| Rfc | 6402 |
|---|
| Title | Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Updates |
|---|
| Author | J. Schaad |
|---|
| Date | November
2011 |
|---|
| Format: | TXT, HTML |
|---|
| Updates | RFC5272, RFC5273, RFC5274 |
|---|
| Status: | PROPOSED STANDARD |
|---|
|
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Schaad
Request for Comments: 6402 Soaring Hawk Consulting
Updates: 5272, 5273, 5274 November 2011
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721
Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Updates
Abstract
This document contains a set of updates to the base syntax for CMC, a
Certificate Management protocol using the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS). This document updates RFC 5272, RFC 5273, and RFC
5274.
The new items in this document are: new controls for future work in
doing server side key generation, definition of a Subject Information
Access value to identify CMC servers, and the registration of a port
number for TCP/IP for the CMC service to run on.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Updates to RFC 5272 - "Certificate Management over CMS
(CMC)" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. New Section 1.3 - "Updates Made by RFC 6402" . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Update Section 6 - "Controls" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Replace Section 6.3 - "Linking Identity and POP
Information" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4. Replace Section 6.3.3 - "Renewal and Rekey Messages" . . . 5
2.5. New Section 6.20 - "RA Identity Proof Witness Control" . . 5
2.6. New Section 6.21 - "Response Body Control" . . . . . . . . 7
2.7. New Section 7 - "Other Attributes" . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.8. New Section 7.1 - "Change Subject Name Attribute" . . . . 8
2.9. New Section 9 - "Certificate Requirements" . . . . . . . . 10
2.10. New Section 9.1 - "Extended Key Usage" . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.11. New Section 9.2 - "Subject Information Access" . . . . . . 11
2.12. Update Section 8 - "Security Considerations" . . . . . . . 11
3. Updates to RFC 5273 - "Certificate Management over CMS
(CMC): Transport Protocols" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1. Update Section 5 - "TCP-Based Protocol" . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2. New Section 6 - "IANA Considerations" . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Updates to RFC 5274 - "Certificate Management Message over
CMS (CMC): Compliance Requirements" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Update to Section 4.2 - "Controls" . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.2. 2008 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1. Introduction
While dealing with the Suite B profile of CMC [RFC6403], a number of
deficiencies were noted in the current base CMC specification. This
document has a set of updates to [RFC5272], [RFC5273], and [RFC5274]
to deal with those issues.
1.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.2. Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this document. Terms are
used as defined in Section 2.1 of RFC 5272.
CA - Certification Authority
CRL - Certificate Revocation List
CRMF - Certificate Request Message Format
EE - End-Entity
MAC - Message Authentication Code
PKI - Public Key Infrastructure
RA - Registration Authority
2. Updates to RFC 5272 - "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)"
2.1. New Section 1.3 - "Updates Made by RFC 6402"
Insert this section before the current Section 1.3.
The following updates were made by RFC 6402.
o Add new controls:
RA Identity Witness allows for an RA to perform identity checking
using the identity and shared-secret, and then tell any
following servers that the identity check was successfully
performed.
Response Body allows for an RA to identify a nested response for
an EE to process.
o Create a new attribute, Change Subject Name, that allows a client
to request a change in the subject name and subject alternate name
fields in a certificate.
o Add Extended Key Usages for CMC to distinguish server types.
o Define a new Subject Information Access type to hold locations to
contact the CMC server.
o Clarify that the use of a pre-existing certificate is not limited
to just renewal and rekey messages and is required for support.
This formalizes a requirement for the ability to do renewal and
rekey that previously was implicit.
2.2. Update Section 6 - "Controls"
Update Table 1 by adding the following rows:
+--------------------------+-----------+-----------------+---------+
| Identifier Description | OID | ASN.1 Structure | Section |
+--------------------------+-----------+-----------------+---------+
| id-cmc-raIdentityWitness | id-cmc 35 | BodyPartPath | 6.20 |
| | | | |
| id-cmc-responseBody | id-cmc 37 | BodyPartPath | 6.21 |
+--------------------------+-----------+-----------------+---------+
Addition to Table 1: CMC Control Attributes
2.3. Replace Section 6.3 - "Linking Identity and POP Information"
Replace the text of the section with the following text.
In a CMC Full PKI Request, identity proof information about the
client is carried in the certificate associated with the signature of
the SignedData containing the certification requests, one of the two
identity proof controls or the MAC computed for the AuthenticatedData
containing the certification requests. Proof-of-possession (POP)
information for key pairs, however, is carried separately for each
PKCS #10 or CRMF certification request. (For keys capable of
generating a digital signature, the POP is provided by the signature
on the PKCS #10 or CRMF request. For encryption-only keys, the
controls described in Section 6.7 are used.) In order to prevent
substitution-style attacks, the protocol must guarantee that the same
entity supplied both the POP and proof-of-identity information.
