Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) K. Watsen
Request for Comments: 9640 Watsen Networks
Category: Standards Track October 2024
ISSN: 2070-1721
YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography
Abstract
This document presents a YANG 1.1 (RFC 7950) module defining
identities, typedefs, and groupings useful to cryptographic
applications.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9640.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Relation to Other RFCs
1.2. Specification Language
1.3. Adherence to the NMDA
1.4. Conventions
2. The "ietf-crypto-types" Module
2.1. Data Model Overview
2.2. Example Usage
2.3. YANG Module
3. Security Considerations
3.1. No Support for CRMF
3.2. No Support for Key Generation
3.3. Unconstrained Public Key Usage
3.4. Unconstrained Private Key Usage
3.5. Cleartext Passwords and Keys
3.6. Encrypting Passwords and Keys
3.7. Deletion of Cleartext Key Values
3.8. Considerations for the "ietf-crypto-types" YANG Module
4. IANA Considerations
4.1. The IETF XML Registry
4.2. The YANG Module Names Registry
5. References
5.1. Normative References
5.2. Informative References
Acknowledgements
Author's Address
1. Introduction
This document presents a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module defining
identities, typedefs, and groupings useful to cryptographic
applications.
1.1. Relation to Other RFCs
This document presents a YANG module [RFC7950] that is part of a
collection of RFCs that work together to, ultimately, support the
configuration of both the clients and servers of both the Network
Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040].
The dependency relationship between the primary YANG groupings
defined in the various RFCs is presented in the below diagram. In
some cases, a document may define secondary groupings that introduce
dependencies not illustrated in the diagram. The labels in the
diagram are shorthand names for the defining RFCs. The citation
references for the shorthand names are provided below the diagram.
Please note that the arrows in the diagram point from referencer to
referenced. For example, the "crypto-types" RFC does not have any
dependencies, whilst the "keystore" RFC depends on the "crypto-types"
RFC.
crypto-types
^ ^
/ \
/ \
truststore keystore
^ ^ ^ ^
| +---------+ | |
| | | |
| +------------+ |
tcp-client-server | / | |
^ ^ ssh-client-server | |
| | ^ tls-client-server
| | | ^ ^ http-client-server
| | | | | ^
| | | +-----+ +---------+ |
| | | | | |
| +-----------|--------|--------------+ | |
| | | | | |
+-----------+ | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
netconf-client-server restconf-client-server
+========================+==========================+
| Label in Diagram | Reference |
+========================+==========================+
| crypto-types | RFC 9640 |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| truststore | [RFC9641] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| keystore | [RFC9642] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| tcp-client-server | [RFC9643] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| ssh-client-server | [RFC9644] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| tls-client-server | [RFC9645] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| http-client-server | [HTTP-CLIENT-SERVER] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| netconf-client-server | [NETCONF-CLIENT-SERVER] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| restconf-client-server | [RESTCONF-CLIENT-SERVER] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
Table 1: Labels in Diagram to RFC Mapping
1.2. Specification Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.3. Adherence to the NMDA
This document is compliant with the Network Management Datastore
Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. It does not define any protocol-
accessible nodes that are "config false".
1.4. Conventions
Various examples in this document use "BASE64VALUE=" as a placeholder
value for binary data that has been base64 encoded (per Section 9.8
of [RFC7950]). This placeholder value is used because real
base64-encoded structures are often many lines long and hence
distracting to the example being presented.
Various examples in this document use the XML [W3C.REC-xml-20081126]
encoding. Other encodings, such as JSON [RFC8259], could
alternatively be used.
Various examples in this document contain long lines that may be
folded, as described in [RFC8792].
2. The "ietf-crypto-types" Module
This section defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf-crypto-
types". A high-level overview of the module is provided in
Section 2.1. Examples illustrating the module's use are provided in
Section 2.2. The YANG module itself is defined in Section 2.3.
2.1. Data Model Overview
This section provides an overview of the "ietf-crypto-types" module
in terms of its features, identities, typedefs, and groupings.
2.1.1. Features
The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in
the "ietf-crypto-types" module:
Features:
+-- one-symmetric-key-format
+-- one-asymmetric-key-format
+-- symmetrically-encrypted-value-format
+-- asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format
+-- cms-enveloped-data-format
+-- cms-encrypted-data-format
+-- p10-csr-format
+-- csr-generation
+-- certificate-expiration-notification
+-- cleartext-passwords
+-- encrypted-passwords
+-- cleartext-symmetric-keys
+-- hidden-symmetric-keys
+-- encrypted-symmetric-keys
+-- cleartext-private-keys
+-- hidden-private-keys
+-- encrypted-private-keys
The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not the same as
that in [RFC8340].
2.1.2. Identities
The following diagram illustrates the hierarchical relationship
amongst the "identity" statements defined in the "ietf-crypto-types"
module:
Identities:
+-- public-key-format
| +-- subject-public-key-info-format
| +-- ssh-public-key-format
+-- private-key-format
| +-- rsa-private-key-format
| +-- ec-private-key-format
| +-- one-asymmetric-key-format
| {one-asymmetric-key-format}?
+-- symmetric-key-format
| +-- octet-string-key-format
| +-- one-symmetric-key-format
| {one-symmetric-key-format}?
+-- encrypted-value-format
| +-- symmetrically-encrypted-value-format
| | | {symmetrically-encrypted-value-format}?
| | +-- cms-encrypted-data-format
| | {cms-encrypted-data-format}?
| +-- asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format
| | {asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format}?
| +-- cms-enveloped-data-format
| {cms-enveloped-data-format}?
+-- csr-format
+-- p10-csr-format {p10-csr-format?}
The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not the same as
that in [RFC8340].
Comments:
* The diagram shows that there are five base identities. The first
three identities are used to indicate the format for the key data,
while the fourth identity is used to indicate the format for
encrypted values. The fifth identity is used to indicate the
format for a certificate signing request (CSR). The base
identities are "abstract", in the object oriented programming
sense, in that they only define a "class" of formats, rather than
a specific format.
* The various terminal identities define specific encoding formats.
The derived identities defined in this document are sufficient for
the effort described in Section 1.1, but by nature of them being
identities, additional derived identities MAY be defined by future
efforts.
* Identities used to specify uncommon formats are enabled by
"feature" statements, allowing applications to support them when
needed.
2.1.3. Typedefs
The following diagram illustrates the relationship amongst the
"typedef" statements defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module:
Typedefs:
binary
+-- csr-info
+-- csr
+-- x509
| +-- trust-anchor-cert-x509
| +-- end-entity-cert-x509
+-- crl
+-- ocsp-request
+-- ocsp-response
+-- cms
+-- data-content-cms
+-- signed-data-cms
| +-- trust-anchor-cert-cms
| +-- end-entity-cert-cms
+-- enveloped-data-cms
+-- digested-data-cms
+-- encrypted-data-cms
+-- authenticated-data-cms
The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not the same as
that in [RFC8340].
