| Rfc | 6744 |
|---|
| Title | IPv6 Nonce Destination Option for the Identifier-Locator Network
Protocol for IPv6 (ILNPv6) |
|---|
| Author | RJ Atkinson, SN Bhatti |
|---|
| Date | November 2012 |
|---|
| Format: | TXT, HTML |
|---|
| Status: | EXPERIMENTAL |
|---|
|
Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) RJ Atkinson
Request for Comments: 6744 Consultant
Category: Experimental SN Bhatti
ISSN: 2070-1721 U. St Andrews
November 2012
IPv6 Nonce Destination Option for the
Identifier-Locator Network Protocol for IPv6 (ILNPv6)
Abstract
The Identifier-Locator Network Protocol (ILNP) is an experimental,
evolutionary enhancement to IP. ILNP has multiple instantiations.
This document describes an experimental Nonce Destination Option used
only with ILNP for IPv6 (ILNPv6). This document is a product of the
IRTF Routing Research Group.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for examination, experimental implementation, and
evaluation.
This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
community. This document is a product of the Internet Research Task
Force (IRTF). The IRTF publishes the results of Internet-related
research and development activities. These results might not be
suitable for deployment. This RFC represents the individual
opinion(s) of one or more members of the Routing Research Group of
the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF). Documents approved for
publication by the IRSG are not a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6744.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document.
This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not
be created, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to
translate it into languages other than English.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. ILNP Document Roadmap ......................................3
1.2. Terminology ................................................5
2. Syntax ..........................................................5
3. Transport Protocol Effects ......................................6
4. Location Changes ................................................7
5. Implementation Considerations ...................................7
5.1. ILNP Communication Cache ...................................8
5.2. Mode Indicator .............................................8
5.3. IP Security ................................................8
6. Backwards Compatibility .........................................8
7. Security Considerations ........................................10
8. IANA Considerations ............................................12
9. References .....................................................12
9.1. Normative References ......................................12
9.2. Informative References ....................................13
10. Acknowledgements ..............................................14
1. Introduction
This document is part of the ILNP document set, which has had
extensive review within the IRTF Routing RG. ILNP is one of the
recommendations made by the RG Chairs. Separately, various refereed
research papers on ILNP have also been published during this decade.
So, the ideas contained herein have had much broader review than the
IRTF Routing RG. The views in this document were considered
controversial by the Routing RG, but the RG reached a consensus that
the document still should be published. The Routing RG has had
remarkably little consensus on anything, so virtually all Routing RG
outputs are considered controversial.
At present, the Internet research and development community is
exploring various approaches to evolving the Internet Architecture to
solve a variety of issues including, but not limited to, scalability
of inter-domain routing [RFC4984]. A wide range of other issues
(e.g., site multihoming, node multihoming, site/subnet mobility, node
mobility) are also active concerns at present. Several different
classes of evolution are being considered by the Internet research
and development community. One class is often called "Map and
Encapsulate", where traffic would be mapped and then tunnelled
through the inter-domain core of the Internet. Another class being
considered is sometimes known as "Identifier/Locator Split". This
document relates to a proposal that is in the latter class of
evolutionary approaches.
This document describes a new option for the IPv6 Destination Options
header that is used with the Identifier-Locator Network Protocol for
IPv6 (ILNPv6). ILNPv6 is an experimental protocol that is backwards
compatible with, and incrementally upgradable from, IPv6. This
option is ONLY used in ILNPv6 sessions and is never used with classic
IPv6 sessions.
The Nonce Option for the IPv6 Destination Options Header that is
described in this document provides two functions. First, it
provides protection against off-path attacks for packets when ILNPv6
is in use. Second, it provides a signal during initial network-layer
session creation that ILNPv6 is proposed for use with this network-
layer session, rather than classic IPv6. This last function is
particularly important for ensuring that ILNP is both incrementally
deployable and backwards compatible with IPv6. Consequently, this
option MUST NOT be used except by an ILNPv6-capable node.