We describe three mechanisms for linking identity and POP
information: witness values cryptographically derived from a shared-
secret (Section 6.3.1), shared-secret/subject name matching (Section
6.3.2), and subject name matching to an existing certificate (Section
6.3.3). Clients and servers MUST support the witness value and the
certificate linking techniques. Clients and servers MAY support
shared-secret/name matching or MAY support other bilateral techniques
of similar strength. The idea behind the first two mechanisms is to
force the client to sign some data into each certification request
that can be directly associated with the shared-secret; this will
defeat attempts to include certification requests from different
entities in a single Full PKI Request.
2.4. Replace Section 6.3.3 - "Renewal and Rekey Messages"
Make the new section title "Existing Certificate Linking". Replace
all text in this section with this text.
Linking between the POP and an identity is easy when an existing
certificate is used. The client copies all of the naming information
from the existing certificate (subject name and subject alternative
name) into the new certification request. The POP on the new public
key is then performed by using the new key to sign the identity
information (linking the POP to a specific identity). The identity
information is then tied to the POP information by signing the entire
enrollment request with the private key of the existing certificate.
Existing certificate linking can be used in the following
circumstances:
When replacing a certificate by doing a renewal or rekey
certification request.
Using an existing certificate to get a new certificate. An
example of this would be to get a key establishment certificate
after having gotten a signature certificate.
Using a third-party certificate to get a new certificate from a
CA. An example of this would be using a certificate and key pair
distributed with a device to prove an identity. This requires
that the CA have an out-of-band channel to map the identity in the
device certificate to the new EE identity.
2.5. New Section 6.20 - "RA Identity Proof Witness Control"
Insert this section.
The RA Identity Proof Witness control allows an RA to indicate to
subsequent control processors that all of the identity proof
requirements have been met. This permits the identity proof to be
performed at a location closer to the end-entity. For example, the
identity proof could be done at multiple physical locations, while
the CA could operate on a company-wide basis. The RA performs the
identity proof, and potentially other tasks that require the secret
to be used, while the CA is prevented from knowing the secret. If
the identity proof fails, then the RA returns an error to the client
denoting that fact.
The relevant ASN.1 for the RA Identity Proof Witness control is as
follows:
cmc-raIdentityWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ BodyPartPath IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-raIdentityWitness }
id-cmc-raIdentityWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 35}
The above ASN.1 defines the following items:
cmc-raIdentityWitness is a CMC-CONTROL associating the object
identifier id-cmc-raIdentityWitness and the type BodyPartPath.
This object is omitted from the 1988 module. The object is added
to the object set Cmc-Control-Set. The control is permitted to
appear only in the control sequence of a PKIData object. It MUST
NOT appear in the control sequence of a PKIResponse. The control
is permitted to be used only by an RA. The control may appear
multiple times in a control sequence with each occurrence pointing
to a different object.
id-cmc-raIdentityWitness is the object identifier used to identify
this CMC control.
BodyPartPath is the type structure associated with the control. The
syntax of BodyPartPath is defined in Section 3.2.2. The path
contains a sequence of body part identifiers leading to one of the
following items:
Identity Proof control if the RA verified the identity proof in
this control.
Identity Proof Version 2 control if the RA verified the identity
proof in this control.
Full PKI Request if the RA performed an out-of-band identity
proof for this request. The request SHOULD NOT contain either
Identity Proof control.
Simple PKI Request if the RA performed an out-of-band identity
proof for this request.
The RA Identity Proof Witness control will frequently be associated
with a Modify Certification Request control, which changes the name
fields in the associated certification requests. This is because the
RA knows the actual name to be assigned to the entity requesting the
certificate, and the end-entity does not yet have the details of the
name. (The association would be set up by the operator at the time
the shared-secret was generated by the RA.)
When this control is placed in a message, it is RECOMMENDED that the
Control Processed control be placed in the body sequence as well.
Using the explicit new control, rather than implicitly relying on the
Control Processed control is important due to the need to know
explicitly which identity proofs have been performed. The new
control also allows an RA to state that out-of-band identity proofs
have been performed.
When the identity proof is performed by an RA, the RA also MUST
validate the linking between the identity proof and the name
information wrapped inside of the key proof-of-possession.
2.6. New Section 6.21 - "Response Body Control"
Insert this section.
The Response Body Control is designed to enable an RA to inform an EE
that there is an embedded response message that MUST be processed as
part of the processing of this message. This control is designed to
be used in a couple of different cases where an RA has done some
additional processing for the certification request, e.g., as key
generation. When an RA performs key generation on behalf of an EE,
the RA MUST respond with both the original response message from the
certificate issuer (containing the certificate issuance) as part of
the response generated by the RA (containing the new key). Another
case where this is useful is when the secret is shared between the RA
and the EE (rather than between the CA and the EE) and the RA returns
the Publish Trust Anchors control (to populate the correct trust
points).
The relevant ASN.1 for the Response Body Control is as follows:
cmc-responseBody CMC-CONTROL ::= {
BodyPartPath IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-responseBody
}
id-cmc-responseBody OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 37}
The above ASN.1 defines the following items:
cmc-responseBody is a CMC-CONTROL associating the object identifier
id-cmc-responseBody with the type BodyPartPath. This object is
omitted from the 1988 module. The object is added to the object
set Cmc-Control-Set. The control is permitted to appear only in
the control sequence of a PKIResponse. The control MUST NOT
appear in the control sequence of a PKIData. It is expected that
only an intermediary RA will use this control; a CA generally does
not need the control as it is creating the original innermost
message.
id-cmc-responseBody is the object identifier used to identify this
CMC control.
