| Rfc | 4491 |
|---|
| Title | Using the GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and CRL Profile |
|---|
| Author | S. Leontiev, Ed., D. Shefanovski, Ed. |
|---|
| Date | May 2006 |
|---|
| Format: | TXT, HTML |
|---|
| Updates | RFC3279 |
|---|
| Status: | PROPOSED
STANDARD |
|---|
|
Network Working Group S. Leontiev, Ed.
Request for Comments: 4491 CRYPTO-PRO
Updates: 3279 D. Shefanovski, Ed.
Category: Standards Track Mobile TeleSystems OJSC
May 2006
Using the GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and
GOST R 34.11-94 Algorithms with the
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and CRL Profile
Status of This Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
This document supplements RFC 3279. It describes encoding formats,
identifiers, and parameter formats for the algorithms GOST R 34.10-
94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94 for use in Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. Requirement Words ..........................................3
2. Algorithm Support ...............................................3
2.1. One-Way Hash Function ......................................3
2.1.1. One-Way Hash Function GOST R 34.11-94 ...............3
2.2. Signature Algorithms .......................................4
2.2.1. Signature Algorithm GOST R 34.10-94 .................4
2.2.2. Signature Algorithm GOST R 34.10-2001 ...............5
2.3. Subject Public Key Algorithms ..............................5
2.3.1. GOST R 34.10-94 Keys ................................6
2.3.2. GOST R 34.10-2001 Keys ..............................8
3. Security Considerations .........................................9
4. Examples .......................................................10
4.1. GOST R 34.10-94 Certificate ...............................10
4.2. GOST R 34.10-2001 Certificate .............................12
5. Acknowledgements ...............................................15
6. References .....................................................16
6.1. Normative References ......................................16
6.2. Informative References ....................................17
1. Introduction
This document supplements RFC 3279 [PKALGS]. It describes the
conventions for using the GOST R 34.10-94 [GOST3431095, GOSTR341094]
and GOST R 34.10-2001 [GOST3431004, GOSTR341001] signature
algorithms, VKO GOST R 34.10-94 and VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 key
derivation algorithms, and GOST R 34.11-94 [GOST3431195, GOSTR341194]
one-way hash function in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) [PROFILE].
This document provides supplemental information and specifications
needed by the "Russian Cryptographic Software Compatibility
Agreement" community.
The algorithm identifiers and associated parameters are specified for
subject public keys that employ the GOST R 34.10-94 [GOSTR341094]/VKO
GOST R 34.10-94 [CPALGS] or the GOST R 34.10-2001 [GOSTR341001]/VKO
GOST R 34.10-2001 [CPALGS] algorithms, as is the encoding format for
the signatures produced by these algorithms. Also, the algorithm
identifiers for using the GOST R 34.11-94 one-way hash function with
the GOST R 34.10-94 and GOST R 34.10-2001 signature algorithms are
specified.
This specification defines the contents of the signatureAlgorithm,
signatureValue, signature, and subjectPublicKeyInfo fields within
X.509 Certificates and CRLs. For each algorithm, the appropriate
alternatives for the keyUsage certificate extension are provided.
ASN.1 modules, including all the definitions used in this document,
can be found in [CPALGS].
1.1. Requirement Words
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Algorithm Support
This section is an overview of cryptographic algorithms that may be
used within the Internet X.509 certificates and CRL profile
[PROFILE]. It describes one-way hash functions and digital signature
algorithms that may be used to sign certificates and CRLs, and it
identifies object identifiers (OIDs) and ASN.1 encoding for public
keys contained in a certificate.
Certification authorities (CAs) and/or applications conforming to
this standard MUST support at least one of the specified public key
and signature algorithms.
2.1. One-Way Hash Function
This section describes the use of a one-way, collision-free hash
function GOST R 34.11-94, the only one that can be used in the
digital signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-94/2001. The data that is
hashed for certificates and CRL signing is fully described in RFC
3280 [PROFILE].