Comments:
* All the typedefs defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module extend
the "binary" type defined in [RFC7950].
* Additionally, all the typedefs define a type for encoding an ASN.1
[ITU.X680.2021] structure using DER [ITU.X690.2021].
* The "trust-anchor-*" and "end-entity-*" typedefs are syntactically
identical to their base typedefs and only distinguish themselves
by the expected nature of their content. These typedefs are
defined to facilitate common modeling needs.
2.1.4. Groupings
The "ietf-crypto-types" module defines the following "grouping"
statements:
* encrypted-value-grouping
* password-grouping
* symmetric-key-grouping
* public-key-grouping
* private-key-grouping
* asymmetric-key-pair-grouping
* certificate-expiration-grouping
* trust-anchor-cert-grouping
* end-entity-cert-grouping
* generate-csr-grouping
* asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping
* asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.
2.1.4.1. The "encrypted-value-grouping" Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "encrypted-
value-grouping" grouping:
grouping encrypted-value-grouping:
+-- encrypted-by
+-- encrypted-value-format identityref
+-- encrypted-value binary
Comments:
* The "encrypted-by" node is an empty container (difficult to see in
the diagram) that a consuming module MUST augment key references
into. The "ietf-crypto-types" module is unable to populate this
container as the module only defines groupings. Section 2.2.1
presents an example illustrating a consuming module populating the
"encrypted-by" container.
* The "encrypted-value" node is the value encrypted by the key
referenced by the "encrypted-by" node and encoded in the format
appropriate for the kind of key it was encrypted by.
- If the value is encrypted by a symmetric key, then the
encrypted value is encoded using the format associated with the
"symmetrically-encrypted-value-format" identity.
- If the value is encrypted by an asymmetric key, then the
encrypted value is encoded using the format associated with the
"asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format" identity.
See Section 2.1.2 for information about the "format" identities.
2.1.4.2. The "password-grouping" Grouping
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
"password-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not expand the
internally used "grouping" statement(s):
grouping password-grouping:
+-- (password-type)
+--:(cleartext-password) {cleartext-passwords}?
| +-- cleartext-password? string
+--:(encrypted-password) {encrypted-passwords}?
+-- encrypted-password
+---u encrypted-value-grouping
Comments:
* The "password-grouping" enables the configuration of credentials
needed to authenticate to a remote system. The "ianach:crypt-
hash" typedef from [RFC7317] should be used instead when needing
to configure a password to authenticate a local account.
* For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):
- The "encrypted-value-grouping" grouping is discussed in
Section 2.1.4.1.
* The "choice" statement enables the password data to be cleartext
or encrypted, as follows:
- The "cleartext-password" node can encode any cleartext value.
- The "encrypted-password" node is an instance of the "encrypted-
value-grouping" discussed in Section 2.1.4.1.
2.1.4.3. The "symmetric-key-grouping" Grouping
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
"symmetric-key-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not expand
the internally used "grouping" statement(s):
grouping symmetric-key-grouping:
+-- key-format? identityref
+-- (key-type)
+--:(cleartext-symmetric-key)
| +-- cleartext-symmetric-key? binary
| {cleartext-symmetric-keys}?
+--:(hidden-symmetric-key) {hidden-symmetric-keys}?
| +-- hidden-symmetric-key? empty
+--:(encrypted-symmetric-key) {encrypted-symmetric-keys}?
+-- encrypted-symmetric-key
+---u encrypted-value-grouping
Comments:
* For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):
- The "encrypted-value-grouping" grouping is discussed in
Section 2.1.4.1.
* The "key-format" node is an identity-reference to the "symmetric-
key-format" abstract base identity discussed in Section 2.1.2,
enabling the symmetric key to be encoded using any of the formats
defined by the derived identities.
* The "choice" statement enables the private key data to be
cleartext, encrypted, or hidden, as follows:
- The "cleartext-symmetric-key" node can encode any cleartext key
value.
- The "hidden-symmetric-key" node is of type "empty" as the real
value cannot be presented via the management interface.
- The "encrypted-symmetric-key" node's structure is discussed in
Section 2.1.4.1.
2.1.4.4. The "public-key-grouping" Grouping
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
"public-key-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not expand
any internally used "grouping" statement(s):
grouping public-key-grouping:
+-- public-key-format identityref
+-- public-key binary
Comments:
* The "public-key-format" node is an identity-reference to the
"public-key-format" abstract base identity discussed in
Section 2.1.2, enabling the public key to be encoded using any of
the formats defined by the derived identities.
* The "public-key" node is the public key data in the selected
format. No "choice" statement is used to hide or encrypt the
public key data because it is unnecessary to do so for public
keys.
2.1.4.5. The "private-key-grouping" Grouping
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
"private-key-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not expand
the internally used "grouping" statement(s):
grouping private-key-grouping:
+-- private-key-format? identityref
+-- (private-key-type)
+--:(cleartext-private-key) {cleartext-private-keys}?
| +-- cleartext-private-key? binary
+--:(hidden-private-key) {hidden-private-keys}?
| +-- hidden-private-key? empty
+--:(encrypted-private-key) {encrypted-private-keys}?
+-- encrypted-private-key
+---u encrypted-value-grouping
Comments:
* For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):
- The "encrypted-value-grouping" grouping is discussed in
Section 2.1.4.1.
* The "private-key-format" node is an identity-reference to the
"private-key-format" abstract base identity discussed in
Section 2.1.2, enabling the private key to be encoded using any of
the formats defined by the derived identities.
* The "choice" statement enables the private key data to be
cleartext, encrypted, or hidden, as follows:
- The "cleartext-private-key" node can encode any cleartext key
value.
- The "hidden-private-key" node is of type "empty" as the real
value cannot be presented via the management interface.
- The "encrypted-private-key" node's structure is discussed in
Section 2.1.4.1.
2.1.4.6. The "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" Grouping
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
"asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not
expand the internally used "grouping" statement(s):
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping:
+---u public-key-grouping
+---u private-key-grouping
Comments:
* For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):
- The "public-key-grouping" grouping is discussed in
Section 2.1.4.4.
- The "private-key-grouping" grouping is discussed in
Section 2.1.4.5.
2.1.4.7. The "certificate-expiration-grouping" Grouping
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
"certificate-expiration-grouping" grouping:
grouping certificate-expiration-grouping:
+---n certificate-expiration
{certificate-expiration-notification}?
+-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
Comments:
* This grouping's only purpose is to define the "certificate-
expiration" notification statement, used by the groupings defined
in Sections 2.1.4.8 and 2.1.4.9.
* The "certificate-expiration" notification enables servers to
notify clients when certificates are nearing expiration.