Further, each Nonce value is unidirectional. Since packets often
travel asymmetric paths between two correspondents, having separate
Nonces for each direction limits the number of on-path nodes that can
easily learn an ILNP session's nonce. So a typical TCP session will
have two different nonce values in use: one nonce is used from Local
Node to the Correspondent Node and a different nonce is used from the
Correspondent Node to the Local Node.
1.1. ILNP Document Roadmap
This document defines a new IPv6 Nonce Destination Option used by
ILNPv6 nodes (1) to indicate to ILNP correspondent nodes (by
inclusion within the initial packets of an ILNP session) that the
node is operating in the ILNP mode and (2) to prevent off-path
attacks against ILNP ICMP messages. This Nonce is used, for example,
with all ILNP ICMPv6 Locator Update messages that are exchanged among
ILNP correspondent nodes.
The ILNP architecture can have more than one engineering
instantiation. For example, one can imagine a "clean-slate"
engineering design based on the ILNP architecture. In separate
documents, we describe two specific engineering instances of ILNP.
The term "ILNPv6" refers precisely to an instance of ILNP that is
based upon, and backwards compatible with, IPv6. The term "ILNPv4"
refers precisely to an instance of ILNP that is based upon, and
backwards compatible with, IPv4.
Many engineering aspects common to both ILNPv4 and ILNPv6 are
described in [RFC6741]. A full engineering specification for either
ILNPv6 or ILNPv4 is beyond the scope of this document.
Readers are referred to other related ILNP documents for details not
described here:
a) [RFC6740] is the main architectural description of ILNP, including
the concept of operations.
b) [RFC6741] describes engineering and implementation considerations
that are common to both ILNPv4 and ILNPv6.
c) [RFC6742] defines additional DNS resource records that support
ILNP.
d) [RFC6743] defines a new ICMPv6 Locator Update message used by an
ILNP node to inform its correspondent nodes of any changes to its
set of valid Locators.
e) [RFC6745] defines a new ICMPv4 Locator Update message used by an
ILNP node to inform its correspondent nodes of any changes to its
set of valid Locators.
f) [RFC6746] defines a new IPv4 Nonce Option used by ILNPv4 nodes to
carry a security nonce to prevent off-path attacks against ILNP
ICMP messages and also defines a new IPv4 Identifier Option used
by ILNPv4 nodes.
g) [RFC6747] describes extensions to Address Resolution Protocol
(ARP) for use with ILNPv4.
h) [RFC6748] describes optional engineering and deployment functions
for ILNP. These are not required for the operation or use of ILNP
and are provided as additional options.
1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Syntax
The Nonce Option is carried within an IPv6 Destination Options
header. Section 4 of [RFC2460] provides much more information on the
various options and optional headers used with IPv6.
More than one option might be inside the IPv6 Destination Options
Header; however, at most, one Nonce Option exists in a given IPv6
packet.
A system that receives a packet containing more than one Nonce Option
SHOULD discard the packet as "Authentication Failed" (instead of
passing the packet up to the appropriate transport-layer protocol or
to ICMP) and SHOULD log the event, including the Source Locator,
Source Identifier, Destination Locator, Destination Identifier,
upper-layer protocol (e.g., OSPF, TCP, UDP) if any, and transport-
layer port numbers (if any), as a security fault in accordance with
local logging policies.
As of this writing, IPv6 Destination Options headers, and the options
carried by such headers, are extremely uncommon in the deployed
Internet. So, it is expected that this Nonce Option commonly would
be the only IPv6 Destination Option present in a given IPv6 packet.
If a Common Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO) label
option [RFC5570] is also present in the same IPv6 Destination Options
header, the CALIPSO Option SHOULD precede the Nonce Option. The
Nonce Option SHOULD precede other possible options in the same IPv6
Destination Options header.
In the diagram below, we show not only the Nonce Option but also the
IPv6 Destination Options header that carries the Nonce Option.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | Option Type | Option Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ Nonce Value /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Next Header: 8-bit selector. Identifies the type of header
immediately following the Destination Options
header. This field uses the same values as the
IPv4 Protocol field, as described in [RFC2460].
Hdr Ext Len: 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the Destination
Options header in 8-octet units, not including the
first 8 octets.