BodyPartPath is the type structure associated with the control. The
syntax of BodyPartPath is defined in Section 3.2.2. The path
contains a sequence of body part identifiers leading to a
cmsSequence item which contains a PKIResponse within it.
2.7. New Section 7 - "Other Attributes"
Insert this section before the current Section 7.
There are a number of different locations where various types of
attributes can be placed in either a CMC request or a CMC response
message. These places include the attribute sequence of a PKCS #10
request, controls in CRMF (Section 6 of [RFC4211]), and the various
CMS attribute sequences.
2.8. New Section 7.1 - "Change Subject Name Attribute"
Insert this section.
The Client Name Change Request attribute is designed for a client to
ask for a change in its name as part of a certification request.
Because of security issues, this cannot be done in the simple way of
just changing the requested subject name in the certificate template.
The name in the certification request MUST match the name in the
certificate used to verify the request, in order that identity and
possession proofs are correctly applied.
The relevant ASN.1 for the Client Name Change Request attribute is as
follows:
at-cmc-changeSubjectName ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ ChangeSubjectName IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-changeSubjectName }
id-cmc-changeSubjectName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 36}
ChangeSubjectName ::= SEQUENCE {
subject Name OPTIONAL,
subjectAlt SubjectAltName OPTIONAL
}
(WITH COMPONENTS {..., subject PRESENT} |
COMPONENTS {..., subjectAlt PRESENT} )
The attribute is designed to be used as an ATTRIBUTE object. As
such, the attribute is placed in one of the following two places:
The attributes field in a CertificationRequest.
The controls field of a CertRequest for a CRMF certification
request.
The control is identified by the Object Identifier
id-cmc-changeSubjectName.
The ASN.1 type associated with control is ChangeSubjectName. The
fields of the structure are configured as follows:
subject contains the requested subject name for the new certificate.
subjectAlt contains the requested subject alternative name for the
new certificate.
At least one of the fields in the sequence MUST be present when
encoding the structure.
When the CA processes this attribute in a certification request, it
will do the following:
1. If present, the subject field is copied to the name field of the
template. If the subject field is absent, the name field of the
template will be set to a empty sequence.
2. If present, the subjectAlt field is used as the content of a
SubjectAltName extension in the certificate. If the subjectAlt
field is absent, the subjectAltName extension is removed from the
certificate template.
2.9. New Section 9 - "Certificate Requirements"
Insert this section before the current Section 8.
Certificates for servers used in the CMC protocol SHOULD conform to
the profile defined in [RFC5280]. This document defines some
additional items that MAY appear in CMC server certificates. Section
9.1 defines some additional values for the Extended Key Usage
extension. Section 9.2 defines a new Subject Information Access
value that allows for a CMC certificate to publish information on how
to contact the services it provides.
2.10. New Section 9.1 - "Extended Key Usage"
Insert this section.
The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension is used to restrict the use of
a certificate to specific applications. We define three different
EKUs in this document. The ASN.1 to define these EKUs is:
id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmcArchive OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 29 }
The usage description for each of the EKUs is as follows:
CMC Certification Authorities are identified by the id-kp-cmcCA
extended key usage. The certificate may be the same as or
different than the CA certificate. If a different certificate is
used, the certificates containing the id-kp-cmcCA extended key
usage SHOULD have the same name as the certificate used for
issuing the certificates. (Using a separate key pair for CMC
protocol operations and for issuing certificates and CRLs
decreases the number of operations for which the private key used
to sign certificates and CRLs would be used.)
CMC Registration Authorities are identified by the id-kp-cmcRA
extended key usage. This usage is placed into RA certificates.
CMC Archive Servers are identified by the id-kp-cmcArchive extended
key usage. CMC Archive Servers and the associated protocol are to
be defined in a future document.
2.11. New Section 9.2 - "Subject Information Access"
Insert this section.
The subject information access extension indicates how to access
information and services for the subject of the certificate. We
define a new value for use in this extension, to identify the
different locations that CMC services will be available. If this
value is placed in a certificate, an appropriate extended key usage
defined in Section 9.1 MUST be included in the certificate as well.
The id-ad-cmc OID is used when the subject offers certification
services using the CMC protocol. If the CMC services are available
via HTTP or FTP, accessLocation MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier.
If the CMC services are available via electronic mail, accessLocation
MUST be an rfc822Name. If CMC services are available using TCP/IP,
the dNSName or iPAddress name forms MUST be used. Since the
GeneralName data structure does not permit the inclusion of a port
number, in the absence of other external configuration information,
the value of 5318 should be used. (The port registration is in
Section 3.2.) The semantics of other name forms of accessLocation
(when accessMethod is id-ad-cmc) are not defined by this
specification.
