| Rfc | 6097 |
|---|
| Title | Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) Discovery for Proxy Mobile IPv6 |
|---|
| Author | J.
Korhonen, V. Devarapalli |
|---|
| Date | February 2011 |
|---|
| Format: | TXT, HTML |
|---|
| Status: | INFORMATIONAL |
|---|
|
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Korhonen
Request for Comments: 6097 Nokia Siemens Networks
Category: Informational V. Devarapalli
ISSN: 2070-1721 Vasona Networks
February 2011
Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) Discovery for Proxy Mobile IPv6
Abstract
Large Proxy Mobile IPv6 deployments would benefit from a
functionality where a Mobile Access Gateway could dynamically
discover a Local Mobility Anchor for a Mobile Node attaching to a
Proxy Mobile IPv6 domain. The purpose of the dynamic discovery
functionality is to reduce the amount of static configuration in the
Mobile Access Gateway. This document describes several possible
dynamic Local Mobility Anchor discovery solutions.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6097.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................2
2. AAA-Based Discovery Solutions ...................................3
2.1. Receiving the LMA Address during Network Access
Authentication .............................................4
2.2. Receiving the LMA FQDN during Network Access
Authentication .............................................4
3. Discovery Solutions Based on Data from Lower Layers .............5
3.1. Constructing the LMA FQDN from a Mobile Node Identity ......5
3.2. Receiving the LMA FQDN or IP Address from Lower Layers .....5
3.3. Constructing the LMA FQDN from a Service Name ..............6
4. Handover Considerations .........................................6
5. Recommendations .................................................7
6. Security Considerations .........................................8
7. Acknowledgements ................................................8
8. References ......................................................9
8.1. Normative References .......................................9
8.2. Informative References .....................................9
1. Introduction
A Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) [RFC5213] deployment would benefit from
a functionality where a Mobile Access Gateway (MAG) can dynamically
discover a Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) for a Mobile Node (MN)
attaching to a PMIPv6 domain. The purpose of the dynamic discovery
functionality is to reduce the amount of static configuration in the
MAG. Other drivers for the dynamic discovery of an LMA include LMA
load balancing solutions and selecting an LMA based on desired
services (i.e., allowing service-specific routing of traffic)
[RFC5149]. This document describes several possible dynamic LMA
discovery approaches and makes a recommendation of the preferred one.
The following list briefly introduces solution approaches that will
be discussed in this document. The approaches discussed do not
include all possible discovery mechanisms, but are limited to those
considered to fit most simply into the PMIPv6 environment.
o LMA Address is retrieved from the Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting (AAA) infrastructure during the network access
authentication procedure when the MN attaches to the MAG.
o LMA Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) is retrieved from the AAA
infrastructure during the network access authentication, followed
by a Domain Name System (DNS) lookup.
o LMA FQDN is derived from the MN identity received from the lower
layers during the network attachment, followed by a DNS lookup.
o LMA FQDN or IP address is received from the lower layers during
the network attachment. The reception of an FQDN from the lower
layers is followed by a DNS lookup.
o LMA FQDN is derived from the service selection indication received
from lower layers during the network attachment, followed by a DNS
lookup.
When an MN performs a handover from one MAG to another, the new MAG
must use the same LMA that the old MAG was using. This is required
for session continuity. The LMA discovery mechanism in the new MAG
should be able to return the information of the same LMA that was
being used by the old MAG. This document also discusses solutions
for LMA discovery during a handover.
2. AAA-Based Discovery Solutions
This section presents an LMA discovery solution that requires a MAG
to be connected to an AAA infrastructure (as described in [RFC5779],
for instance). The AAA infrastructure is also assumed to be aware of
PMIPv6. An MN attaching to a PMIPv6 domain is typically required to
provide authentication for network access and to be authorized for
mobility services before the MN is allowed to send or receive any IP
packets or even complete its IP level configuration.