* The "expiration-date" node indicates when the designated
certificate will (or did) expire.
* Identification of the certificate that is expiring is built into
the notification itself. For an example, please see
Section 2.2.3.
2.1.4.8. The "trust-anchor-cert-grouping" Grouping
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
"trust-anchor-cert-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not
expand the internally used "grouping" statement(s):
grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping:
+-- cert-data? trust-anchor-cert-cms
+---u certificate-expiration-grouping
Comments:
* For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):
- The "certificate-expiration-grouping" grouping is discussed in
Section 2.1.4.7.
* The "cert-data" node contains a chain of one or more certificates
containing at most one self-signed certificate (the "root"
certificate), encoded using a "signed-data-cms" typedef discussed
in Section 2.1.3.
2.1.4.9. The "end-entity-cert-grouping" Grouping
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the "end-
entity-cert-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram does not expand
the internally used "grouping" statement(s):
grouping end-entity-cert-grouping:
+-- cert-data? end-entity-cert-cms
+---u certificate-expiration-grouping
Comments:
* For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):
- The "certificate-expiration-grouping" grouping is discussed in
Section 2.1.4.7.
* The "cert-data" node contains a chain of one or more certificates
containing at most one certificate that is not self-signed and
does not have Basic constraint "CA true" (where "CA" means
Certification Authority), encoded using a "signed-data-cms"
typedef discussed in Section 2.1.3.
2.1.4.10. The "generate-csr-grouping" Grouping
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
"generate-csr-grouping" grouping:
grouping generate-csr-grouping:
+---x generate-csr {csr-generation}?
+---w input
| +---w csr-format identityref
| +---w csr-info csr-info
+--ro output
+--ro (csr-type)
+--:(p10-csr)
+--ro p10-csr? p10-csr
Comments:
* This grouping's only purpose is to define the "generate-csr"
action statement, used by the groupings defined in Sections
2.1.4.11 and 2.1.4.12.
* This action takes two input parameters: a "csr-info" parameter,
for what content should be in the certificate, and a "csr-format"
parameter, for what CSR format to return. The action returns the
CSR in the specified format. Both the "csr-info" and "csr" types
are discussed in Section 2.1.3.
* For an example, please see Section 2.2.2.
2.1.4.11. The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" Grouping
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
"asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" grouping. This tree diagram
does not expand the internally used "grouping" statement(s):
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping:
+---u asymmetric-key-pair-grouping
+---u end-entity-cert-grouping
+---u generate-csr-grouping
Comments:
* This grouping defines an asymmetric key with at most one
associated certificate, a commonly needed combination in protocol
models.
* For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):
- The "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping is discussed in
Section 2.1.4.6.
- The "end-entity-cert-grouping" grouping is discussed in
Section 2.1.4.9.
- The "generate-csr-grouping" grouping is discussed in
Section 2.1.4.10.
2.1.4.12. The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" Grouping
This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
"asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping. This tree
diagram does not expand the internally used "grouping" statement(s):
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping:
+---u asymmetric-key-pair-grouping
+-- certificates
| +-- certificate* [name]
| +-- name string
| +---u end-entity-cert-grouping
+---u generate-csr-grouping
Comments:
* This grouping defines an asymmetric key with one or more
associated certificates, a commonly needed combination in
configuration models.
* For the referenced "grouping" statement(s):
- The "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping is discussed in
Section 2.1.4.6.
- The "end-entity-cert-grouping" grouping is discussed in
Section 2.1.4.9.
- The "generate-csr-grouping" grouping is discussed in
Section 2.1.4.10.
2.1.5. Protocol-Accessible Nodes
The "ietf-crypto-types" module does not contain any protocol-
accessible nodes, but the module needs to be "implemented", as
described in Section 5.6.5 of [RFC7950], in order for the identities
in Section 2.1.2 to be defined.
2.2. Example Usage
2.2.1. The "symmetric-key-grouping", "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-
grouping", and "password-grouping" Groupings
The following non-normative module is constructed in order to
illustrate the use of the "symmetric-key-grouping" (Section 2.1.4.3),
the "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" (Section 2.1.4.12), and
the "password-grouping" (Section 2.1.4.2) "grouping" statements.
Notably, this example module and associated configuration data
illustrates that a hidden private key (ex-hidden-asymmetric-key) has
been used to encrypt a symmetric key (ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-
based-symmetric-key) that has been used to encrypt another private
key (ex-encrypted-rsa-based-asymmetric-key). Additionally, the
symmetric key is also used to encrypt a password (ex-encrypted-
password).
2.2.1.1. Example Module
module ex-crypto-types-usage {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage";
prefix ectu;
import ietf-crypto-types {
prefix ct;
reference
"RFC 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
organization
"Example Corporation";
contact
"YANG Designer <mailto:yang.designer@example.com>";
description
"This example module illustrates the 'symmetric-key-grouping'
and 'asymmetric-key-grouping' groupings defined in the
'ietf-crypto-types' module defined in RFC 9640.";
revision 2024-10-10 {
description
"Initial version.";
reference
"RFC 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
container symmetric-keys {
description
"A container of symmetric keys.";
list symmetric-key {
key "name";
description
"A symmetric key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this key.";
}
uses ct:symmetric-key-grouping {
augment "key-type/encrypted-symmetric-key/"
+ "encrypted-symmetric-key/encrypted-by" {
description
"Augments in a 'choice' statement enabling the
encrypting key to be any other symmetric or
asymmetric key.";
uses encrypted-by-grouping;
}
}
}
}
container asymmetric-keys {
description
"A container of asymmetric keys.";
list asymmetric-key {
key "name";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this key.";
}
uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping {
augment "private-key-type/encrypted-private-key/"
+ "encrypted-private-key/encrypted-by" {
description
"Augments in a 'choice' statement enabling the
encrypting key to be any other symmetric or
asymmetric key.";
uses encrypted-by-grouping;
}
}
description
"An asymmetric key pair with associated certificates.";
}
}
container passwords {
description
"A container of passwords.";
list password {
key "name";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this password.";
}
uses ct:password-grouping {
augment "password-type/encrypted-password/"
+ "encrypted-password/encrypted-by" {
description
"Augments in a 'choice' statement enabling the
encrypting key to be any symmetric or
asymmetric key.";
uses encrypted-by-grouping;
}
}
description
"A password.";
}
}
grouping encrypted-by-grouping {
description
"A grouping that defines a choice enabling references
to other keys.";
choice encrypted-by {
mandatory true;
description
"A choice amongst other symmetric or asymmetric keys.";
case symmetric-key-ref {
leaf symmetric-key-ref {
type leafref {
path "/ectu:symmetric-keys/ectu:symmetric-key/"
+ "ectu:name";
}
description
"Identifies the symmetric key that encrypts this key.";
}
}
case asymmetric-key-ref {
leaf asymmetric-key-ref {
type leafref {
path "/ectu:asymmetric-keys/ectu:asymmetric-key/"
+ "ectu:name";
}
description
"Identifies the asymmetric key that encrypts this key.";
}
}
}
}
}
2.2.1.2. Tree Diagram for the Example Module
The tree diagram [RFC8340] for this example module is as follows:
module: ex-crypto-types-usage
+--rw symmetric-keys
| +--rw symmetric-key* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw key-format? identityref
| +--rw (key-type)
| +--:(cleartext-symmetric-key)
| | +--rw cleartext-symmetric-key? binary
| | {cleartext-symmetric-keys}?