The ASN.1 type for this extension is GeneralName (see Section 4.2.1.8
of [RFC5280]).
id-ad-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 12 }
2.12. Update Section 8 - "Security Considerations"
Add the following paragraphs to the end of Section 8.
A number of controls such as the RA Identity Proof Witness control
exist for an RA to either make assertions about or modify a
certification request. Any upstream request processor, such as a CA,
MUST verify that the RA is fully identified and authorized to make
the assertion or modification it is claiming. If it is not
identified or authorized, then any request MUST be rejected.
CMC servers, both RAs and CAs, need to perform due diligence in
checking the contents of a certification request. At an absolute
minimum, all fields should be checked to ensure that the policies of
the CA/RA are correctly enforced. While all fields need to be
checked, special care should be taken with names, name forms,
algorithm choices, and algorithm parameters.
3. Updates to RFC 5273 - "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC):
Transport Protocols"
3.1. Update Section 5 - "TCP-Based Protocol"
Replace paragraph 3 in Section 5 with the following.
CMC requires a registered port number to send and receive CMC
messages over TCP. The title of this IP Protocol number is
"pkix-cmc". The value of this TCP port is 5318.
Prior to this update, CMC did not have a registered port number and
used an externally configured port from the Private Port range.
Client implementations MAY want to continue to allow for this to
occur. Servers SHOULD change to use the new port. It is expected
that HTTP will continue to be the primary transport method used by
CMC installations.
3.2. New Section 6 - "IANA Considerations"
Insert this new section before the current Section 6.
IANA has assigned a TCP port number in the Registered Port Number
range for the use of CMC.
Service name: pkix-cmc
Port Number: 5318
Transport protocol: TCP
Description: PKIX Certificate Management using CMS (CMC)
Reference: RFC 6402
Assignee: iesg@ietf.org
Contact: chair@ietf.org
4. Updates to RFC 5274 - "Certificate Management Message over CMS
(CMC): Compliance Requirements"
4.1. Update to Section 4.2 - "Controls"
Add the following lines to the end of Table 1.
The following table lists the name and level of support required for
each control.
+---------------------------+-----+------+-----+
| Control | EE | RA | CA |
+---------------------------+-----+------+-----+
| RA Identity Proof Witness | N/A | MUST | (2) |
| | | | |
| Response Body | (6) | (6) | N/A |
+---------------------------+-----+------+-----+
Addition to Table 1: CMC Control Attributes
The following note should be added.
6. EE's SHOULD implement if designed to work with RAs and MUST
implement if intended to be used in environments where RAs are
used for identity validation or key generation. RAs SHOULD
implement and validate responses for consistency.
5. IANA Considerations
This document contains a new IANA Considerations section to be added
to [RFC5273] as part of this update.
6. Security Considerations
No changes are made to the existing security considerations of RFC
5273 and RFC 5274. The security considerations for RFC 5272 have
been slightly modified (Section 2.12).
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5272] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over
CMS (CMC)", RFC 5272, June 2008.
[RFC5273] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over
CMS (CMC): Transport Protocols", RFC 5273, June 2008.
[RFC5274] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management
Messages over CMS (CMC): Compliance Requirements",
RFC 5274, June 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
7.2. Informative References
[CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
STD 70, RFC 5652, September 2009.
[RFC6403] Zieglar, L., Turner, S., and M. Peck, "Suite B Profile
of Certificate Management over CMS", RFC 6403, November
2011.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
September 2005.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)",
RFC 5912, June 2010.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module
This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for [RFC5272]. This
module replaces the module in Appendix A of that document. Although
a 2008 ASN.1 module is provided, this remains the normative module as
per the policy of the PKIX working group.
EnrollmentMessageSyntax-2011-v88
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-enrollMsgSyntax-2011-88(76) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS All --
-- The types and values defined in this module are exported for use
-- in the other ASN.1 modules. Other applications may use them for
-- their own purposes.
IMPORTS
-- PKIX Part 1 - Implicit From [RFC5280]
GeneralName, CRLReason, ReasonFlags, GeneralNames
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-implicit(19)}
-- PKIX Part 1 - Explicit From [RFC5280]
AlgorithmIdentifier, Extension, Name, CertificateSerialNumber,
id-ad, id-kp
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit(18)}
-- Cryptographic Message Syntax FROM [CMS]
ContentInfo, Attribute, IssuerAndSerialNumber
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
modules(0) cms-2004(24)}
-- CRMF FROM [RFC4211]
CertReqMsg, PKIPublicationInfo, CertTemplate
FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-crmf2005(36)};
-- Global Types
-- UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING
-- The content of this type conforms to RFC 3629.