2.1.1. One-Way Hash Function GOST R 34.11-94
GOST R 34.11-94 has been developed by "GUBS of Federal Agency
Government Communication and Information" and "All-Russian Scientific
and Research Institute of Standardization". The algorithm GOST R
34.11-94 produces a 256-bit hash value of an arbitrary finite bit
length input. This document does not contain the full GOST R 34.11-
94 specification, which can be found in [GOSTR341194] (in Russian).
[Schneier95], ch. 18.11, p. 454, contains a brief technical
description in English.
This function MUST always be used with parameter set identified by
id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet (see Section 8.2 of [CPALGS]).
2.2. Signature Algorithms
Conforming CAs may use GOST R 34.10-94 or GOST R 34.10-2001 signature
algorithms to sign certificates and CRLs.
These signature algorithms MUST always be used with a one-way hash
function GOST R 34.11-94 as indicated in [GOSTR341094] and
[GOSTR341001].
This section defines algorithm identifiers and parameters to be used
in the signatureAlgorithm field in a Certificate or CertificateList.
2.2.1. Signature Algorithm GOST R 34.10-94
GOST R 34.10-94 has been developed by "GUBS of Federal Agency
Government Communication and Information" and "All-Russian Scientific
and Research Institute of Standardization". This document does not
contain the full GOST R 34.10-94 specification, which can be found in
[GOSTR341094] (in Russian). [Schneier95], ch. 20.3, p. 495, contains
a brief technical description in English.
The ASN.1 object identifier used to identify this signature algorithm
is:
id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2) cryptopro(2)
gostR3411-94-with-gostR3410-94(4) }
When the id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94 algorithm identifier
appears as the algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the
encoding SHALL omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: the OBJECT
IDENTIFIER id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94.
The signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-94 generates a digital signature
in the form of two 256-bit numbers, r' and s. Its octet string
representation consists of 64 octets, where the first 32 octets
contain the big-endian representation of s and the second 32 octets
contain the big-endian representation of r'.
This definition of a signature value is directly usable in CMS [CMS],
where such values are represented as octet strings. However,
signature values in certificates and CRLs [PROFILE] are represented
as bit strings, and thus the octet string representation must be
converted.
To convert an octet string signature value to a bit string, the most
significant bit of the first octet of the signature value SHALL
become the first bit of the bit string, and so on through the least
significant bit of the last octet of the signature value, which SHALL
become the last bit of the bit string.
2.2.2. Signature Algorithm GOST R 34.10-2001
GOST R 34.10-2001 was developed by "GUBS of Federal Agency Government
Communication and Information" and "All-Russian Scientific and
Research Institute of Standardization". This document does not
contain the full GOST R 34.10-2001 specification, which can be found
in [GOSTR341001] (in Russian).
The ASN.1 object identifier used to identify this signature algorithm
is:
id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2) cryptopro(2)
gostR3411-94-with-gostR3410-2001(3) }
When the id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001 algorithm identifier
appears as the algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the
encoding SHALL omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: the OBJECT
IDENTIFIER id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001.
The signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-2001 generates a digital
signature in the form of two 256-bit numbers, r and s. Its octet
string representation consists of 64 octets, where the first 32
octets contain the big-endian representation of s and the second 32
octets contain the big-endian representation of r.
The process described above (Section 2.2.1) MUST be used to convert
this octet string representation to a bit string for use in
certificates and CRLs.
2.3. Subject Public Key Algorithms
This section defines OIDs and public key parameters for public keys
that employ the GOST R 34.10-94 [GOSTR341094]/VKO GOST R 34.10-94
[CPALGS] or the GOST R 34.10-2001 [GOSTR341001]/VKO GOST R 34.10-2001
[CPALGS] algorithms.
Use of the same key for both signature and key derivation is NOT
RECOMMENDED. The intended application for the key MAY be indicated
in the keyUsage certificate extension (see [PROFILE], Section
4.2.1.3).
2.3.1. GOST R 34.10-94 Keys
GOST R 34.10-94 public keys can be used for the signature algorithm
GOST R 34.10-94 [GOSTR341094] and for the key derivation algorithm
VKO GOST R 34.10-94 [CPALGS].