The AAA-based LMA discovery solution hooks into the network access
authentication and authorization process. The MAG also has the role
of a Network Access Server (NAS) at this step. While the MN is
attaching to the network, the PMIPv6-related parameters are
bootstrapped in parallel with authentication for the network access
and authorization for the mobility services. The bootstrapping of
PMIPv6 parameters involves the policy profile download over the AAA
infrastructure to the MAG (see Appendix A of [RFC5213]).
2.1. Receiving the LMA Address during Network Access Authentication
After the MN has been successfully authenticated for network access
and authorized for the mobility service, the MAG receives the LMA IP
address from the AAA server over the AAA infrastructure. The LMA IP
address information would be part of the AAA message that ends the
successful authentication and authorization portion of the AAA
exchange.
Once the MAG receives the LMA IP address, it sends a Proxy Binding
Update (PBU) message for the newly authenticated and authorized MN.
The MAG expects that the LMA returned by the AAA server is able to
provide mobility session continuity for the MN, i.e., after a
handover, the LMA would be the same one the MN already has a mobility
session set up with.
2.2. Receiving the LMA FQDN during Network Access Authentication
This solution is similar to the procedure described in Section 2.1.
The difference is that the MAG receives an FQDN of the LMA instead of
the IP address(es). The MAG has to query the DNS infrastructure in
order to resolve the FQDN to the LMA IP address(es).
The LMA FQDN might be a generic name for a PMIPv6 domain that
resolves to one or more LMAs in the PMIPv6 domain. Alternatively,
the LMA FQDN might be resolved to exactly one LMA within the PMIPv6
domain. The latter approach would obviously be useful if a new
target MAG, after a handover, resolved the LMA FQDN to the LMA IP
address where the MN mobility session is already located.
The procedures described in this section and in Section 2.1 may also
be used together. For example, the AAA server might return a generic
LMA FQDN during the MN's initial attachment, and once the LMA gets
selected, return the LMA IP address during the subsequent attachments
to other MAGs in the PMIPv6 domain. In order for this to work, the
resolved and selected LMA IP address must be updated to the remote
policy store. For example, the LMA could perform the policy store
update using the AAA infrastructure once it receives the initial PBU
from the MAG for the new mobility session.
3. Discovery Solutions Based on Data from Lower Layers
The following section discusses solutions where a MAG acquires
information from layers below the IP layer. Based on this
information, the MAG is able to determine which LMA to contact when
the MN attaches to the MAG. The lower layers discussed here are not
explicitly defined but include different radio access technologies
and tunneling solutions such as an Internet Key Exchange version 2
(IKEv2) [RFC5996] IPsec tunnel [RFC4303].
3.1. Constructing the LMA FQDN from a Mobile Node Identity
A MAG acquires an MN identity from lower layers. The MAG can use the
information embedded in the identity to construct a generic LMA FQDN
(based on some pre-configured formatting rules) and then proceed to
resolve the LMA IP address(es) using the DNS. Obviously, the MN
identity must embed information that can be used to uniquely identify
the entity hosting and operating the LMA for the MN. Examples of
such MN identities are the International Mobile Subscriber Identity
(IMSI) and the Globally Unique Temporary User Equipment Identity
(GUTI) [3GPP.23.003]. These MN identities contain information that
can uniquely identify the operator to whom the subscription belongs.
3.2. Receiving the LMA FQDN or IP Address from Lower Layers
The solution described here is similar to the solution discussed in
Section 3.1. A MAG receives an LMA FQDN or an IP address from lower
layers, for example, as a part of the normal lower-layer signaling
when the MN attaches to the network. IKEv2 could be an existing
example of such lower-layer signaling where IPsec is the "lower
layer" for the MN [3GPP.24.302]. IKEv2 has an IKEv2
Identification - Responder (IDr) payload, which is used by the IKEv2
initiator (i.e., the MN in this case) to specify which of the
responder's identities (i.e., the LMA in this case) it wants to talk
to. And here the responder identity could be an FQDN or an IP
address of the LMA (as the IKEv2 identification payload can be an IP
address or an FQDN). Another existing example is the Access Point
Name Information Element (APN IE) [3GPP.24.008] used in 3GPP radio
network access signaling and capable of carrying an FQDN. However,
in general, this means the MN is also the originator of the LMA
information. The LMA information content as such can be transparent
to the MN, meaning the MN does not associate the information with any
LMA function.