| +--:(hidden-symmetric-key) {hidden-symmetric-keys}?
| | +--rw hidden-symmetric-key? empty
| +--:(encrypted-symmetric-key) {encrypted-symmetric-keys}?
| +--rw encrypted-symmetric-key
| +--rw encrypted-by
| | +--rw (encrypted-by)
| | +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| | +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| +--rw encrypted-value-format identityref
| +--rw encrypted-value binary
+--rw asymmetric-keys
| +--rw asymmetric-key* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw public-key-format? identityref
| +--rw public-key? binary
| +--rw private-key-format? identityref
| +--rw (private-key-type)
| | +--:(cleartext-private-key) {cleartext-private-keys}?
| | | +--rw cleartext-private-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-private-key) {hidden-private-keys}?
| | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-private-key) {encrypted-private-keys}?
| | +--rw encrypted-private-key
| | +--rw encrypted-by
| | | +--rw (encrypted-by)
| | | +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | | | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| | | +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | +--rw encrypted-value-format identityref
| | +--rw encrypted-value binary
| +--rw certificates
| | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | +--rw name string
| | +--rw cert-data end-entity-cert-cms
| | +---n certificate-expiration
| | {certificate-expiration-notification}?
| | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| +---x generate-csr {csr-generation}?
| +---w input
| | +---w csr-format identityref
| | +---w csr-info csr-info
| +--ro output
| +--ro (csr-type)
| +--:(p10-csr)
| +--ro p10-csr? p10-csr
+--rw passwords
+--rw password* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw (password-type)
+--:(cleartext-password) {cleartext-passwords}?
| +--rw cleartext-password? string
+--:(encrypted-password) {encrypted-passwords}?
+--rw encrypted-password
+--rw encrypted-by
| +--rw (encrypted-by)
| +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
+--rw encrypted-value-format identityref
+--rw encrypted-value binary
2.2.1.3. Usage Example for the Example Module
Finally, the following example illustrates various symmetric and
asymmetric keys as they might appear in configuration.
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<symmetric-keys
xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<symmetric-key>
<name>ex-hidden-symmetric-key</name>
<hidden-symmetric-key/>
</symmetric-key>
<symmetric-key>
<name>ex-octet-string-based-symmetric-key</name>
<key-format>ct:octet-string-key-format</key-format>
<cleartext-symmetric-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-symmetric-key>
</symmetric-key>
<symmetric-key>
<name>ex-one-symmetric-based-symmetric-key</name>
<key-format>ct:one-symmetric-key-format</key-format>
<cleartext-symmetric-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-symmetric-key>
</symmetric-key>
<symmetric-key>
<name>ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetric-key</name>
<key-format>ct:one-symmetric-key-format</key-format>
<encrypted-symmetric-key>
<encrypted-by>
<asymmetric-key-ref>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key\
-ref>
</encrypted-by>
<encrypted-value-format>ct:cms-enveloped-data-format</encrypte\
d-value-format>
<encrypted-value>BASE64VALUE=</encrypted-value>
</encrypted-symmetric-key>
</symmetric-key>
</symmetric-keys>
<asymmetric-keys
xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\
-format>
<public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key>
<hidden-private-key/>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key-cert</name>
<cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ex-rsa-based-asymmetric-key</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\
-format>
<public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-forma\
t>
<cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-cert</name>
<cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ex-one-asymmetric-based-asymmetric-key</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\
-format>
<public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:one-asymmetric-key-format</private-key-fo\
rmat>
<cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ex-encrypted-rsa-based-asymmetric-key</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\
-format>
<public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-forma\
t>
<encrypted-private-key>
<encrypted-by>
<symmetric-key-ref>ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetri\
c-key</symmetric-key-ref>
</encrypted-by>
<encrypted-value-format>ct:cms-encrypted-data-format</encrypte\
d-value-format>
<encrypted-value>BASE64VALUE=</encrypted-value>
</encrypted-private-key>
</asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys>
<passwords
xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<password>
<name>ex-cleartext-password</name>
<cleartext-password>super-secret</cleartext-password>
</password>
<password>
<name>ex-encrypted-password</name>
<encrypted-password>
<encrypted-by>
<symmetric-key-ref>ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetri\
c-key</symmetric-key-ref>
</encrypted-by>
<encrypted-value-format>ct:cms-encrypted-data-format</encrypte\
d-value-format>
<encrypted-value>BASE64VALUE=</encrypted-value>
</encrypted-password>
</password>
</passwords>
2.2.2. The "generate-csr" Action
The following example illustrates the "generate-csr" action,
discussed in Section 2.1.4.10, with the NETCONF protocol.
REQUEST
<rpc message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
<asymmetric-keys
xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage">
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</name>
<generate-csr>
<csr-format>ct:p10-csr-format</csr-format>
<csr-info>BASE64VALUE=</csr-info>
</generate-csr>
</asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys>
</action>
</rpc>
RESPONSE
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<rpc-reply message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<p10-csr xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage"\
>BASE64VALUE=</p10-csr>
</rpc-reply>
2.2.3. The "certificate-expiration" Notification
The following example illustrates the "certificate-expiration"
notification, discussed in Section 2.1.4.7, with the NETCONF
protocol.