GOST R 34.10-94 public keys are identified by the following OID:
id-GostR3410-94 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2) cryptopro(2)
gostR3410-94(20) }
The SubjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm.algorithm field (see RFC 3280
[PROFILE]) for GOST R 34.10-94 keys MUST be set to id-GostR3410-94.
When the id-GostR3410-94 algorithm identifier appears as the
algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the encoding MAY omit the
parameters field or set it to NULL. Otherwise, this field MUST have
the following structure:
GostR3410-94-PublicKeyParameters ::=
SEQUENCE {
publicKeyParamSet
OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
digestParamSet
OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
encryptionParamSet
OBJECT IDENTIFIER DEFAULT
id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet
}
where:
* publicKeyParamSet - public key parameters identifier for GOST R
34.10-94 (see Section 8.3 of [CPALGS])
* digestParamSet - parameters identifier for GOST R 34.11-94 (see
Section 8.2 of [CPALGS])
* encryptionParamSet - parameters identifier for GOST 28147-89
[GOST28147] (see Section 8.1 of [CPALGS])
The absence of parameters SHALL be processed as described in RFC 3280
[PROFILE], Section 6.1; that is, parameters are inherited from the
issuer certificate. When the working_public_key_parameters variable
is set to null, the certificate and any signature verifiable on this
certificate SHALL be rejected.
The GOST R 34.10-94 public key MUST be ASN.1 DER encoded as an OCTET
STRING; this encoding shall be used as the contents (i.e., the value)
of the subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo data element.
GostR3410-94-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING -- public key, Y
GostR3410-94-PublicKey MUST contain 128 octets of the little-endian
representation of the public key Y = a^x (mod p), where a and p are
public key parameters, and x is a private key.
Some erroneous applications discard zero bits at the end of BIT
STRING containing the public key. It is RECOMMENDED to pad the bit
string with zeroes up to 1048 bits (131 octets) on decoding to be
able to decode the encapsulated OCTET STRING.
If the keyUsage extension is present in an end-entity certificate
that contains a GOST R 34.10-94 public key, the following values MAY
be present:
digitalSignature;
nonRepudiation;
keyEncipherment; and
keyAgreement.
If the keyAgreement or keyEnchiperment extension is present in a
certificate GOST R 34.10-94 public key, the following values MAY be
present as well:
encipherOnly; and
decipherOnly.
The keyUsage extension MUST NOT assert both encipherOnly and
decipherOnly.
If the keyUsage extension is present in an CA or CRL signer
certificate that contains a GOST R 34.10-94 public key, the following
values MAY be present:
digitalSignature;
nonRepudiation;
keyCertSign; and
cRLSign.
2.3.2. GOST R 34.10-2001 Keys
GOST R 34.10-2001 public keys can be used for the signature algorithm
GOST R 34.10-2001 [GOSTR341001] and for the key derivation algorithm
VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 [CPALGS].
GOST R 34.10-2001 public keys are identified by the following OID:
id-GostR3410-2001 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2) cryptopro(2)
gostR3410-2001(19) }
The SubjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm.algorithm field (see RFC 3280
[PROFILE]) for GOST R 34.10-2001 keys MUST be set to id-GostR3410-
2001.
When the id-GostR3410-2001 algorithm identifier appears as the
algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the encoding MAY omit the
parameters field or set it to NULL. Otherwise, this field MUST have
the following structure:
GostR3410-2001-PublicKeyParameters ::=
SEQUENCE {
publicKeyParamSet
OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
digestParamSet
OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
encryptionParamSet
OBJECT IDENTIFIER DEFAULT
id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet
}
where:
* publicKeyParamSet - public key parameters identifier for GOST R
34.10-2001 (see Section 8.4 of [CPALGS])
* digestParamSet - parameters identifier for GOST R 34.11-94 (see
Section 8.2 of [CPALGS])
* encryptionParamSet - parameters identifier for GOST 28147-89
[GOST28147] (see Section 8.1 of [CPALGS])
The absence of parameters SHALL be processed as described in RFC 3280
[PROFILE], Section 6.1; that is, parameters are inherited from the
issuer certificate. When the working_public_key_parameters variable
is set to null, the certificate and any signature verifiable on this
certificate SHALL be rejected.