3.3. Constructing the LMA FQDN from a Service Name
Some network access technologies (including tunneling solutions)
allow the MN to signal the service name that identifies a particular
service or the external network it wants to access [3GPP.24.302]
[RFC5996]. If the MN-originated service name also embeds the
information of the entity hosting the service, or the hosting
information can be derived from other information available at the
same time (e.g., see Section 3.1), then the MAG can construct a
generic LMA FQDN (e.g., based on some pre-defined formatting rules)
providing an access to the service or the external network. The
pre-defined formatting rules [3GPP.23.003] are usually agreed on
among operators that belong to the same inter-operator roaming
consortium or by network infrastructure vendors defining an open
networking system architecture.
Once the MAG has the FQDN, it can proceed to resolve the LMA IP
address(es) using the DNS. An example of such a service or external
network name is the Access Point Name (APN) [3GPP.23.003] that
contains the information of the operator providing the access to the
given service or the external network. For example, an FQDN for an
"ims" APN could be "ims.apn.epc.mnc015.mcc234.3gppnetwork.org".
4. Handover Considerations
Whenever an MN moves and attaches to a new MAG in a PMIPv6 domain,
all the MAGs that the MN attaches to should use the same LMA. If
there is only one LMA per PMIPv6 domain, then there is no issue. If
there is a context transfer mechanism available between the MAGs,
then the new MAG knows the LMA information from the old MAG. Such a
mechanism is described in [RFC5949]. If the MN-related context is
not transferred between the MAGs, then a mechanism to deliver the
current LMA information to the new MAG is required.
Relying on DNS during handovers is not generally a working solution
if the PMIPv6 domain has more than one LMA, unless the DNS
consistently assigns a specific LMA for each given MN. In most cases
described in Section 3, where the MAG derives the LMA FQDN, there is
no prior knowledge whether the LMA FQDN resolves to one or more LMA
IP address(es) in the PMIPv6 domain. However, depending on the
deployment and deployment-related regulations (such as inter-operator
roaming consortium agreements), the situation might not be this
desperate. For example, a MAG might be able to synthesize an
LMA-specific FQDN (e.g., out of an MN identity or some other
service-specific parameters). Alternatively, the MAG could use (for
example), an MN identity as an input to an algorithm that
deterministically assigns the same LMA out of a pool of LMAs
(assuming the MAG has, e.g., learned a group of LMA FQDNs via an SRV
[RFC2782] query). These approaches would guarantee that DNS always
returns the same LMA Address to the MAG.
Once the MN completes its initial attachment to a PMIPv6 domain, the
information about the LMA that is selected to serve the MN is stored
in the policy store (or the AAA server). The LMA information is
conveyed to the policy store by the LMA after the initial attachment
is completed [RFC5779]. Typically, AAA infrastructure is used for
exchanging information between the LMA and the policy store.
When the MN moves and attaches to another MAG in the PMIPv6 domain,
then the AAA server delivers the existing LMA information to the new
MAG as part of the authentication and authorization procedure as
described in Section 2.1.
5. Recommendations
This document discussed several solution approaches for a dynamic LMA
discovery. All discussed solution approaches actually require
additional functionality or infrastructure support that the base
PMIPv6 specification [RFC5213] does not require.
Solutions in Section 3 all depend on lower layers being able to
provide information that a MAG can then use to query the DNS and
discover a suitable LMA. The capabilities of the lower layers and
the interactions with them are generally out of scope of the IETF,
and specific to a certain system and architecture.
