| Rfc | 6542 |
|---|
| Title | Kerberos Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface (GSS-API) Channel Binding Hash Agility |
|---|
| Author | S. Emery |
|---|
| Date | March
2012 |
|---|
| Format: | TXT, HTML |
|---|
| Updates | RFC4121 |
|---|
| Status: | PROPOSED
STANDARD |
|---|
|
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Emery
Request for Comments: 6542 Oracle
Updates: 4121 March 2012
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721
Kerberos Version 5
Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API)
Channel Binding Hash Agility
Abstract
Currently, channel bindings are implemented using an MD5 hash in the
Kerberos Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Programming
Interface (GSS-API) mechanism (RFC 4121). This document updates RFC
4121 to allow channel bindings using algorithms negotiated based on
Kerberos crypto framework as defined in RFC 3961. In addition,
because this update makes use of the last extensible field in the
Kerberos client-server exchange message, extensions are defined to
allow future protocol extensions.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6542.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................2
2. Conventions Used in This Document ...............................2
3. Channel Binding Hash Agility ....................................2
3.1. Structure of the Exts Field ................................3
3.2. The Channel Binding Extension ..............................4
4. Security Considerations .........................................4
5. IANA Considerations .............................................4
6. Acknowledgments .................................................5
7. References ......................................................5
7.1. Normative References .......................................5
7.2. Informative References .....................................5
1. Introduction
With the recently discovered weaknesses in the MD5 hash algorithm
(see [RFC6151]), there is a need to use stronger hash algorithms.
The Kerberos Version 5 Generic Security Service Application
Programming Interface (GSS-API) mechanism [RFC4121] uses MD5 to
calculate channel binding verifiers. This document specifies an
update to the mechanism that allows it to create channel binding
information based on negotiated algorithms. This will allow
deploying new algorithms incrementally without breaking
interoperability with older implementations when new attacks arise in
the future.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The term "little-endian order" is used for brevity to refer to the
least-significant-octet-first encoding, while the term "big-endian
order" is used for the most-significant-octet-first encoding.
3. Channel Binding Hash Agility
When generating a channel binding verifier, Bnd, a hash is computed
from the channel binding fields. Initiators MUST populate the Bnd
field in order to maintain interoperability with existing acceptors.
In addition, initiators MUST populate the extension field (Exts)
defined below.
3.1. Structure of the Exts Field
The 0x8003 GSS checksum has the same structure described in [RFC4121]
except that the Exts field is now defined; the entire structure of
the 0x8003 checksum, including the now defined Exts field, follows:
Octet Name Description
-----------------------------------------------------------------
0..3 Lgth Number of octets in Bnd field, represented
in little-endian order; currently contains
hex value 10 00 00 00 (16).
4..19 Bnd Channel binding information, as described in
Section 4.1.1.2 of [RFC4121].
20..23 Flags Four-octet context-establishment flags in
little-endian order as described in Section
4.1.1.1 of [RFC4121].
24..25 DlgOpt The delegation option identifier (=1) in
little-endian order [optional]. This field
and the next two fields are present if and
only if GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG is set as described
in Section 4.1.1.1 of [RFC4121].
26..27 Dlgth The length of the Deleg field in
little-endian order [optional].
28..(n-1) Deleg KRB_CRED message (n = Dlgth + 28) [optional].
n..last Exts Extensions.
where Exts is the concatenation of zero, one, or more individual
extensions, each of which consists of the following, in order:
type -- big-endian-order unsigned integer, 32 bits, which
contains the type of extension
length -- big-endian-order unsigned integer, 32 bits, which
contains the length, in octets, of the extension data
encoded as an array of octets immediately following
this field
data -- octet string of extension information
If multiple extensions are present, then there MUST be at most one
instance of a given extension type.
3.2. The Channel Binding Extension
When channel binding is used, the Exts MUST include the following
extension:
data-type 0x00000000
data-value
The output obtained by applying the Kerberos V get_mic
operation [RFC3961] with key usage number 43 to the channel
binding data as described in [RFC4121], Section 4.1.1.2 (using
get_mic instead of MD5). The key used is the sub-session key
from the authenticator, if it is present; otherwise, the key
used is the session key from the ticket. The get_mic algorithm
is chosen as the "required checksum mechanism" for the
encryption type of the key used.
Initiators that are unwilling to use an MD5 hash of the channel
bindings MUST set the Bnd field to sixteen octets of hex value FF.
4. Security Considerations
With this mechanism, initiators get no indication as to whether the
acceptors check or ignore channel bindings.
It is up to the application whether or not to enforce the use of
channel bindings. [RFC5056] and [RFC5554] give guidance for
application developers on channel binding usage.
5. IANA Considerations
IANA has created a new top-level registry titled "Kerberos V GSS-API
Mechanism Parameters," separate from the existing Kerberos parameters
registry. Within this registry, IANA has created a sub-registry of
"Kerberos V GSS-API Mechanism Extension Types" with four-field
entries (Type Number, Type Name, Description, and Reference) and,
initially, a single registration: 0x00000000, "Channel Binding MIC,"
"Extension for the verifier of the channel bindings," [RFC6542].
Using the guidelines for allocation as described in [RFC5226], type
number assignments are as follows:
0x00000000 - 0x000003FF IETF Review
0x00000400 - 0xFFFFF3FF Specification Required
0xFFFFF400 - 0xFFFFFFFF Private Use
6. Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Larry Zhu, Nicolas Williams, Sam
Hartman, Jeffrey Hutzelman, and Simon Josefsson for their help in
reviewing and providing valuable feedback on this document.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3961] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005.
[RFC4121] Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and S. Hartman, "The Kerberos
Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism: Version 2", RFC 4121, July
2005.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007.
[RFC5554] Williams, N., "Clarifications and Extensions to the
Generic Security Service Application Program Interface
(GSS-API) for the Use of Channel Bindings", RFC 5554, May
2009.
[RFC6151] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
RFC 6151, March 2011.
Author's Address
Shawn Emery
Oracle
500 Eldorado Blvd, Building 1
Broomfield, CO 80021
USA
EMail: shawn.emery@oracle.com