The GOST R 34.10-2001 public key MUST be ASN.1 DER encoded as an
OCTET STRING; this encoding shall be used as the contents (i.e., the
value) of the subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo data element.
GostR3410-2001-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING -- public key vector, Q
According to [GOSTR341001], a public key is a point on the elliptic
curve Q = (x,y).
GostR3410-2001-PublicKey MUST contain 64 octets, where the first 32
octets contain the little-endian representation of x and the second
32 octets contain the little-endian representation of y. This
corresponds to the binary representation of (<y>256||<x>256) from
[GOSTR341001], ch. 5.3.
Some erroneous applications discard zero bits at the end of BIT
STRING containing the public key. It is RECOMMENDED to pad the bit
string with zeroes up to 528 bits (66 octets) on decoding to be able
to decode the encapsulated OCTET STRING.
The same keyUsage constraints apply for use of GOST R 34.10-2001 keys
as described in Section 2.3.1 for GOST R 34.10-94 keys.
3. Security Considerations
It is RECOMMENDED that applications verify signature values and
subject public keys to conform to [GOSTR341001, GOSTR341094]
standards prior to their use.
When a certificate is used to support digital signatures as an
analogue to manual ("wet") signatures, in the context of Russian
Federal Electronic Digital Signature Law [RFEDSL], the certificate
MUST contain keyUsage extension, it MUST be critical, and keyUsage
MUST NOT include keyEncipherment and keyAgreement.
It is RECOMMENDED that CAs and applications make sure that the
private key for creating signatures is not used for more than its
allowed validity period (typically 15 months for both the GOST R
34.10-94 and GOST R 34.10-2001 algorithms).
For security discussion concerning use of algorithm parameters, see
the Security Considerations section in [CPALGS].
4. Examples
4.1. GOST R 34.10-94 Certificate
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
0 30 523: SEQUENCE {
4 30 442: SEQUENCE {
8 02 16: INTEGER
: 23 0E E3 60 46 95 24 CE C7 0B E4 94 18 2E 7E EB
26 30 8: SEQUENCE {
28 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94 (1 2 643 2 2 4)
: }
36 30 105: SEQUENCE {
38 31 29: SET {
40 30 27: SEQUENCE {
42 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
47 0C 20: UTF8String 'GostR3410-94 example'
: }
: }
69 31 18: SET {
71 30 16: SEQUENCE {
73 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
78 0C 9: UTF8String 'CryptoPro'
: }
: }
89 31 11: SET {
91 30 9: SEQUENCE {
93 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
98 13 2: PrintableString 'RU'
: }
: }
102 31 39: SET {
104 30 37: SEQUENCE {
106 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER emailAddress (1 2 840 113549 1 9 1)
117 16 24: IA5String 'GostR3410-94@example.com'
: }
: }
: }
143 30 30: SEQUENCE {
145 17 13: UTCTime '050816123250Z'
160 17 13: UTCTime '150816123250Z'
: }
175 30 105: SEQUENCE {
177 31 29: SET {
179 30 27: SEQUENCE {
181 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
186 0C 20: UTF8String 'GostR3410-94 example'
: }
: }
208 31 18: SET {
210 30 16: SEQUENCE {
212 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
217 0C 9: UTF8String 'CryptoPro'
: }
: }
228 31 11: SET {
230 30 9: SEQUENCE {
232 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