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<notification
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
<eventTime>2018-05-25T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
<asymmetric-keys xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-type\
s-usage">
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</name>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key-cert</name>
<certificate-expiration>
<expiration-date>2018-08-05T14:18:53-05:00</expiration-d\
ate>
</certificate-expiration>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys>
</notification>
2.3. YANG Module
This module has normative references to [RFC2119], [RFC2986],
[RFC4253], [RFC5280], [RFC5652], [RFC5915], [RFC5958], [RFC6031],
[RFC6960], [RFC6991], [RFC7093], [RFC8017], [RFC8174], [RFC8341], and
[ITU.X690.2021].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-crypto-types@2024-10-10.yang"
module ietf-crypto-types {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types";
prefix ct;
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}
import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm;
reference
"RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf
WG List: NETCONF WG list <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>";
description
"This module defines common YANG types for cryptographic
applications.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Revised
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9640
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9640); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2024-10-10 {
description
"Initial version.";
reference
"RFC 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
/****************/
/* Features */
/****************/
feature one-symmetric-key-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'one-symmetric-key-format' identity.";
}
feature one-asymmetric-key-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'one-asymmetric-key-format' identity.";
}
feature symmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'symmetrically-encrypted-value-format' identity.";
}
feature asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format' identity.";
}
feature cms-enveloped-data-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'cms-enveloped-data-format' identity.";
}
feature cms-encrypted-data-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'cms-encrypted-data-format' identity.";
}
feature p10-csr-format {
description
"Indicates that the server implements support
for generating P10-based CSRs, as defined
in RFC 2986.";
reference
"RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7";
}
feature csr-generation {
description
"Indicates that the server implements the
'generate-csr' action.";
}
feature certificate-expiration-notification {
description
"Indicates that the server implements the
'certificate-expiration' notification.";
}
feature cleartext-passwords {
description
"Indicates that the server supports cleartext
passwords.";
}
feature encrypted-passwords {
description
"Indicates that the server supports password
encryption.";
}
feature cleartext-symmetric-keys {
description
"Indicates that the server supports cleartext
symmetric keys.";
}
feature hidden-symmetric-keys {
description
"Indicates that the server supports hidden keys.";
}
feature encrypted-symmetric-keys {
description
"Indicates that the server supports encryption
of symmetric keys.";
}
feature cleartext-private-keys {
description
"Indicates that the server supports cleartext
private keys.";
}
feature hidden-private-keys {
description
"Indicates that the server supports hidden keys.";
}
feature encrypted-private-keys {
description
"Indicates that the server supports encryption
of private keys.";
}
/*************************************************/
/* Base Identities for Key Format Structures */
/*************************************************/
identity symmetric-key-format {
description
"Base key-format identity for symmetric keys.";
}
identity public-key-format {
description
"Base key-format identity for public keys.";
}
identity private-key-format {
description
"Base key-format identity for private keys.";
}
/****************************************************/
/* Identities for Private Key Format Structures */
/****************************************************/
identity rsa-private-key-format {
base private-key-format;
description
"Indicates that the private key value is encoded as
an RSAPrivateKey (from RFC 8017), encoded using ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 8017:
PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
identity ec-private-key-format {
base private-key-format;
description
"Indicates that the private key value is encoded as
an ECPrivateKey (from RFC 5915), encoded using ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5915:
Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
identity one-asymmetric-key-format {
if-feature "one-asymmetric-key-format";
base private-key-format;
description
"Indicates that the private key value is a
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) OneAsymmetricKey
structure, as defined in RFC 5958, encoded using
ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as
specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5958:
Asymmetric Key Packages
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
/***************************************************/
/* Identities for Public Key Format Structures */
/***************************************************/
identity ssh-public-key-format {
base public-key-format;
description
"Indicates that the public key value is a Secure Shell (SSH)
public key, as specified in RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.:
string certificate or public key format
identifier
byte[n] key/certificate data.";
reference
"RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity subject-public-key-info-format {
base public-key-format;
description
"Indicates that the public key value is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo
structure, as described in RFC 5280, encoded using ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
/******************************************************/
/* Identities for Symmetric Key Format Structures */
/******************************************************/
identity octet-string-key-format {
base symmetric-key-format;
description
"Indicates that the key is encoded as a raw octet string.
The length of the octet string MUST be appropriate for
the associated algorithm's block size.
The identity of the associated algorithm is outside the
scope of this specification. This is also true when
the octet string has been encrypted.";
}
identity one-symmetric-key-format {
if-feature "one-symmetric-key-format";
base symmetric-key-format;
description
"Indicates that the private key value is a CMS
OneSymmetricKey structure, as defined in RFC 6031,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 6031:
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Symmetric Key Package Content Type
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
/*************************************************/
/* Identities for Encrypted Value Structures */
/*************************************************/
identity encrypted-value-format {
description
"Base format identity for encrypted values.";
}
identity symmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
if-feature "symmetrically-encrypted-value-format";
base encrypted-value-format;
description
"Base format identity for symmetrically encrypted
values.";
}
identity asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
if-feature "asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format";
base encrypted-value-format;
description
"Base format identity for asymmetrically encrypted
values.";
}
identity cms-encrypted-data-format {
if-feature "cms-encrypted-data-format";
base symmetrically-encrypted-value-format;
description
"Indicates that the encrypted value conforms to
the 'encrypted-data-cms' type with the constraint
that the 'unprotectedAttrs' value is not set.";
reference
"RFC 5652:
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
identity cms-enveloped-data-format {
if-feature "cms-enveloped-data-format";
base asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format;
description
"Indicates that the encrypted value conforms to the
'enveloped-data-cms' type with the following constraints:
The EnvelopedData structure MUST have exactly one
'RecipientInfo'.
If the asymmetric key supports public key cryptography
(e.g., RSA), then the 'RecipientInfo' must be a
'KeyTransRecipientInfo' with the 'RecipientIdentifier'
using a 'subjectKeyIdentifier' with the value set using
'method 1' in RFC 7093 over the recipient's public key.
Otherwise, if the asymmetric key supports key agreement
(e.g., Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)), then the
'RecipientInfo' must be a 'KeyAgreeRecipientInfo'. The
'OriginatorIdentifierOrKey' value must use the
'OriginatorPublicKey' alternative. The
'UserKeyingMaterial' value must not be present. There
must be exactly one 'RecipientEncryptedKeys' value
having the 'KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier' set to 'rKeyId'
with the value set using 'method 1' in RFC 7093 over the
recipient's public key.";
reference
"RFC 5652:
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
RFC 7093:
Additional Methods for Generating Key
Identifiers Values
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
/*********************************************************/
/* Identities for Certificate Signing Request Formats */
/*********************************************************/
identity csr-format {
description
"A base identity for the certificate signing request
formats. Additional derived identities MAY be defined
by future efforts.";
}
identity p10-csr-format {
if-feature "p10-csr-format";
base csr-format;
description
"Indicates the CertificationRequest structure
defined in RFC 2986.";
reference
"RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7";
}
/***************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 2986 */
/***************************************************/
typedef csr-info {
type binary;
description
"A CertificationRequestInfo structure, as defined in
RFC 2986, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding
rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
typedef p10-csr {
type binary;
description
"A CertificationRequest structure, as specified in
RFC 2986, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding
rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
/***************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 5280 */
/***************************************************/
typedef x509 {
type binary;
description
"A Certificate structure, as specified in RFC 5280,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
typedef crl {
type binary;
description
"A CertificateList structure, as specified in RFC 5280,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
/***************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 6960 */
/***************************************************/
typedef oscp-request {
type binary;
description
"A OCSPRequest structure, as specified in RFC 6960,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 6960:
X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
typedef oscp-response {
type binary;
description
"A OCSPResponse structure, as specified in RFC 6960,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 6960:
X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
/***********************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from 5652 */
/***********************************************/
typedef cms {
type binary;
description
"A ContentInfo structure, as specified in RFC 5652,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5652:
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
typedef data-content-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
data content type, as described in Section 4 of RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef signed-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
signed-data content type, as described in Section 5 of
RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef enveloped-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
enveloped-data content type, as described in Section 6
of RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef digested-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
digested-data content type, as described in Section 7
of RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef encrypted-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
encrypted-data content type, as described in Section 8
of RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef authenticated-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
authenticated-data content type, as described in Section 9
of RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
/*********************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures related to RFC 5280 */
/*********************************************************/
typedef trust-anchor-cert-x509 {
type x509;
description
"A Certificate structure that MUST encode a self-signed
root certificate.";
}
typedef end-entity-cert-x509 {
type x509;
description
"A Certificate structure that MUST encode a certificate
that is neither self-signed nor has Basic constraint
CA true.";
}
/*********************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures related to RFC 5652 */
/*********************************************************/
typedef trust-anchor-cert-cms {
type signed-data-cms;
description
"A CMS SignedData structure that MUST contain the chain of
X.509 certificates needed to authenticate the certificate
presented by a client or end entity.