id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) }
id-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 7} -- CMC controls
id-cct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 12} -- CMC content types
-- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING
id-cmc-identityProof OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 3}
id-cmc-dataReturn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 4}
id-cmc-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 18}
id-cmc-responseInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 19}
id-cmc-queryPending OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 21}
id-cmc-popLinkRandom OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 22}
id-cmc-popLinkWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 23}
-- The following controls have the type UTF8String
id-cmc-identification OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 2}
-- The following controls have the type INTEGER
id-cmc-transactionId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 5}
-- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING
id-cmc-senderNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 6}
id-cmc-recipientNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 7}
-- This is the content type used for a request message
-- in the protocol
id-cct-PKIData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 2 }
PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
controlSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
reqSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest,
cmsSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
otherMsgSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
}
bodyIdMax INTEGER ::= 4294967295
BodyPartID ::= INTEGER(0..bodyIdMax)
TaggedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
attrValues SET OF AttributeValue
}
AttributeValue ::= ANY
TaggedRequest ::= CHOICE {
tcr [0] TaggedCertificationRequest,
crm [1] CertReqMsg,
orm [2] SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
requestMessageType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
requestMessageValue ANY DEFINED BY requestMessageType
}
}
TaggedCertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
certificationRequest CertificationRequest
}
CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
certificationRequestInfo SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER,
subject Name,
subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING },
attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute },
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING
}
TaggedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
contentInfo ContentInfo
}
OtherMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
otherMsgType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
otherMsgValue ANY DEFINED BY otherMsgType }
-- This defines the response message in the protocol
id-cct-PKIResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 3 }
ResponseBody ::= PKIResponse
PKIResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
controlSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
cmsSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
otherMsgSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
}
-- Used to return status state in a response
id-cmc-statusInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 1}
CMCStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
cMCStatus CMCStatus,
bodyList SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID,
statusString UTF8String OPTIONAL,
otherInfo CHOICE {
failInfo CMCFailInfo,
pendInfo PendInfo } OPTIONAL
}
PendInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
pendToken OCTET STRING,
pendTime GeneralizedTime
}
CMCStatus ::= INTEGER {
success (0),
failed (2),
pending (3),
noSupport (4),
confirmRequired (5),
popRequired (6),
partial (7)
}
-- Note:
-- The spelling of unsupportedExt is corrected in this version.
-- In RFC 2797, it was unsuportedExt.
CMCFailInfo ::= INTEGER {
badAlg (0),
badMessageCheck (1),
badRequest (2),
badTime (3),
badCertId (4),
unsupportedExt (5),
mustArchiveKeys (6),
badIdentity (7),
popRequired (8),
popFailed (9),
noKeyReuse (10),
internalCAError (11),
tryLater (12),
authDataFail (13)
}
-- Used for RAs to add extensions to certification requests
id-cmc-addExtensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 8}
AddExtensions ::= SEQUENCE {
pkiDataReference BodyPartID,
certReferences SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID,
extensions SEQUENCE OF Extension
}
id-cmc-encryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 9}
id-cmc-decryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 10}
EncryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
request TaggedRequest,
cms ContentInfo,
thePOPAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier,
witnessAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier,
witness OCTET STRING
}
DecryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
thePOPAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier,
thePOP OCTET STRING
}
id-cmc-lraPOPWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 11}
LraPopWitness ::= SEQUENCE {
pkiDataBodyid BodyPartID,
bodyIds SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID
}
--
id-cmc-getCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 15}
GetCert ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName GeneralName,
serialNumber INTEGER }
id-cmc-getCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 16}
GetCRL ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName Name,
cRLName GeneralName OPTIONAL,
time GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
reasons ReasonFlags OPTIONAL }
id-cmc-revokeRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 17}
RevokeRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName Name,
serialNumber INTEGER,
reason CRLReason,
invalidityDate GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
passphrase OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
comment UTF8String OPTIONAL }
id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 24}
CMCCertId ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber
-- The following is used to request V3 extensions be added to a
-- certificate
id-ExtensionReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 14}
ExtensionReq ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension
-- The following exists to allow Diffie-Hellman Certification
-- Request Messages to be well-formed
id-alg-noSignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 2}
NoSignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING
-- Unauthenticated attribute to carry removable data.
-- This could be used in an update of "CMC Extensions: Server
-- Side Key Generation and Key Escrow" (February 2005) and in
-- other documents.