237 13 2: PrintableString 'RU'
: }
: }
241 31 39: SET {
243 30 37: SEQUENCE {
245 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER emailAddress (1 2 840 113549 1 9 1)
256 16 24: IA5String 'GostR3410-94@example.com'
: }
: }
: }
282 30 165: SEQUENCE {
285 30 28: SEQUENCE {
287 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-GostR3410-94 (1 2 643 2 2 20)
295 30 18: SEQUENCE {
297 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet
: (1 2 643 2 2 32 2)
306 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet
: (1 2 643 2 2 30 1)
: }
: }
315 03 132: BIT STRING 0 unused bits, encapsulates {
319 04 128: OCTET STRING
: BB 84 66 E1 79 9E 5B 34 D8 2C 80 7F 13 A8 19 66
: 71 57 FE 8C 54 25 21 47 6F 30 0B 27 77 46 98 C6
: FB 47 55 BE B7 B2 F3 93 6C 39 B5 42 37 26 84 E2
: 0D 10 8A 24 0E 1F 0C 42 4D 2B 3B 11 2B A8 BF 66
: 39 32 5C 94 8B C1 A8 FE 1B 63 12 F6 09 25 87 CC
: 75 1B F4 E5 89 8A 09 82 68 D3 5C 77 A6 0F B6 90
: 10 13 8D E3 3E 7C 9C 91 D6 AC 0D 08 2C 3E 78 C1
: B5 C2 B6 B7 1A A8 2A 8B 45 81 93 32 32 76 FA 7B
: }
: }
: }
450 30 8: SEQUENCE {
452 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94 (1 2 643 2 2 4)
: }
460 03 65: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
: 11 C7 08 7E 12 DC 02 F1 02 23 29 47 76 8F 47 2A
: 81 83 50 E3 07 CC F2 E4 31 23 89 42 C8 73 E1 DE
: 22 F7 85 F3 55 BD 94 EC 46 91 9C 67 AC 58 D7 05
: 2A A7 8C B7 85 2A 01 75 85 F7 D7 38 03 FB CD 43
: }
In the signature of the above certificate, r' equals
0x22F785F355BD94EC46919C67AC58D7052AA78CB7852A017585F7D73803FBCD43
and s equals
0x11C7087E12DC02F102232947768F472A818350E307CCF2E431238942C873E1DE
4.2. GOST R 34.10-2001 Certificate
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIB0DCCAX8CECv1xh7CEb0Xx9zUYma0LiEwCAYGKoUDAgIDMG0xHzAdBgNVBAMM
Fkdvc3RSMzQxMC0yMDAxIGV4YW1wbGUxEjAQBgNVBAoMCUNyeXB0b1BybzELMAkG
A1UEBhMCUlUxKTAnBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWGkdvc3RSMzQxMC0yMDAxQGV4YW1wbGUu
Y29tMB4XDTA1MDgxNjE0MTgyMFoXDTE1MDgxNjE0MTgyMFowbTEfMB0GA1UEAwwW
R29zdFIzNDEwLTIwMDEgZXhhbXBsZTESMBAGA1UECgwJQ3J5cHRvUHJvMQswCQYD
VQQGEwJSVTEpMCcGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYaR29zdFIzNDEwLTIwMDFAZXhhbXBsZS5j
b20wYzAcBgYqhQMCAhMwEgYHKoUDAgIkAAYHKoUDAgIeAQNDAARAhJVodWACGkB1
CM0TjDGJLP3lBQN6Q1z0bSsP508yfleP68wWuZWIA9CafIWuD+SN6qa7flbHy7Df
D2a8yuoaYDAIBgYqhQMCAgMDQQA8L8kJRLcnqeyn1en7U23Sw6pkfEQu3u0xFkVP
vFQ/3cHeF26NG+xxtZPz3TaTVXdoiYkXYiD02rEx1bUcM97i
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
0 30 464: SEQUENCE {
4 30 383: SEQUENCE {
8 02 16: INTEGER
: 2B F5 C6 1E C2 11 BD 17 C7 DC D4 62 66 B4 2E 21
26 30 8: SEQUENCE {
28 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001 (1 2 643 2 2 3)
: }
36 30 109: SEQUENCE {
38 31 31: SET {
40 30 29: SEQUENCE {
42 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
47 0C 22: UTF8String 'GostR3410-2001 example'
: }
: }
71 31 18: SET {
73 30 16: SEQUENCE {
75 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
80 0C 9: UTF8String 'CryptoPro'
: }
: }
91 31 11: SET {
93 30 9: SEQUENCE {
95 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
100 13 2: PrintableString 'RU'
: }
: }
104 31 41: SET {
106 30 39: SEQUENCE {
108 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER emailAddress (1 2 840 113549 1 9 1)
119 16 26: IA5String 'GostR3410-2001@example.com'
: }
: }
: }
147 30 30: SEQUENCE {