Option Type: This contains the value 0x8B (139). This is the
first octet of the Nonce Option itself.
Option Length: This indicates the length in 8-bit octets of the
Nonce Value field of the Nonce Option. This value
must be selected so that the enveloping IPv6
Destination Option complies with the IPv6 header
alignment rules. Common values are 4 (when the
Nonce Value is 32 bits) and 12 (when the Nonce
value is 96 bits).
Nonce Value: An unpredictable cryptographically random value
[RFC4086] used to prevent off-path attacks on an
ILNP session. This field has variable length,
with the length indicated by the Option Length
field preceding it. Note that the overall IPv6
IPv6 Destination Option MUST comply with IPv6
header alignment rules. Implementations MUST
support sending and receiving 32-bit and 96-bit
Nonce values.
3. Transport Protocol Effects
When the initial packet(s) of an IPv6 session contain this Nonce
Destination Option, ILNPv6 is in use for that network-layer session.
(NOTE: Backwards compatibility and incremental deployment are
discussed in more detail in Section 6 below.)
When a network-layer session is using ILNPv6, the transport-layer
pseudo-header calculations MUST set to zero the high-order 64-bits
("Locator" or "Routing Prefix") of each IPv6 address. This has the
effect that the transport-layer is no longer aware of the topological
network location of either node in that transport-layer session.
The preceding rule applies not only to unicast ILNPv6 sessions but
also to multicast or anycast ILNPv6 sessions.
4. Location Changes
When a node has a change in its Locator set that causes all
previously valid Locators to become invalid, the node MUST send an
ICMP Locator Update message (containing the Nonce Option with the
appropriate nonce value) to each of its correspondents [RFC6740]
[RFC6743].
In the deployed Internet, packets sometimes arrive at a destination
out of order. A receiving node MUST drop a packet arriving from a
correspondent if the Source Locator of the received packet is not in
the receiving node's Identifier-Locator Communication Cache's
(ILCC's) Set of Correspondent Locators UNLESS that packet contains a
Nonce Option with the appropriate nonce value for that Source
Identifier and Destination Identifier pair. This is done to reduce
the risk of ILNP session hijacking or ILNP session interference
attacks.
Hence, the node that has had all previously valid Locators become
invalid MUST include the Nonce Option with the appropriate nonce
value in all packets (data or otherwise) to all correspondents for at
least three round-trip times (RTTs) for each correspondent. (N.B. An
implementation need not actually calculate RTT values; it could just
use a fixed timer with a time long enough to cover the longest RTT
path, such as 1 minute.) This "gratuitous authentication" ensures
that the correspondent can authenticate any received packet, even if
the ICMP Locator Update control message arrives and is processed
AFTER some other packet using the new Source Locator(s). If an ILNP
session is using IPsec, then, of course, IPsec SHOULD continue to be
used even if one or more participating nodes change location.
Because IP Security for ILNP [RFC6741] binds only to the Identifiers,
and not to the Locators in the packet, changes in Locator value have
no impact on IP Security for ILNP sessions.
As mobility and multihoming are functionally equivalent for ILNP,
this section applies equally to either situation and also to any
other situation in which a node's set of Locators might change over
time.
5. Implementation Considerations
Implementers may use any internal implementation they wish, PROVIDED
that the externally visible behaviour is the same as this
implementation approach.
5.1. ILNP Communication Cache
As described in [RFC6741], ILNP nodes maintain an Identifier-Locator
Communication Cache (ILCC) that contains several variables for each
correspondent. The ILNP Nonce value is an important part of that
cache.
5.2. Mode Indicator
To support ILNP, and to retain needed incremental deployability and
backwards compatibility, the network layer needs a (logical) mode bit
in the Transport Control Block (or equivalent for one's
implementation) to track which IP sessions are using traditional IPv6
and which IP sessions are using ILNPv6.
If a given transport-layer session is using ILNP, then an entry
corresponding to the network-layer components of that transport-layer
session also will exist in the ILNP Communication Cache. Multiple
transport-layer sessions between a given pair of nodes normally share
a single entry in the ILNP Communication Cache, provided their
network-layer details (e.g., Identifiers, Nonces) are identical.