id-aa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2)}
id-aa-cmc-unsignedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-aa 34}
CMCUnsignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartPath BodyPartPath,
identifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
content ANY DEFINED BY identifier
}
-- Replaces CMC Status Info
--
id-cmc-statusInfoV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 25}
CMCStatusInfoV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
cMCStatus CMCStatus,
bodyList SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
BodyPartReference,
statusString UTF8String OPTIONAL,
otherInfo CHOICE {
failInfo CMCFailInfo,
pendInfo PendInfo,
extendedFailInfo SEQUENCE {
failInfoOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
failInfoValue AttributeValue
}
} OPTIONAL
}
BodyPartReference ::= CHOICE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
bodyPartPath BodyPartPath
}
BodyPartPath ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID
-- Allow for distribution of trust anchors
--
id-cmc-trustedAnchors OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 26}
PublishTrustAnchors ::= SEQUENCE {
seqNumber INTEGER,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
anchorHashes SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING
}
id-cmc-authData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 27}
AuthPublish ::= BodyPartID
-- These two items use BodyPartList
id-cmc-batchRequests OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 28}
id-cmc-batchResponses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 29}
BodyPartList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID
--
id-cmc-publishCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 30}
CMCPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg AlgorithmIdentifier,
certHashes SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING,
pubInfo PKIPublicationInfo
}
id-cmc-modCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 31}
ModCertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
pkiDataReference BodyPartPath,
certReferences BodyPartList,
replace BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
certTemplate CertTemplate
}
-- Inform follow-on servers that one or more controls have already
-- been processed
id-cmc-controlProcessed OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 32}
ControlsProcessed ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyList SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF BodyPartReference
}
-- Identity Proof control w/ algorithm agility
id-cmc-identityProofV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 34 }
IdentifyProofV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
proofAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier,
macAlgId AlgorithmIdentifier,
witness OCTET STRING
}
id-cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 33 }
PopLinkWitnessV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
keyGenAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
macAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
witness OCTET STRING
}
--
id-cmc-raIdentityWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 35}
--
-- Allow for an End-Entity to request a change in name.
-- This item is added to RegControlSet in CRMF.
--
id-cmc-changeSubjectName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 36}
ChangeSubjectName ::= SEQUENCE {
subject Name OPTIONAL,
subjectAlt GeneralNames OPTIONAL
}
-- (WITH COMPONENTS {..., subject PRESENT} |
-- WITH COMPONENTS {..., subjectAlt PRESENT} )
--
-- Embedded response from a third party for processing
--
id-cmc-responseBody OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 37}
--
-- Key purpose identifiers are in the Extended Key Usage extension
--
id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmcArchive OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
--
-- Subject Information Access identifier
--
id-ad-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 12 }
END
A.2. 2008 ASN.1 Module
An updated 2008 ASN.1 module has been provided as part of this
update. The module contains those changes that were done to update
the current ASN.1 standards (done for [RFC5912]) as well as changes
made for this document.
EnrollmentMessageSyntax-2011-v08
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-enrollMsgSyntax-2011-08(76)}
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
AttributeSet{}, Extension{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, KEY-WRAP, KEY-DERIVATION,
MAC-ALGORITHM, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}
CertificateSerialNumber, GeneralName, CRLReason, ReasonFlags,
CertExtensions, GeneralNames
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}
Name, id-pkix, PublicKeyAlgorithms, SignatureAlgorithms, id-ad, id-kp
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}
ContentInfo, IssuerAndSerialNumber, CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }
CertReqMsg, PKIPublicationInfo, CertTemplate
FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005-02(55)}
mda-sha1
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56)}
kda-PBKDF2, maca-hMAC-SHA1
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms-2009
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cmsalg-2001-02(37) }
mda-sha256
FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54) } ;
-- CMS content types defined in this document
CMC-ContentTypes CONTENT-TYPE ::= { ct-PKIData | ct-PKIResponse, ... }
-- Signature Algorithms defined in this document
SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { sa-noSignature }
-- CMS Unsigned Attributes
CMC-UnsignedAtts ATTRIBUTE ::= { aa-cmc-unsignedData }
--
--
id-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 7} -- CMC controls
id-cct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 12} -- CMC content types
-- This is the content type for a request message in the protocol
ct-PKIData CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE PKIData IDENTIFIED BY id-cct-PKIData }
id-cct-PKIData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 2 }
PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
controlSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
reqSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest,
cmsSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
otherMsgSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
}
BodyPartID ::= INTEGER(0..4294967295)
TaggedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
attrType CMC-CONTROL.&id({Cmc-Control-Set}),
attrValues SET OF CMC-CONTROL.
&Type({Cmc-Control-Set}{@attrType})
}
Cmc-Control-Set CMC-CONTROL ::= {
cmc-identityProof | cmc-dataReturn | cmc-regInfo |
cmc-responseInfo | cmc-queryPending | cmc-popLinkRandom |
cmc-popLinkWitness | cmc-identification | cmc-transactionId |
cmc-senderNonce | cmc-recipientNonce | cmc-statusInfo |
cmc-addExtensions | cmc-encryptedPOP | cmc-decryptedPOP |
cmc-lraPOPWitness | cmc-getCert | cmc-getCRL |
cmc-revokeRequest | cmc-confirmCertAcceptance |
cmc-statusInfoV2 | cmc-trustedAnchors | cmc-authData |
cmc-batchRequests | cmc-batchResponses | cmc-publishCert |
cmc-modCertTemplate | cmc-controlProcessed |
cmc-identityProofV2 | cmc-popLinkWitnessV2, ...,
cmc-raIdentityWitness | cmc-responseBody }
OTHER-REQUEST ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
-- We do not define any other requests in this document.
-- Examples might be attribute certification requests.