149 17 13: UTCTime '050816141820Z'
164 17 13: UTCTime '150816141820Z'
: }
179 30 109: SEQUENCE {
181 31 31: SET {
183 30 29: SEQUENCE {
185 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
190 0C 22: UTF8String 'GostR3410-2001 example'
: }
: }
214 31 18: SET {
216 30 16: SEQUENCE {
218 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
223 0C 9: UTF8String 'CryptoPro'
: }
: }
234 31 11: SET {
236 30 9: SEQUENCE {
238 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
243 13 2: PrintableString 'RU'
: }
: }
247 31 41: SET {
249 30 39: SEQUENCE {
251 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER emailAddress (1 2 840 113549 1 9 1)
262 16 26: IA5String 'GostR3410-2001@example.com'
: }
: }
: }
290 30 99: SEQUENCE {
292 30 28: SEQUENCE {
294 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-GostR3410-2001 (1 2 643 2 2 19)
302 30 18: SEQUENCE {
304 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet
: (1 2 643 2 2 36 0)
313 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet
: (1 2 643 2 2 30 1)
: }
: }
322 03 67: BIT STRING 0 unused bits, encapsulates {
325 04 64: OCTET STRING
: 84 95 68 75 60 02 1A 40 75 08 CD 13 8C 31 89 2C
: FD E5 05 03 7A 43 5C F4 6D 2B 0F E7 4F 32 7E 57
: 8F EB CC 16 B9 95 88 03 D0 9A 7C 85 AE 0F E4 8D
: EA A6 BB 7E 56 C7 CB B0 DF 0F 66 BC CA EA 1A 60
: }
: }
: }
391 30 8: SEQUENCE {
393 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001 (1 2 643 2 2 3)
: }
401 03 65: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
: 3C 2F C9 09 44 B7 27 A9 EC A7 D5 E9 FB 53 6D D2
: C3 AA 64 7C 44 2E DE ED 31 16 45 4F BC 54 3F DD
: C1 DE 17 6E 8D 1B EC 71 B5 93 F3 DD 36 93 55 77
: 68 89 89 17 62 20 F4 DA B1 31 D5 B5 1C 33 DE E2
: }
In the public key of the above certificate, x equals
0x577E324FE70F2B6DF45C437A0305E5FD2C89318C13CD0875401A026075689584
and y equals
0x601AEACABC660FDFB0CBC7567EBBA6EA8DE40FAE857C9AD0038895B916CCEB8F
The corresponding private key d equals
0x0B293BE050D0082BDAE785631A6BAB68F35B42786D6DDA56AFAF169891040F77
In the signature of the above certificate, r equals
0xC1DE176E8D1BEC71B593F3DD36935577688989176220F4DAB131D5B51C33DEE2
and s equals
0x3C2FC90944B727A9ECA7D5E9FB536DD2C3AA647C442EDEED3116454FBC543FDD
5. Acknowledgements
This document was created in accordance with "Russian Cryptographic
Software Compatibility Agreement", signed by FGUE STC "Atlas",
CRYPTO-PRO, Factor-TS, MD PREI, Infotecs GmbH, SPRCIS (SPbRCZI),
Cryptocom, R-Alpha. The goal of this agreement is to achieve mutual
compatibility of the products and solutions.
The authors wish to thank the following:
Microsoft Corporation Russia for providing information about
company products and solutions, and also for technical consulting
in PKI.
RSA Security Russia and Demos Co Ltd for active collaboration and
critical help in creation of this document.
RSA Security Inc for compatibility testing of the proposed data
formats while incorporating them into the RSA Keon product.
Baltimore Technology plc for compatibility testing of the proposed
data formats while incorporating them into their UniCERT product.
Peter Gutmann for his helpful "dumpasn1" program.
Russ Housley (Vigil Security, LLC, housley@vigilsec.com) and
Vasilij Sakharov (DEMOS Co Ltd, svp@dol.ru) for encouraging the
authors to create this document.
Grigorij Chudov for navigating the IETF process for this document.
