders are CA certificates. The private key associated with each of
these certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE)
certificates and CRLs.
4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage
The primary relying parties in this PKI are organizations that use
RPKI EE certificates to verify RPKI-signed objects. Relying parties
are referred to Section 4.5.2 of [RFC6484] for additional guidance
with respect to acts of reliance on RPKI certificates.
4.6. Certificate Renewal
4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal
As per RFC 6484, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on
its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
Subject. The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing a
resource holding agreement, or explicit. If <name of organization>
initiates the renewal process based on the certificate expiration
date, then <name of organization> will notify the subscriber <insert
the period of advance warning, e.g., "2 weeks in advance of the
expiration date", or the general policy, e.g., "in conjunction with
notification of service expiration">. The validity interval of the
new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the previous
certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1 week>, to
ensure uninterrupted coverage.
Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
compromised (see Section 4.9.1). If a new key pair is being used,
the stipulations of Section 4.7 will apply.
4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal
The subscriber or <name of organization> may initiate the renewal
process. <For the case of the subscriber, describe the procedures
that will be used to ensure that the requester is the legitimate
holder of the INRs in the certificate being renewed. This MUST also
include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate being renewed or
the new public key if the public key is being changed. With respect
to authentication of the subscriber, the procedures should be
commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of INR
distribution records. If you operate a BPKI for this, describe how
that business-based PKI is used to authenticate renewal requests, and
refer to Section 3.2.6.>
4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests
<Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests.
Describe how you verify that the requester is the subscriber or is
authorized by the subscriber, and that the certificate in question
has not been revoked.>
4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber
<Name of organization> will notify the subscriber when the
certificate is published. <Describe your procedure for notification
of new certificate issuance to the subscriber. This should be
consistent with Section 4.3.2.>
4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate
See Section 4.4.1. <If you employ a different policy from that
specified in Section 4.4.1, describe it here.>
4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA
See Section 4.4.2.
4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities
See Section 4.4.3.
4.7. Certificate Re-key
4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-key
As per RFC 6484, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
required, based on:
1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
private key, or
2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key
pair
If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
new key.
If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
certificate will be revoked.
4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key
Only the holder of a certificate may request a re-key. In addition,
<name of organization> may initiate a re-key based on a verified
compromise report. <If the subscriber (certificate Subject) requests
the re-key, describe how authentication is effected, e.g., using the
<name of registry> BPKI. Describe how a compromise report received
from other than a subscriber is verified.>
4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests
<Describe your process for handling re-keying requests. As per the
RPKI CP, this should be consistent with the process described in
Section 4.3, so reference can be made to that section.>
4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber
<Describe your policy for notifying the subscriber regarding
availability of the new re-keyed certificate. This should be
consistent with the notification process for any new certificate
issuance (see Section 4.3.2).>
4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-keyed Certificate
When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will publish it in the
repository and notify the subscriber. See Section 4.4.1.
4.7.6. Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA
<Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate.
This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
certificate (see Section 4.4.2).>
4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities
See Section 4.4.3.
4.8. Certificate Modification
4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification
As per RFC 6484, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
changes to the RFC 3779 extension values or the SIA extension in a
certificate. A subscriber can request a certificate modification
when this information in a currently valid certificate has changed,
as a result of changes in the INR holdings of the subscriber, or as a
result of change of the repository publication point data.
If a subscriber is to receive a distribution of INRs in addition to a
current distribution, and if the subscriber does not request that a
new certificate be issued containing only these additional INRs, then
this is accomplished through a certificate modification. When a
certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued.
The new certificate will contain the same public key and the same
expiration date as the original certificate, but with the incidental
information corrected and/or the INR distribution expanded. When
previously distributed INRs are to be removed from a certificate,
then the old certificate will be revoked and a new certificate
(reflecting the new distribution) issued.
4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification
The subscriber or <name of organization> may initiate the certificate
modification process. <For the case of the subscriber, state here
what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of
the entity requesting the modification.>
4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests
<Describe your procedures for verification of the modification
request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate. These
should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2
and 4.3.1.>
4.8.4. Notification of Modified Certificate Issuance to Subscriber
<Describe your procedure for notifying the subscriber about the
issuance of a modified certificate. This should be consistent
with the notification process for any new certificate (see
Section 4.3.2).>
4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate
When a modified certificate is issued, <name of organization> will
publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber. See
Section 4.4.1.
4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA
<Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate.
This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
certificate (see Section 4.4.2).>
4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities
See Section 4.4.3.
4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension
4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation
As per RFC 6484, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
Either <name of organization> or the subject may choose to end the
relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
revoke the certificate. If one or more of the INRs bound to the
public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation. A certificate
also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Finally, a
certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by the
private key associated with that certificate.
4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation
The subscriber or <name of organization> may request a revocation.
<For the case of the subscriber, describe what steps will be taken to
verify the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the
revocation.>
4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request
<Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation request.
This should include:
o Procedure to be used by the subscriber to request a revocation.
o Procedure for notification of the subscriber when the revocation
is initiated by <name of organization>.>
4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period
A subscriber is required to request revocation as soon as possible
after the need for revocation has been identified.