Solutions in Section 2 depend on the existence of an AAA
infrastructure, which is able to provide to a MAG either an LMA IP
address or an LMA FQDN. While there can be system- and architecture-
specific details regarding the AAA interactions and the use of DNS,
the dynamic LMA discovery can be implemented in an access- and
technology-agnostic manner, and work in the same way across
heterogeneous environments. Therefore, using AAA-based LMA discovery
solutions is recommended by this document. Furthermore, following
the guidance in Section 4, Paragraph 4.1 of [RFC1958], the use of
FQDNs should be preferred over IP addresses in the context of
AAA-based LMA discovery solutions.
6. Security Considerations
The use of DNS for obtaining the IP address of a mobility agent
carries certain security risks. These are explained in detail in
Section 9.1 of [RFC5026]. However, the risks described in [RFC5026]
are mitigated to a large extent in this document, since the MAG and
the LMA belong to the same PMIPv6 domain. The DNS server that the
MAG queries is also part of the same PMIPv6 domain. Even if the MAG
obtains the IP address of a bogus LMA from a bogus DNS server,
further harm is prevented since the MAG and the LMA should
authenticate each other before exchanging PMIPv6 signaling messages.
[RFC5213] specifies the use of IKEv2 between the MAG and the LMA to
authenticate each other and set up IPsec security associations for
protecting the PMIPv6 signaling messages.
The AAA infrastructure may be used to transport the LMA-discovery-
related information between the MAG and the AAA server via one or
more AAA brokers and/or AAA proxies. In this case, the MAG-to-AAA-
server communication relies on the security properties of the
intermediate AAA brokers and AAA proxies.
7. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Julien Laganier, Christian Vogt,
Ryuji Wakikawa, Frank Xia, Behcet Sarikaya, Charlie Perkins, Qin Wu,
Jari Arkko, and Xiangsong Cui for their comments, extensive
discussions, and suggestions on this document.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC5213] Gundavelli, S., Leung, K., Devarapalli, V., Chowdhury, K.,
and B. Patil, "Proxy Mobile IPv6", RFC 5213, August 2008.
8.2. Informative References
[3GPP.23.003]
3GPP, "Numbering, addressing and identification", 3GPP
TS 23.003 v10.0.0, December 2010.
[3GPP.24.008]
3GPP, "Mobile radio interface Layer 3 specification", 3GPP
TS 24.008 v10.1.0, December 2010.
[3GPP.24.302]
3GPP, "Access to the 3GPP Evolved Packet Core (EPC) via
non-3GPP access networks", 3GPP TS 24.302 v10.2.0,
December 2010.
[RFC1958] Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the
Internet", RFC 1958, June 1996.
[RFC2782] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
February 2000.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, December 2005.
[RFC5026] Giaretta, G., Ed., Kempf, J., and V. Devarapalli, Ed.,
"Mobile IPv6 Bootstrapping in Split Scenario", RFC 5026,
October 2007.
[RFC5149] Korhonen, J., Nilsson, U., and V. Devarapalli, "Service
Selection for Mobile IPv6", RFC 5149, February 2008.
[RFC5779] Korhonen, J., Ed., Bournelle, J., Chowdhury, K., Muhanna,
A., and U. Meyer, "Diameter Proxy Mobile IPv6: Mobile
Access Gateway and Local Mobility Anchor Interaction with
Diameter Server", RFC 5779, February 2010.
[RFC5949] Yokota, H., Chowdhury, K., Koodli, R., Patil, B., and F.
Xia, "Fast Handovers for Proxy Mobile IPv6", RFC 5949,
September 2010.
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
RFC 5996, September 2010.
Authors' Addresses
Jouni Korhonen
Nokia Siemens Networks
Linnoitustie 6
FIN-02600 Espoo
Finland
EMail: jouni.nospam@gmail.com
Vijay Devarapalli
Vasona Networks
EMail: dvijay@gmail.com