OtherRequests OTHER-REQUEST ::= {...}
TaggedRequest ::= CHOICE {
tcr [0] TaggedCertificationRequest,
crm [1] CertReqMsg,
orm [2] SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
requestMessageType OTHER-REQUEST.&id({OtherRequests}),
requestMessageValue OTHER-REQUEST.&Type({OtherRequests}
{@.requestMessageType})
}
}
TaggedCertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
certificationRequest CertificationRequest
}
AttributeList ATTRIBUTE ::= {at-extension-req, ...,
at-cmc-changeSubjectName}
CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
certificationRequestInfo SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER,
subject Name,
subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY,
{PublicKeyAlgorithms}},
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING
},
attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF
AttributeSet{{AttributeList}}
},
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
{SignatureAlgorithms}},
signature BIT STRING
}
TaggedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
contentInfo ContentInfo
}
OTHER-MSG ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
-- No other messages currently defined
OtherMsgSet OTHER-MSG ::= {...}
OtherMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
otherMsgType OTHER-MSG.&id({OtherMsgSet}),
otherMsgValue OTHER-MSG.&Type({OtherMsgSet}{@otherMsgType}) }
-- This defines the response message in the protocol
ct-PKIResponse CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE PKIResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-cct-PKIResponse }
id-cct-PKIResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 3 }
ResponseBody ::= PKIResponse
PKIResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
controlSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
cmsSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
otherMsgSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
}
CMC-CONTROL ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
-- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING
cmc-identityProof CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-identityProof }
id-cmc-identityProof OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 3}
cmc-dataReturn CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-dataReturn }
id-cmc-dataReturn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 4}
cmc-regInfo CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-regInfo }
id-cmc-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 18}
cmc-responseInfo CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-responseInfo }
id-cmc-responseInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 19}
cmc-queryPending CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-queryPending }
id-cmc-queryPending OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 21}
cmc-popLinkRandom CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-popLinkRandom }
id-cmc-popLinkRandom OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 22}
cmc-popLinkWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-popLinkWitness }
id-cmc-popLinkWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 23}
-- The following controls have the type UTF8String
cmc-identification CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ UTF8String IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-identification }
id-cmc-identification OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 2}
-- The following controls have the type INTEGER
cmc-transactionId CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ INTEGER IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-transactionId }
id-cmc-transactionId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 5}
-- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING
cmc-senderNonce CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-senderNonce }
id-cmc-senderNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 6}
cmc-recipientNonce CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-recipientNonce }
id-cmc-recipientNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 7}
-- Used to return status in a response
cmc-statusInfo CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ CMCStatusInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-statusInfo }
id-cmc-statusInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 1}
CMCStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
cMCStatus CMCStatus,
bodyList SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID,
statusString UTF8String OPTIONAL,
otherInfo CHOICE {
failInfo CMCFailInfo,
pendInfo PendInfo
} OPTIONAL
}
PendInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
pendToken OCTET STRING,
pendTime GeneralizedTime
}
CMCStatus ::= INTEGER {
success (0),
failed (2),
pending (3),
noSupport (4),
confirmRequired (5),
popRequired (6),
partial (7)
}
CMCFailInfo ::= INTEGER {
badAlg (0),
badMessageCheck (1),
badRequest (2),
badTime (3),
badCertId (4),
unsuportedExt (5),
mustArchiveKeys (6),
badIdentity (7),
popRequired (8),
popFailed (9),
noKeyReuse (10),
internalCAError (11),
tryLater (12),
authDataFail (13)
}
-- Used for RAs to add extensions to certification requests
cmc-addExtensions CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ AddExtensions IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-addExtensions }
id-cmc-addExtensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 8}
AddExtensions ::= SEQUENCE {
pkiDataReference BodyPartID,
certReferences SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID,
extensions SEQUENCE OF Extension{{CertExtensions}}
}
cmc-encryptedPOP CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ EncryptedPOP IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-encryptedPOP }
cmc-decryptedPOP CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ DecryptedPOP IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-decryptedPOP }
id-cmc-encryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 9}
id-cmc-decryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 10}
EncryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
request TaggedRequest,
cms ContentInfo,
thePOPAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
witnessAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
{WitnessAlgs}},
witness OCTET STRING
}
POPAlgs MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {maca-hMAC-SHA1, ...}
WitnessAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {mda-sha1, ...}
DecryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
thePOPAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
thePOP OCTET STRING
}
cmc-lraPOPWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ LraPopWitness IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-lraPOPWitness }
id-cmc-lraPOPWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 11}
LraPopWitness ::= SEQUENCE {
pkiDataBodyid BodyPartID,
bodyIds SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID
}
--
cmc-getCert CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ GetCert IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-getCert }
id-cmc-getCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 15}
GetCert ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName GeneralName,
serialNumber INTEGER }
cmc-getCRL CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ GetCRL IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-getCRL }
id-cmc-getCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 16}
GetCRL ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName Name,
cRLName GeneralName OPTIONAL,
time GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
reasons ReasonFlags OPTIONAL }
cmc-revokeRequest CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ RevokeRequest IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-revokeRequest}
id-cmc-revokeRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 17}
RevokeRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName Name,
serialNumber INTEGER,
reason CRLReason,
invalidityDate GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
passphrase OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
comment UTF8String OPTIONAL }
cmc-confirmCertAcceptance CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ CMCCertId IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance }
id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 24}
CMCCertId ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber
-- The following is used to request V3 extensions be added
-- to a certificate
at-extension-req ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE ExtensionReq IDENTIFIED BY id-ExtensionReq }
id-ExtensionReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 14}
ExtensionReq ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
Extension{{CertExtensions}}
-- The following allows Diffie-Hellman Certification Request
-- Messages to be well-formed
sa-noSignature SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-noSignature
VALUE NoSignatureValue
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
HASHES { mda-sha1 }
}
id-alg-noSignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 2}
NoSignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING
-- Unauthenticated attribute to carry removable data.