Because two different ILNP nodes at two different locations might
share the same Identifier value, it is important for an ILNP
implementation to use the ILNP Nonce values to distinguish between
different ILNP nodes that happen to be using the same (or some of the
same) Identifier value(s).
5.3. IP Security
Whether or not ILNP is in use, the IPsec subsystem MUST maintain an
IPsec Security Association Database (SAD) and MUST maintain
information about which IPsec Selectors apply to traffic received by
or sent from the local node [RFC4301]. By combining the information
in the IPsec SAD, of what IPsec Selectors apply, and the information
in the ILCC, an implementation has sufficient knowledge to apply
IPsec properly to both received and transmitted packets.
6. Backwards Compatibility
This option MUST NOT be present in an IPv6 packet unless the packet
is part of an ILNPv6 session. As is explained below in more detail,
the presence or absence of this option from the initial packets of a
new IPv6 session is an important indication of whether the session is
using classic IPv6 or ILNPv6.
ILNPv6 nodes MUST include this option in the first few packets of
each ILNPv6 session, MUST include this option in all ICMP messages
generated by endpoints participating in an ILNPv6 session, and MAY
include this option in any and all packets of an ILNPv6 session. It
is recommended that this option be included in all packets of the
ILNPv6 session if the packet loss for that session is known to be
much higher than normal.
If a node supports ILNP and the node wishes to be able to receive
incoming new ILNP sessions, then that node's FQDN SHOULD have one or
more Node Identifier (NID) records and also one or more Locator
(e.g., L64 or LP) records associated with it in the DNS [RFC6742].
When a host ("initiator") initiates a new IP session with a
correspondent ("responder"), it normally will perform a DNS lookup to
determine the address(es) of the responder. A host that has been
enhanced to support the Identifier/Locator Split operating mode
SHOULD look for Node Identifier ("NID") and Locator ("L64") records
in any received DNS replies. DNS servers that support Identifier and
Locator (i.e., L64 or LP) records might include them (when they
exist) as additional data in all DNS replies to DNS queries for DNS A
or AAAA records associated with a specified DNS FQDN.
If the initiator supports ILNP, and from DNS data learns that the
responder also supports ILNP, then the initiator SHOULD attempt to
use ILNP for new sessions with that responder. In such cases, the
initiator MUST generate an unpredictable, cryptographically random,
ILNP Nonce value, MUST store that ILNP Nonce value in the local ILCC,
and MUST include the ILNP Nonce Destination Option in its initial
packet(s) to the responder. The IETF has provided advice on
generating cryptographically random numbers, such as this nonce value
[RFC4086].
If the responder supports ILNP and receives initial packet(s)
containing the ILNP Nonce Destination Option, the responder will
thereby learn that the initiator supports ILNP and the responder also
will use ILNP for this new IP session.
If the responder supports ILNP and receives initial IP packet(s) NOT
containing the Nonce Destination Option, the responder will thereby
learn that the initiator does NOT support ILNP and the responder will
use classic IPv6 for this new IP session.
If the responder does not support ILNP and receives initial packet(s)
containing the ILNP Nonce Destination Option, the responder MUST drop
the packet and MUST send an ICMP "Parameter Problem" error message
back to the initiator [RFC4443]. Indeed, it is not expected that
this behaviour will need to be coded into non-ILNP nodes, as this is
the normal behaviour for nodes receiving unknown option headers.
If the initiator EITHER does not receive a response from the
responder in a timely manner (e.g., within the applicable TCP timeout
for a TCP session), and does not receive an ICMP Unreachable error
message for that packet, OR receives an ICMP Parameter Problem error
message for that packet, then the initiator infers that the responder
is not able to support ILNP. In this case, the initiator should try
again to create the new IP session, but this time use classic IPv6
and hence MUST NOT include the ILNP Nonce Destination Option.
7. Security Considerations
The ILNPv6 Nonce Destination Option is used ONLY for ILNPv6 sessions,
because this option is part of the backwards compatibility and
incremental-deployment approach for the Identifier-Locator Network
Protocol (ILNP). This option MUST NOT be used with classic IPv6
sessions.