4.9.5. Time within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request
<Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
process a revocation request.>
4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties
As per RFC 6484, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.
4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency
<State the CRL issuance frequency for the CRLs that you publish.>
Each CRL contains a nextUpdate value, and a new CRL will be published
at or before that time. <Name of organization> will set the
nextUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the next
scheduled CRL will be issued.
4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs
A CRL will be published to the repository system within <state the
maximum latency> after generation.
4.10. Certificate Status Services
<Name of organization> does not support the Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP) or the Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
(SCVP). <Name of organization> issues CRLs.
5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls
5.1. Physical Controls
<As per RFC 6484, describe the physical controls that you employ for
certificate management. These should be commensurate with those used
in the management of INR distribution.>
5.1.1. Site Location and Construction
5.1.2. Physical Access
5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning
5.1.4. Water Exposures
5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection
5.1.6. Media Storage
5.1.7. Waste Disposal
5.1.8. Off-Site Backup
5.2. Procedural Controls
<As per RFC 6484, describe the procedural security controls that you
employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate with
those used in the management of INR distribution.>
5.2.1. Trusted Roles
5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task
5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role
5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties
5.3. Personnel Controls
<As per RFC 6484, describe the personnel security controls that you
employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
should be commensurate with those used in the management of INR
distribution.>
5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements
5.3.2. Background Check Procedures
5.3.3. Training Requirements
5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements
5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence
5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions
5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements
5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel
5.4. Audit Logging Procedures
<As per the CP, describe in the following sections the details of how
you implement audit logging.>
5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded
Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
Certification Authority computing equipment. Audit records will
include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
content data relating to the event. Auditable events include:
o Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
o Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate
requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
notifications)
o Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
o Posting of any material to a repository
o Any attempts to change or delete audit data
o Key generation
o Software and/or configuration updates to the CA
o Clock adjustments
<List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>
5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log
<Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>
5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log
<Describe your policies for retention of audit logs.>
5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log
<Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>
5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures
<Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>
5.4.6. Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External) [OMITTED]
5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject [OMITTED]
5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments
<Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
already applied) to the PKI subsystems. This should include whether
such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>
5.5. Records Archival [OMITTED]
5.6. Key Changeover
The <name of organization> CA certificate will contain a validity
period that is at least as long as that of any certificate being
issued under that certificate. When <name of organization> CA
changes keys, it will follow the procedures described in [RFC6489].
5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery
<Describe your plans for dealing with CA key compromise and how you
plan to continue/restore operation of your RPKI CA in the event of a
disaster.>
5.8. CA or RA Termination
<Describe your policy for management of your CA's INR distributions
in case of its own termination.>
6. Technical Security Controls
This section describes the security controls used by <name of
organization>.
6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation
6.1.1. Key Pair Generation
<Describe the procedures used to generate the CA key pair and, if
applicable, key pairs for subscribers. In most instances, public-key
pairs will be generated by the subscriber, i.e., the organization
receiving the distribution of INRs. However, your procedures may
include one for generating key pairs on behalf of your subscribers if
they so request.>
6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber
<If the procedures in Section 6.1.1 include providing key pair
generation services for subscribers, describe the means by which
private keys are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion.
Otherwise, say this is not applicable.>
6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer
<Describe the procedures that will be used to deliver a subscriber's
public keys to the <name of organization> RPKI CA. These procedures
MUST ensure that the public key has not been altered during transit
and that the subscriber possesses the private key corresponding to
the transferred public key.> See RFC 6487 for details.
6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties
CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are
contained in certificates issued by other CAs and will be published
to the RPKI repository system. Relying parties will download these
certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data
for (putative) trust anchors will be distributed out of band and
accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally defined criteria,
e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made
available to the Internet community.
6.1.5. Key Sizes
The key sizes used in this PKI are as specified in [RFC6485].
6.1.6. Public Key Parameter Generation and Quality Checking
The public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI are as
specified in [RFC6485].
<If the procedures in Section 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair
generation, EITHER insert here text specifying that the subscriber is
responsible for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and
saying that <name of organization> is not responsible for performing
such checks for subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA
for checking the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>
6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field)
The KeyUsage extension bit values employed in RPKI certificates are
specified in [RFC6487].
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls
6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls
<Describe the standards and controls employed for the CA
cryptographic module, e.g., it was evaluated under FIPS 140-2/3, at
level 2 or 3. See [FIPS] for details.>
6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control
<If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
your CA's private keys, then insert the following text. "There will
be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person
control.">
6.2.3. Private Key Escrow
<No private key escrow procedures are required for the RPKI, but if
the CA chooses to employ escrow, state so here.>
6.2.4. Private Key Backup
<Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be
done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
the original private key. (2) At least one copy should be kept at an
off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>
6.2.5. Private Key Archival
See Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4.
6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module
The private key for the <name of organization> production CA <if
appropriate, change "production CA" to "production and offline CAs">
will be generated by the cryptographic module specified in
Section 6.2.1. The private keys will never leave the module except
in encrypted form for backup and/or transfer to a new module.