The CMS MUST contain only a single chain of certificates.
The client or end-entity certificate MUST only authenticate
to the last intermediate CA certificate listed in the chain.
In all cases, the chain MUST include a self-signed root
certificate. In the case where the root certificate is
itself the issuer of the client or end-entity certificate,
only one certificate is present.
This CMS structure MAY (as applicable where this type is
used) also contain suitably fresh (as defined by local
policy) revocation objects with which the device can
verify the revocation status of the certificates.
This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData
structure (RFC 5652, Section 5.2) that is commonly used
to disseminate X.509 certificates and revocation objects
(RFC 5280).";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
RFC 5652:
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef end-entity-cert-cms {
type signed-data-cms;
description
"A CMS SignedData structure that MUST contain the end-entity
certificate itself and MAY contain any number
of intermediate certificates leading up to a trust
anchor certificate. The trust anchor certificate
MAY be included as well.
The CMS MUST contain a single end-entity certificate.
The CMS MUST NOT contain any spurious certificates.
This CMS structure MAY (as applicable where this type is
used) also contain suitably fresh (as defined by local
policy) revocation objects with which the device can
verify the revocation status of the certificates.
This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData
structure (RFC 5652, Section 5.2) that is commonly
used to disseminate X.509 certificates and revocation
objects (RFC 5280).";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
RFC 5652:
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
/*****************/
/* Groupings */
/*****************/
grouping encrypted-value-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for a value that has been encrypted by
a referenced symmetric or asymmetric key.";
container encrypted-by {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description
"An empty container enabling a reference to the key that
encrypted the value to be augmented in. The referenced
key MUST be a symmetric key or an asymmetric key.
A symmetric key MUST be referenced via a leaf node called
'symmetric-key-ref'. An asymmetric key MUST be referenced
via a leaf node called 'asymmetric-key-ref'.
The leaf nodes MUST be direct descendants in the data tree
and MAY be direct descendants in the schema tree (e.g.,
'choice'/'case' statements are allowed but not a
container).";
}
leaf encrypted-value-format {
type identityref {
base encrypted-value-format;
}
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the format of the 'encrypted-value' leaf.
If 'encrypted-by' points to a symmetric key, then an
identity based on 'symmetrically-encrypted-value-format'
MUST be set (e.g., 'cms-encrypted-data-format').
If 'encrypted-by' points to an asymmetric key, then an
identity based on 'asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format'
MUST be set (e.g., 'cms-enveloped-data-format').";
}
leaf encrypted-value {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type binary;
must '../encrypted-by';
mandatory true;
description
"The value, encrypted using the referenced symmetric
or asymmetric key. The value MUST be encoded using
the format associated with the 'encrypted-value-format'
leaf.";
}
}
grouping password-grouping {
description
"A password used for authenticating to a remote system.
The 'ianach:crypt-hash' typedef from RFC 7317 should be
used instead when needing a password to authenticate a
local account.";
choice password-type {
nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true;
description
"Choice between password types.";
case cleartext-password {
if-feature "cleartext-passwords";
leaf cleartext-password {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type string;
description
"The cleartext value of the password.";
}
}
case encrypted-password {
if-feature "encrypted-passwords";
container encrypted-password {
description
"A container for the encrypted password value.";
uses encrypted-value-grouping;
}
}
}
}
grouping symmetric-key-grouping {
description
"A symmetric key.";
leaf key-format {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type identityref {
base symmetric-key-format;
}
description
"Identifies the symmetric key's format. Implementations
SHOULD ensure that the incoming symmetric key value is
encoded in the specified format.
For encrypted keys, the value is the decrypted key's
format (i.e., the 'encrypted-value-format' conveys the
encrypted key's format).";
}
choice key-type {
nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true;
description
"Choice between key types.";
case cleartext-symmetric-key {
leaf cleartext-symmetric-key {
if-feature "cleartext-symmetric-keys";
nacm:default-deny-all;
type binary;
must '../key-format';
description
"The binary value of the key. The interpretation of
the value is defined by the 'key-format' field.";
}
}
case hidden-symmetric-key {
if-feature "hidden-symmetric-keys";
leaf hidden-symmetric-key {
type empty;
must 'not(../key-format)';
description
"A hidden key is not exportable and not extractable;
therefore, it is of type 'empty' as its value is
inaccessible via management interfaces. Though hidden
to users, such keys are not hidden to the server and
may be referenced by configuration to indicate which
key a server should use for a cryptographic operation.
How such keys are created is outside the scope of this
module.";
}
}
case encrypted-symmetric-key {
if-feature "encrypted-symmetric-keys";
container encrypted-symmetric-key {
must '../key-format';
description
"A container for the encrypted symmetric key value.
The interpretation of the 'encrypted-value' node
is via the 'key-format' node";
uses encrypted-value-grouping;
}
}
}
}
grouping public-key-grouping {
description
"A public key.";
leaf public-key-format {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type identityref {
base public-key-format;
}
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the public key's format. Implementations SHOULD
ensure that the incoming public key value is encoded in the
specified format.";
}
leaf public-key {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"The binary value of the public key. The interpretation
of the value is defined by the 'public-key-format' field.";
}
}
grouping private-key-grouping {
description
"A private key.";
leaf private-key-format {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type identityref {
base private-key-format;
}
description
"Identifies the private key's format. Implementations SHOULD
ensure that the incoming private key value is encoded in the
specified format.