The ILNPv6 Nonce Destination Option only seeks to provide protection
against off-path attacks on an IP session. Ordinary IPv6 is
vulnerable to on-path attacks unless IPsec is in use [CA-1995-01]
[RFC4301]. This option exists to provide non-cryptographic
protection for ILNP sessions, protection equivalent to the security
of IP sessions that do NOT use IPsec.
When ILNPv6 is in use, the ILNP Nonce Destination Option MUST be
included in any ICMP control messages (e.g., ICMP Unreachable, ICMP
Locator Update) sent by participants in that ILNPv6 session, even if
IPsec also is in use for that ILNPv6 session. Note that certain ICMP
messages, for example, a "Packet Too Big" message, might be generated
by transit devices that are not aware of the ILNP Nonce in use for
that ILNPv6 session; hence, they are not able to include the ILNP
Nonce. Again, this is also true of classic IPv6 in the same
operational situations, so this does not create a new security issue.
For ILNPv6 sessions, any ICMP control messages received from a
participant in that ILNPv6 session that lack a Nonce Destination
Option MUST be discarded as forgeries. This security event SHOULD be
logged in accordance with local security logging policies, including
details of the received packet (i.e., Source Locator, Source
Identifier, Destination Locator, Destination Identifier, upper-layer
protocol (e.g., TCP, UDP, OSPF) if any, transport-layer port numbers
if any, and the date and time the packet was received).
For ILNPv6 sessions, ICMP control messages received from a
participant in that ILNPv6 session that have a Nonce Destination
Option, but do NOT have the correct nonce value inside the Nonce
Destination Option, MUST be discarded as forgeries. This security
event SHOULD be logged as described above.
Of course, longer nonce values provide greater resistance to random
guessing of the nonce value. However, ILNPv6 sessions operating in
higher risk environments SHOULD also use the cryptographic
authentication provided by IP Security for ILNP [RFC6741] [RFC4301].
Use of IP Security for ILNP for an ILNPv6 session does not eliminate
the need for the ILNPv6 Nonce Option to be included as described here
or as described in [RFC6743].
As a performance optimisation, it is suggested that when both the
Nonce Option and IPsec are present in a packet and the Nonce Option
has not been encrypted the Nonce Option value be checked for validity
before beginning IPsec processing. This minimises the ability of an
off-path attacker to force the recipient to perform expensive
cryptographic computations on received control packets.
For environments with data at differing Sensitivity Levels operating
over common infrastructure (e.g., when the IPv6 CALIPSO is deployed),
it is recommended that the ILNP Nonce Option be encrypted by using
ESP Transport-Mode or ESP Tunnel-Mode in order to reduce the covert
channel bandwidth potential created by the Nonce Option and to
prevent a node at one Sensitivity Level from attacking an ILNP
session at a different Sensitivity Level [RFC5570]. Further, Multi-
Level Secure (MLS) systems SHOULD use different nonce values for ILNP
sessions having different Sensitivity Levels [RFC5570]. Also, an MLS
implementation of ILNP will also store the Sensitivity Label
information associated with each ILNP session in the implementation's
ILCC. When the Nonce Option and the CALIPSO Option are present in
the same IPv6 Destination Options header, the CALIPSO Option SHOULD
appear before the Nonce Option.
In all cases, the ILNP Nonce Value MUST be unpredictable and
cryptographically random. [RFC4086] provides concrete advice on how
to generate a suitable nonce value.
As this is an option within the IPv6 Destination Options header,
rather than an option within the IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Option Header, the
presence of this option in an IPv6 packet ought not disturb routers
along the path an IP packet containing this option happens to travel.
Further, many deployed modern IP routers (both IPv4 and IPv6) have
been explicitly configured to ignore all IP Options, even including
the "Router Alert" option, when forwarding packets not addressed to
the router itself. Reports indicate this has been done to preclude
use of IP Options as a (Distributed) Denial-of-Service attack vector
on backbone routers.