id-aa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2)}
aa-cmc-unsignedData ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE CMCUnsignedData IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-cmc-unsignedData }
id-aa-cmc-unsignedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-aa 34}
CMCUnsignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartPath BodyPartPath,
identifier TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&id,
content TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&Type
}
-- Replaces CMC Status Info
--
cmc-statusInfoV2 CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ CMCStatusInfoV2 IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-statusInfoV2 }
id-cmc-statusInfoV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 25}
EXTENDED-FAILURE-INFO ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
ExtendedFailures EXTENDED-FAILURE-INFO ::= {...}
CMCStatusInfoV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
cMCStatus CMCStatus,
bodyList SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
BodyPartReference,
statusString UTF8String OPTIONAL,
otherInfo CHOICE {
failInfo CMCFailInfo,
pendInfo PendInfo,
extendedFailInfo [1] SEQUENCE {
failInfoOID TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&id
({ExtendedFailures}),
failInfoValue TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&Type
({ExtendedFailures}
{@.failInfoOID})
}
} OPTIONAL
}
BodyPartReference ::= CHOICE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
bodyPartPath BodyPartPath
}
BodyPartPath ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID
-- Allow for distribution of trust anchors
--
cmc-trustedAnchors CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ PublishTrustAnchors IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-trustedAnchors }
id-cmc-trustedAnchors OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 26}
PublishTrustAnchors ::= SEQUENCE {
seqNumber INTEGER,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
{HashAlgorithms}},
anchorHashes SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING
}
HashAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
mda-sha1 | mda-sha256, ...
}
cmc-authData CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ AuthPublish IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-authData }
id-cmc-authData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 27}
AuthPublish ::= BodyPartID
-- These two items use BodyPartList
cmc-batchRequests CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ BodyPartList IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-batchRequests }
id-cmc-batchRequests OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 28}
cmc-batchResponses CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ BodyPartList IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-batchResponses }
id-cmc-batchResponses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 29}
BodyPartList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID
cmc-publishCert CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ CMCPublicationInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-publishCert }
id-cmc-publishCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 30}
CMCPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
{HashAlgorithms}},
certHashes SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING,
pubInfo PKIPublicationInfo
}
cmc-modCertTemplate CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ ModCertTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-modCertTemplate }
id-cmc-modCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 31}
ModCertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
pkiDataReference BodyPartPath,
certReferences BodyPartList,
replace BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
certTemplate CertTemplate
}
-- Inform follow-on servers that one or more controls have
-- already been processed
cmc-controlProcessed CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ ControlsProcessed IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-controlProcessed }
id-cmc-controlProcessed OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 32}
ControlsProcessed ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyList SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF BodyPartReference
}
-- Identity Proof control w/ algorithm agility
cmc-identityProofV2 CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ IdentityProofV2 IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-identityProofV2 }
id-cmc-identityProofV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 33 }
IdentityProofV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
proofAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
{WitnessAlgs}},
macAlgId AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
witness OCTET STRING
}
cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ PopLinkWitnessV2 IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 }
id-cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 34 }
PopLinkWitnessV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
keyGenAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{KEY-DERIVATION,
{KeyDevAlgs}},
macAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
witness OCTET STRING
}
KeyDevAlgs KEY-DERIVATION ::= {kda-PBKDF2, ...}
cmc-raIdentityWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ BodyPartPath IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-raIdentityWitness }
id-cmc-raIdentityWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 35}
--
-- Allow for an End-Entity to request a change in name.
-- This item is added to RegControlSet in CRMF.
--
at-cmc-changeSubjectName ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE ChangeSubjectName IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-changeSubjectName }
id-cmc-changeSubjectName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 36}
ChangeSubjectName ::= SEQUENCE {
subject Name OPTIONAL,
subjectAlt GeneralNames OPTIONAL
}
(WITH COMPONENTS {..., subject PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS {..., subjectAlt PRESENT} )
--
-- Embedded response from a third party for processing
--
cmc-responseBody CMC-CONTROL ::= {
BodyPartPath IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-responseBody
}
id-cmc-responseBody OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 37}
--
-- Key purpose identifiers are in the Extended Key Usage extension
--
id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmcArchive OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 29 }
--
-- Subject Information Access identifier
--
id-ad-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 12 }
END
Author's Address
Jim Schaad
Soaring Hawk Consulting
EMail: jimsch@augustcellars.com