Prikhodko Dmitriy (VSTU, PrikhodkoDV@volgablob.ru) for invaluable
assistance in proofreading this document and verifying the form
and the contents of the ASN.1 structures mentioned or used in this
document.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[GOST28147] "Cryptographic Protection for Data Processing System",
GOST 28147-89, Gosudarstvennyi Standard of USSR,
Government Committee of the USSR for Standards, 1989.
(In Russian)
[GOST3431195] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
Cashing function.", GOST 34.311-95, Council for
Standardization, Metrology and Certification of the
Commonwealth of Independence States (EASC), Minsk,
1995. (In Russian)
[GOST3431095] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
Produce and check procedures of Electronic Digital
Signature based on Asymmetric Cryptographic
Algorithm.", GOST 34.310-95, Council for
Standardization, Metrology and Certification of the
Commonwealth of Independence States (EASC), Minsk,
1995. (In Russian)
[GOST3431004] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
Formation and verification processes of (electronic)
digital signature based on Asymmetric Cryptographic
Algorithm.", GOST 34.310-2004, Council for
Standardization, Metrology and Certification of the
Commonwealth of Independence States (EASC), Minsk,
2004. (In Russian)
[GOSTR341094] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
Produce and check procedures of Electronic Digital
Signatures based on Asymmetric Cryptographic
Algorithm.", GOST R 34.10-94, Gosudarstvennyi Standard
of Russian Federation, Government Committee of the
Russia for Standards, 1994. (In Russian)
[GOSTR341001] "Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
Signature and verification processes of [electronic]
digital signature.", GOST R 34.10-2001, Gosudarstvennyi
Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee of
the Russia for Standards, 2001. (In Russian)
[GOSTR341194] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
Hashing function.", GOST R 34.10-94, Gosudarstvennyi
Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee of
the Russia for Standards, 1994. (In Russian)
[CPALGS] Popov, V., Kurepkin, I., and S. Leontiev, "Additional
Cryptographic Algorithms for Use with GOST 28147-89,
GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
Algorithms", RFC 4357, January 2006.
[PKALGS] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.
[PROFILE] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
[X.660] ITU-T Recommendation X.660 Information Technology -
ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding
Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
6.2. Informative References
[Schneier95] B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995.
[RFEDSL] Russian Federal Electronic Digital Signature Law, 10
Jan 2002 N 1-FZ.
[CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC
3852, July 2004.
Authors' Addresses
Serguei Leontiev, Ed.
CRYPTO-PRO
38, Obraztsova,
Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation
EMail: lse@cryptopro.ru
Dennis Shefanovski, Ed.
Mobile TeleSystems OJSC
4, Marksistskaya Str.,
Moscow, 109147, Russian Federation
EMail: dbs@mts.ru
Grigorij Chudov
CRYPTO-PRO
38, Obraztsova,
Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation
EMail: chudov@cryptopro.ru
Alexandr Afanasiev
Factor-TS
office 711, 14, Presnenskij val,
Moscow, 123557, Russian Federation
EMail: afa1@factor-ts.ru
Nikolaj Nikishin
Infotecs GmbH
p/b 35, 80-5, Leningradskij prospekt,
Moscow, 125315, Russian Federation
EMail: nikishin@infotecs.ru
Boleslav Izotov
FGUE STC "Atlas"
38, Obraztsova,
Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation
EMail: izotov@nii.voskhod.ru
Elena Minaeva
MD PREI
build 3, 6A, Vtoroj Troitskij per.,
Moscow, Russian Federation
EMail: evminaeva@mail.ru
Igor Ovcharenko
MD PREI
Office 600, 14, B.Novodmitrovskaya,
Moscow, Russian Federation
EMail: igori@mo.msk.ru
Serguei Murugov
R-Alpha
4/1, Raspletina,
Moscow, 123060, Russian Federation
EMail: msm@top-cross.ru
Igor Ustinov
Cryptocom
office 239, 51, Leninskij prospekt,
Moscow, 119991, Russian Federation
EMail: igus@cryptocom.ru
Anatolij Erkin
SPRCIS (SPbRCZI)
1, Obrucheva,
St.Petersburg, 195220, Russian Federation
EMail: erkin@nevsky.net
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