For encrypted keys, the value is the decrypted key's
format (i.e., the 'encrypted-value-format' conveys the
encrypted key's format).";
}
choice private-key-type {
nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true;
description
"Choice between key types.";
case cleartext-private-key {
if-feature "cleartext-private-keys";
leaf cleartext-private-key {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type binary;
must '../private-key-format';
description
"The value of the binary key. The key's value is
interpreted by the 'private-key-format' field.";
}
}
case hidden-private-key {
if-feature "hidden-private-keys";
leaf hidden-private-key {
type empty;
must 'not(../private-key-format)';
description
"A hidden key. It is of type 'empty' as its value is
inaccessible via management interfaces. Though hidden
to users, such keys are not hidden to the server and
may be referenced by configuration to indicate which
key a server should use for a cryptographic operation.
How such keys are created is outside the scope of this
module.";
}
}
case encrypted-private-key {
if-feature "encrypted-private-keys";
container encrypted-private-key {
must '../private-key-format';
description
"A container for the encrypted asymmetric private key
value. The interpretation of the 'encrypted-value'
node is via the 'private-key-format' node";
uses encrypted-value-grouping;
}
}
}
}
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping {
description
"A private key and, optionally, its associated public key.
Implementations MUST ensure that the two keys, when both
are specified, are a matching pair.";
uses public-key-grouping {
refine "public-key-format" {
mandatory false;
}
refine "public-key" {
mandatory false;
}
}
uses private-key-grouping;
}
grouping certificate-expiration-grouping {
description
"A notification for when a certificate is about to expire or
has already expired.";
notification certificate-expiration {
if-feature "certificate-expiration-notification";
description
"A notification indicating that the configured certificate
is either about to expire or has already expired. When to
send notifications is an implementation-specific decision,
but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a
month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and
then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved.
If the certificate's issuer maintains a Certificate
Revocation List (CRL), the expiration notification MAY
be sent if the CRL is about to expire.";
leaf expiration-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
}
}
}
grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping {
description
"A trust anchor certificate and a notification for when
it is about to expire or has already expired.";
leaf cert-data {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type trust-anchor-cert-cms;
description
"The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
}
uses certificate-expiration-grouping;
}
grouping end-entity-cert-grouping {
description
"An end-entity certificate and a notification for when
it is about to expire or has already expired. Implementations
SHOULD assert that, where used, the end-entity certificate
contains the expected public key.";
leaf cert-data {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type end-entity-cert-cms;
description
"The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
}
uses certificate-expiration-grouping;
}
grouping generate-csr-grouping {
description
"Defines the 'generate-csr' action.";
action generate-csr {
if-feature "csr-generation";
nacm:default-deny-all;
description
"Generates a certificate signing request structure for
the associated asymmetric key using the passed subject
and attribute values.
This 'action' statement is only available when the
associated 'public-key-format' node's value is
'subject-public-key-info-format'.";
input {
leaf csr-format {
type identityref {
base csr-format;
}
mandatory true;
description
"Specifies the format for the returned certificate.";
}
leaf csr-info {
type csr-info;
mandatory true;
description
"A CertificationRequestInfo structure, as defined in
RFC 2986.
Enables the client to provide a fully populated
CertificationRequestInfo structure that the server
only needs to sign in order to generate the complete
CertificationRequest structure to return in the
'output'.
The 'AlgorithmIdentifier' field contained inside
the 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo' field MUST be one known
to be supported by the device.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
RFC 9640:
YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
}
output {
choice csr-type {
mandatory true;
description
"A choice amongst certificate signing request formats.
Additional formats MAY be augmented into this 'choice'
statement by future efforts.";
case p10-csr {
leaf p10-csr {
type p10-csr;
description
"A CertificationRequest, as defined in RFC 2986.";
}
description
"A CertificationRequest, as defined in RFC 2986.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
RFC 9640:
YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
}
}
}
} // generate-csr-grouping
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping {
description
"A private/public key pair and an associated certificate.
Implementations MUST assert that the certificate contains
the matching public key.";
uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
uses end-entity-cert-grouping;
uses generate-csr-grouping;
} // asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping {
description
"A private/public key pair and a list of associated
certificates. Implementations MUST assert that
certificates contain the matching public key.";
uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
container certificates {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description
"Certificates associated with this asymmetric key.";
list certificate {
key "name";
description
"A certificate for this asymmetric key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the certificate.";
}
uses end-entity-cert-grouping {
refine "cert-data" {
mandatory true;
}
}
}
}
uses generate-csr-grouping;
} // asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
}
<CODE ENDS>
3. Security Considerations
3.1. No Support for CRMF
This document uses PKCS #10 [RFC2986] for the "generate-csr" action.
The use of Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] was
considered, but it was unclear if there was market demand for it. If
it is desired to support CRMF in the future, a backwards compatible
solution can be defined at that time.
3.2. No Support for Key Generation
Early revisions of this document included "rpc" statements for
generating symmetric and asymmetric keys. These statements were
removed due to an inability to obtain consensus for how to
generically identify the key algorithm to use. Hence, the solution
presented in this document only supports keys to be configured via an
external client.
Separate protocol-specific modules can present protocol-specific key-
generating RPCs (e.g., the "generate-asymmetric-key-pair" RPC in
[RFC9644] and [RFC9645]).
3.3. Unconstrained Public Key Usage
This module defines the "public-key-grouping" grouping, which enables
the configuration of public keys without constraints on their usage,
e.g., what operations the key is allowed to be used for (e.g.,
encryption, verification, or both).
The "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping uses the aforementioned
"public-key-grouping" grouping and carries the same traits.
The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" grouping uses the
aforementioned "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping, whereby
associated certificates MUST constrain the usage of the public key
according to local policy.
3.4. Unconstrained Private Key Usage
This module defines the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping,
which enables the configuration of private keys without constraints
on their usage, e.g., what operations the key is allowed to be used
for (e.g., signature, decryption, or both).
The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" grouping uses the
aforementioned "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping, whereby
configured certificates (e.g., identity certificates) may constrain
the use of the public key according to local policy.
3.5. Cleartext Passwords and Keys
The module contained within this document enables, only when specific
"feature" statements are enabled, for the cleartext value of
passwords and keys to be stored in the configuration database.
Storing cleartext values for passwords and keys is NOT RECOMMENDED.
3.6. Encrypting Passwords and Keys
The module contained within this document enables cleartext passwords
and keys to be encrypted via another key, either symmetric or
asymmetric. Both formats use a CMS structure (EncryptedData and
EnvelopedData, respectively), which allows any encryption algorithm
to be used.
To securely encrypt a password or key with a symmetric key, a proper
block cipher mode, such as an Authenticated Encryption with
Associated Data (AEAD) or Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), MUST be used.