6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module
The private key for the <name of organization> production CA <if
appropriate, change "production CA" to "production and offline CAs">
will be stored in the cryptographic module. It will be protected
from unauthorized use <say how here>.
6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key
<Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
key.>
6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Key
<Describe the process and procedure for private key deactivation
here.>
6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key
<Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key, e.g.,
when it is superseded. This will depend on the particular module.>
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating
<Describe the rating of the cryptographic module used by the CA, if
applicable.>
6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management
6.3.1. Public Key Archival
<Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
to archive public keys. If keys are not archived, say so. If they
are, describe the archive processes and procedures.>
6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods
The <name of organization> CA's key pair will have a validity
interval of <insert number of years>. <These key pairs and
certificates should have reasonably long validity intervals, e.g.,
10 years, to minimize the disruption caused by key changeover. Note
that the CA's key lifetime is under the control of its issuer, so the
CPS MUST reflect the key lifetime imposed by the issuer.>
6.4. Activation Data
6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation
<Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>
6.4.2. Activation Data Protection
Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by <describe
your procedures here>.
6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data
<Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
activation data for your CA. If there are none, say "None".>
6.5. Computer Security Controls
<Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
capabilities, etc. These requirements should be commensurate with
those used for the computers used for managing distribution of INRs.>
6.6. Life Cycle Technical Controls
6.6.1. System Development Controls
<Describe any system development controls that apply to the PKI
systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology (TSDM).>
6.6.2. Security Management Controls
<Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
RPKI software and equipment employed by the CA. These security
measures should be commensurate with those used for the systems used
by the CAs for managing and distributing INRs.>
6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls
<Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for RPKI
functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated. This
should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
equipment for the management and distribution of INRs is handled.>
6.7. Network Security Controls
<Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
operation. These should be commensurate with the network security
controls employed for the computers used for managing distribution of
INRs.>
6.8. Time-Stamping
The RPKI does not make use of time-stamping.
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles
See [RFC6487].
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
<List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
security of the administration of INRs. These are sufficient for the
RPKI systems. However, additional forms of security assessments are
a good idea and should be listed if performed.>
9. Other Business and Legal Matters
<The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for
your organization. The CP says that CAs should cover Sections 9.1
to 9.11 and 9.13 to 9.16, although not every CA will choose to do so.
Note that the manner in which you manage your business and legal
matters for this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which you
manage business and legal matters for the distribution of INRs.>
9.1. Fees
9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees
9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees [OMITTED]
9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access Fees [OMITTED]
9.1.4. Fees for Other Services (if Applicable)
9.1.5. Refund Policy
9.2. Financial Responsibility
9.2.1. Insurance Coverage
9.2.2. Other Assets
9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities
9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information
9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information
9.3.2. Information Not within the Scope of Confidential Information
9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information
9.4. Privacy of Personal Information
9.4.1. Privacy Plan
9.4.2. Information Treated as Private
9.4.3. Information Not Deemed Private
9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information
9.4.5. Notice and Consent to Use Private Information
9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process
9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances
9.5. Intellectual Property Rights (if Applicable)
9.6. Representations and Warranties
9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties
9.6.2. Subscriber Representations and Warranties
9.6.3. Relying Party Representations and Warranties
9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties
9.8. Limitations of Liability
9.9. Indemnities
9.10. Term and Termination
9.10.1. Term
9.10.2. Termination
9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival
9.11. Individual Notices and Communications with Participants
9.12. Amendments
9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment
9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period
9.13. Dispute Resolution Provisions
9.14. Governing Law
9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law
9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions
9.16.1. Entire Agreement
9.16.2. Assignment
9.16.3. Severability
9.16.4. Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of Rights)
9.16.5. Force Majeure
<END TEMPLATE TEXT>
10. Security Considerations
The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in
a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can include
o the practices followed by the Certification Authority (CA) in
authenticating the subject
o the CA's operating policy, procedures, and technical security
controls, including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities
(for example, in protecting the private key)
o the stated responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of
the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and
limitations of liability)
This document provides a framework to address the technical,
procedural, personnel, and physical security aspects of Certification
Authorities, Registration Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and
relying party cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the
certificate generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and
revocation are done in a secure manner. Specifically, the following
sections are oriented towards ensuring the secure operation of the
PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
relying party systems:
Section 3 ("Identification and Authentication" (I&A))
Section 4 ("Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements")
Section 5 ("Facility, Management, and Operational Controls")
Section 6 ("Technical Security Controls")
Section 7 ("Certificate and CRL Profiles")
Section 8 ("Compliance Audit and Other Assessments")
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484>.
[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
RFC 6485, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/
info/rfc6485>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
11.2. Informative References
[FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3
(FIPS-140-3), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Work in Progress.
[RFC3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647,
November 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
[RFC6489] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "Certification
Authority (CA) Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 174, RFC 6489, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6489>.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Matt Lepinski for help with the
formatting, Ron Watro for assistance with the editing, and other
members of the SIDR working group for reviewing this document.
Authors' Addresses
Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
EMail: skent@bbn.com
Derrick Kong
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
EMail: dkong@bbn.com
Karen Seo
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
EMail: kseo@bbn.com