As the Nonce is used in the checksum of all Authentication Header
(AH) protected packets, as an implementation hint, it would seem
sensible to include the Nonce value from the ILCC for that ILNP
session.
8. IANA Considerations
Consistent with the procedures of [RFC2780], IANA has assigned a new
IPv6 Destination Option Type value of 0x8B.
The Nonce Option MUST NOT change in transit and MUST be included in
IP Authentication Header calculations.
Further, if an end system receives an IPv6 packet containing this
option, but does not recognise this option, the end system MUST
discard the packet and, regardless of whether or not the received
packet's Destination Address was a multicast address, send an ICMPv6
Parameter Problem, Code 2 ("Unrecognised IPv6 Option Encountered"),
message to the received packet's Source IPv6 Address, pointing to the
unrecognised Option Type.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version
6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
[RFC2780] Bradner, S. and V. Paxson, "IANA Allocation Guidelines
For Values In the Internet Protocol and Related
Headers", BCP 37, RFC 2780, March 2000.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 4443,
March 2006.
[RFC6740] Atkinson, R. and S. Bhatti, "Identifier-Locator Network
Protocol (ILNP) Architectural Description", RFC 6740,
November 2012.
[RFC6741] Atkinson, R. and S. Bhatti, "Identifier-Locator Network
Protocol (ILNP) Engineering and Implementation
Considerations", RFC 6741, November 2012.
[RFC6743] Atkinson, R. and S. Bhatti, "ICMPv6 Locator Update
Message", RFC 6743, November 2012.
9.2. Informative References
[CA-1995-01] US CERT, "CERT Advisory CA-1995-01 IP Spoofing Attacks
and Hijacked Terminal Connections", Pittsburgh, PA,
USA, 1995.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC
4086, June 2005.
[RFC4984] Meyer, D., Ed., Zhang, L., Ed., and K. Fall, Ed.,
"Report from the IAB Workshop on Routing and
Addressing", RFC 4984, September 2007.
[RFC5570] StJohns, M., Atkinson, R., and G. Thomas, "Common
Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO)", RFC
5570, July 2009.
[RFC6742] Atkinson, R., Bhatti, S. and S. Rose, "DNS Resource
Records for the Identifier-Locator Network Protocol
(ILNP)", RFC 6742, November 2012.
[RFC6745] Atkinson, R. and S. Bhatti, "ICMP Locator Update
Message for the Identifier-Locator Network Protocol for
IPv4 (ILNPv4)", RFC 6745, November 2012.
[RFC6746] Atkinson, R. and S.Bhatti, "IPv4 Options for the
Identifier-Locator Network Protocol (ILNP)", RFC 6746,
November 2012.
[RFC6747] Atkinson, R. and S. Bhatti, "Address Resolution
Protocol (ARP) Extension for the Identifier-Locator
Network Protocol for IPv4 (ILNPv4)", RFC 6747, November
2012.
[RFC6748] Atkinson, R. and S. Bhatti, "Optional Advanced
Deployment Scenarios for the Identifier-Locator Network
Protocol (ILNP)", RFC 6748, November 2012.
10. Acknowledgements
Steve Blake, Stephane Bortzmeyer, Mohamed Boucadair, Noel Chiappa,
Wes George, Steve Hailes, Joel Halpern, Mark Handley, Volker Hilt,
Paul Jakma, Dae-Young Kim, Tony Li, Yakov Rehkter, Bruce Simpson,
Robin Whittle, and John Wroclawski (in alphabetical order) provided
review and feedback on earlier versions of this document. Steve
Blake provided an especially thorough review of an early version of
the entire ILNP document set, which was extremely helpful. We also
wish to thank the anonymous reviewers of the various ILNP papers for
their feedback.
Roy Arends provided expert guidance on technical and procedural
aspects of DNS issues.
Authors' Addresses
RJ Atkinson
Consultant
San Jose, CA 95125
USA
EMail: rja.lists@gmail.com
SN Bhatti
School of Computer Science
University of St Andrews
North Haugh, St Andrews
Fife KY16 9SX
Scotland, UK
EMail: saleem@cs.st-andrews.ac.uk