This ensures that a random Initialization Vector (IV) is part of the
input, which guarantees that the output for encrypting the same
password or key still produces a different unpredictable ciphertext.
This avoids leaking that some encrypted keys or passwords are the
same and makes it much harder to pre-generate rainbow tables to
brute-force attack weak passwords. The Electronic Codebook (ECB)
block cipher mode MUST NOT be used.
3.7. Deletion of Cleartext Key Values
This module defines storage for cleartext key values that SHOULD be
zeroized when deleted so as to prevent the remnants of their
persisted storage locations from being analyzed in any meaningful
way.
The cleartext key values are the "cleartext-symmetric-key" node
defined in the "symmetric-key-grouping" grouping (Section 2.1.4.3)
and the "cleartext-private-key" node defined in the "asymmetric-key-
pair-grouping" grouping (Section 2.1.4.6).
3.8. Considerations for the "ietf-crypto-types" YANG Module
This section is modeled after the template defined in Section 3.7.1
of [RFC8407].
The "ietf-crypto-types" YANG module defines "grouping" statements
that are designed to be accessed via YANG-based management protocols,
such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these
protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g.,
Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4252], TLS [RFC8446], and QUIC [RFC9000]) and
mandatory-to-implement mutual authentication.
The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341]
provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a
preconfigured subset of all available protocol operations and
content.
Since the module in this document only defines groupings, these
considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that
use these groupings.
Some of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module may be
considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It
is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config,
or notification) to these data nodes. The following subtrees and
data nodes have particular sensitivity/vulnerability:
* The "cleartext-password" node:
The "cleartext-password" node defined in the "password-
grouping" grouping is additionally sensitive to read operations
such that, in normal use cases, it should never be returned to
a client. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-
all" has been applied to it.
* The "cleartext-symmetric-key" node:
The "cleartext-symmetric-key" node defined in the "symmetric-
key-grouping" grouping is additionally sensitive to read
operations such that, in normal use cases, it should never be
returned to a client. For this reason, the NACM extension
"default-deny-all" has been applied to it.
* The "cleartext-private-key" node:
The "cleartext-private-key" node defined in the "asymmetric-
key-pair-grouping" grouping is additionally sensitive to read
operations such that, in normal use cases, it should never be
returned to a client. For this reason, the NACM extension
"default-deny-all" has been applied to it.
* The "cert-data" node:
The "cert-data" node defined in both the "trust-anchor-cert-
grouping" and "end-entity-cert-grouping" groupings is
additionally sensitive to read operations, as certificates may
provide insight into which other resources/applications/servers
this particular server communicates with, as well as
potentially divulge personally identifying information (e.g.,
end-entity certificates). For this reason, the NACM extension
"default-deny-all" has been applied to it.
All the writable data nodes defined by all the groupings defined in
this module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network
environments. For instance, even the modification of a public key or
a certificate can dramatically alter the implemented security policy.
For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been
applied to all the data nodes defined in the module.
Some of the operations in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control access to these operations. These are the
operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
* generate-csr:
This "action" statement SHOULD only be executed by authorized
users. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-all"
has been applied. Note that NACM uses "default-deny-all" to
protect "rpc" and "action" statements; it does not define,
e.g., an extension called "default-deny-execute".
For this action, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations assert
channel binding [RFC5056] so as to ensure that the application
layer that sent the request is the same as the device
authenticated when the secure transport layer was established.
4. IANA Considerations
4.1. The IETF XML Registry
IANA has registered the following URI in the "ns" registry of the
"IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688].
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types
Registrant Contact: The IESG
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
4.2. The YANG Module Names Registry
IANA has registered the following YANG module in the "YANG Module
Names" registry [RFC6020].
Name: ietf-crypto-types
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types
Prefix: ct
Reference: RFC 9640
5. References
5.1. Normative References
[ITU.X680.2021]
ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T
Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021, February 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680-202102-I>.
[ITU.X690.2021]
ITU-T, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1:2021,
February 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690-202102-I>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, DOI 10.17487/RFC4252,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4252>.
[RFC4253] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, DOI 10.17487/RFC4253,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4253>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5915] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key
Structure", RFC 5915, DOI 10.17487/RFC5915, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5915>.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
[RFC6031] Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) Symmetric Key Package Content Type", RFC 6031,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6031, December 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6031>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC7093] Turner, S., Kent, S., and J. Manger, "Additional Methods
for Generating Key Identifiers Values", RFC 7093,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7093, December 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7093>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
5.2. Informative References
[HTTP-CLIENT-SERVER]
Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for HTTP Clients and HTTP
Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
netconf-http-client-server-23, 15 August 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
http-client-server-23>.
[NETCONF-CLIENT-SERVER]
Watsen, K., "NETCONF Client and Server Models", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-
client-server-37, 14 August 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
netconf-client-server-37>.
[RESTCONF-CLIENT-SERVER]
Watsen, K., "RESTCONF Client and Server Models", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-
client-server-38, 14 August 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
restconf-client-server-38>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5056>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC7317] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "A YANG Data Model for
System Management", RFC 7317, DOI 10.17487/RFC7317, August
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7317>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[RFC8342] Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K.,
and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture
(NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.
[RFC8407] Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of
Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.
[RFC8792] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu,
"Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and
RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8792>.
[RFC9641] Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Truststore",
RFC 9641, DOI 10.17487/RFC9641, October 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9641>.
[RFC9642] Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", RFC 9642,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9642, October 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9642>.
[RFC9643] Watsen, K. and M. Scharf, "YANG Groupings for TCP Clients
and TCP Servers", RFC 9643, DOI 10.17487/RFC9643, October
2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9643>.
[RFC9644] Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH
Servers", RFC 9644, DOI 10.17487/RFC9644, October 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9644>.
[RFC9645] Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS
Servers", RFC 9645, DOI 10.17487/RFC9645, October 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9645>.
[W3C.REC-xml-20081126]
Bray, T., Paoli, J., Sperberg-McQueen, C.M., Maler, E.,
and F. Yergeau, "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0
(Fifth Edition)", World Wide Web Consortium
Recommendation REC-xml-20081126, November 2008,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-xml-20081126/>.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the following for lively discussions
on list and in the halls (ordered by first name): Balázs Kovács,
Carsten Bormann, Dale Worley, Eric Voit, Éric Vyncke, Francesca
Palombini, Jürgen Schönwälder, Lars Eggert, Liang Xia, Mahesh
Jethanandani, Martin Björklund, Murray Kucherawy, Nick Hancock, Orie
Steele, Paul Wouters, Rich Salz, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef, Rob Wilton,
Roman Danyliw, Russ Housley, Sandra Murphy, Tom Petch, Valery
Smyslov, Wang Haiguang, Warren Kumari, and Zaheduzzaman Sarker.
Author's Address